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Researcher profile

Stuart Russell

Stuart Russell contributes to research discovery and scholarly infrastructure.

ResearcherAffiliation not importedOpen to collaborate
Artificial IntelligenceMachine LearningMultiagent SystemsComputer Science and Game TheoryNeural and Evolutionary ComputingCryptography and SecurityInformation RetrievalLogic in Computer Sciencephysics.geo-phRobotics

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Published work

14 published item(s)

preprint2026arXiv

Cross-Domain Imitation Learning via Optimal Transport

Cross-domain imitation learning studies how to leverage expert demonstrations of one agent to train an imitation agent with a different embodiment or morphology. Comparing trajectories and stationary distributions between the expert and imitation agents is challenging because they live on different systems that may not even have the same dimensionality. We propose Gromov-Wasserstein Imitation Learning (GWIL), a method for cross-domain imitation that uses the Gromov-Wasserstein distance to align and compare states between the different spaces of the agents. Our theory formally characterizes the scenarios where GWIL preserves optimality, revealing its possibilities and limitations. We demonstrate the effectiveness of GWIL in non-trivial continuous control domains ranging from simple rigid transformation of the expert domain to arbitrary transformation of the state-action space.

0 citations0 reviewsNo code linkedOpen access
preprint2026arXiv

Learning the Preferences of a Learning Agent

For AI systems to be useful to humans, they must understand and act in accordance with our values and preferences. Since specifying preferences is a hard task, inverse reinforcement learning (IRL) aims to develop methods that allow for inferring preferences from observed behavior. However, IRL assumes the human to be approximately optimal. This is a big limitation in cases where the human themselves may be learning to act optimally in an environment. In this paper, we formalize the problem of learning the preferences of a learning agent: a predictor observes a learner acting online and tries to infer the underlying reward function being (initially suboptimally) optimized by the learner. We model the learner as either being no-regret, or as converging to an optimal Boltzmann policy over time. In each of these settings, we establish theoretical guarantees for various preference learning algorithms, or otherwise show that such guarantees are impossible.

0 citations0 reviewsNo code linkedOpen access
preprint2022arXiv

A Re-examination of Ellipticity Corrections for Seismic Phases

The Earth's ellipticity of figure has an effect on the travel times of seismic waves over teleseismic distances. Tables of ellipticity corrections and coefficients have been used by seismologists for several decades, however due to the increasing variety and complexity of seismic phases in use, current tables of ellipticity coefficients are now outmoded and incomplete. We present a Python package, EllipticiPy, for the calculation of ellipticity corrections that removes the dependence on pre-calculated coefficients at discrete source depths and epicentral distances. EllipticiPy also facilitates the calculation of ellipticity corrections on other planetary bodies. When applied to both Earth and Mars, the magnitudes of ellipticity corrections are on the order of single seconds and are significant for some seismic studies on Earth but remain negligible on Mars due to other greater sources of uncertainty.

0 citations0 reviewsNo code linkedOpen access
preprint2022arXiv

An Empirical Investigation of Representation Learning for Imitation

Imitation learning often needs a large demonstration set in order to handle the full range of situations that an agent might find itself in during deployment. However, collecting expert demonstrations can be expensive. Recent work in vision, reinforcement learning, and NLP has shown that auxiliary representation learning objectives can reduce the need for large amounts of expensive, task-specific data. Our Empirical Investigation of Representation Learning for Imitation (EIRLI) investigates whether similar benefits apply to imitation learning. We propose a modular framework for constructing representation learning algorithms, then use our framework to evaluate the utility of representation learning for imitation across several environment suites. In the settings we evaluate, we find that existing algorithms for image-based representation learning provide limited value relative to a well-tuned baseline with image augmentations. To explain this result, we investigate differences between imitation learning and other settings where representation learning has provided significant benefit, such as image classification. Finally, we release a well-documented codebase which both replicates our findings and provides a modular framework for creating new representation learning algorithms out of reusable components.

0 citations0 reviewsNo code linkedOpen access
preprint2022arXiv

Cooperative and uncooperative institution designs: Surprises and problems in open-source game theory

It is increasingly possible for real-world agents, such as software-based agents or human institutions, to view the internal programming of other such agents that they interact with. For instance, a company can read the bylaws of another company, or one software system can read the source code of another. Game-theoretic equilibria between the designers of such agents are called \emph{program equilibria}, and we call this area \emph{open-source game theory}. In this work we demonstrate a series of counterintuitive results on open-source games, which are independent of the programming language in which agents are written. We show that certain formal institution designs that one might expect to defect against each other will instead turn out to cooperate, or conversely, cooperate when one might expect them to defect. The results hold in a setting where each institution has full visibility into the other institution's true operating procedures. We also exhibit examples and ten open problems for better understanding these phenomena. We argue that contemporary game theory remains ill-equipped to study program equilibria, given that even the outcomes of single games in open-source settings remain counterintuitive and poorly understood. Nonetheless, some of these open-source agents exhibit desirable characteristics -- e.g., they can unexploitably create incentives for cooperation and legibility from other agents -- such that analyzing them could yield considerable benefits.

0 citations0 reviewsNo code linkedOpen access
preprint2022arXiv

Estimating and Penalizing Induced Preference Shifts in Recommender Systems

The content that a recommender system (RS) shows to users influences them. Therefore, when choosing a recommender to deploy, one is implicitly also choosing to induce specific internal states in users. Even more, systems trained via long-horizon optimization will have direct incentives to manipulate users: in this work, we focus on the incentive to shift user preferences so they are easier to satisfy. We argue that - before deployment - system designers should: estimate the shifts a recommender would induce; evaluate whether such shifts would be undesirable; and perhaps even actively optimize to avoid problematic shifts. These steps involve two challenging ingredients: estimation requires anticipating how hypothetical algorithms would influence user preferences if deployed - we do this by using historical user interaction data to train a predictive user model which implicitly contains their preference dynamics; evaluation and optimization additionally require metrics to assess whether such influences are manipulative or otherwise unwanted - we use the notion of "safe shifts", that define a trust region within which behavior is safe: for instance, the natural way in which users would shift without interference from the system could be deemed "safe". In simulated experiments, we show that our learned preference dynamics model is effective in estimating user preferences and how they would respond to new recommenders. Additionally, we show that recommenders that optimize for staying in the trust region can avoid manipulative behaviors while still generating engagement.

0 citations0 reviewsNo code linkedOpen access
preprint2022arXiv

For Learning in Symmetric Teams, Local Optima are Global Nash Equilibria

Although it has been known since the 1970s that a globally optimal strategy profile in a common-payoff game is a Nash equilibrium, global optimality is a strict requirement that limits the result's applicability. In this work, we show that any locally optimal symmetric strategy profile is also a (global) Nash equilibrium. Furthermore, we show that this result is robust to perturbations to the common payoff and to the local optimum. Applied to machine learning, our result provides a global guarantee for any gradient method that finds a local optimum in symmetric strategy space. While this result indicates stability to unilateral deviation, we nevertheless identify broad classes of games where mixed local optima are unstable under joint, asymmetric deviations. We analyze the prevalence of instability by running learning algorithms in a suite of symmetric games, and we conclude by discussing the applicability of our results to multi-agent RL, cooperative inverse RL, and decentralized POMDPs.

0 citations0 reviewsNo code linkedOpen access
preprint2022arXiv

Pruned Neural Networks are Surprisingly Modular

The learned weights of a neural network are often considered devoid of scrutable internal structure. To discern structure in these weights, we introduce a measurable notion of modularity for multi-layer perceptrons (MLPs), and investigate the modular structure of MLPs trained on datasets of small images. Our notion of modularity comes from the graph clustering literature: a "module" is a set of neurons with strong internal connectivity but weak external connectivity. We find that training and weight pruning produces MLPs that are more modular than randomly initialized ones, and often significantly more modular than random MLPs with the same (sparse) distribution of weights. Interestingly, they are much more modular when trained with dropout. We also present exploratory analyses of the importance of different modules for performance and how modules depend on each other. Understanding the modular structure of neural networks, when such structure exists, will hopefully render their inner workings more interpretable to engineers. Note that this paper has been superceded by "Clusterability in Neural Networks", arxiv:2103.03386 and "Quantifying Local Specialization in Deep Neural Networks", arxiv:2110.08058!

0 citations0 reviewsNo code linkedOpen access
preprint2022arXiv

Quantifying Local Specialization in Deep Neural Networks

A neural network is locally specialized to the extent that parts of its computational graph (i.e. structure) can be abstractly represented as performing some comprehensible sub-task relevant to the overall task (i.e. functionality). Are modern deep neural networks locally specialized? How can this be quantified? In this paper, we consider the problem of taking a neural network whose neurons are partitioned into clusters, and quantifying how functionally specialized the clusters are. We propose two proxies for this: importance, which reflects how crucial sets of neurons are to network performance; and coherence, which reflects how consistently their neurons associate with features of the inputs. To measure these proxies, we develop a set of statistical methods based on techniques conventionally used to interpret individual neurons. We apply the proxies to partitionings generated by spectrally clustering a graph representation of the network's neurons with edges determined either by network weights or correlations of activations. We show that these partitionings, even ones based only on weights (i.e. strictly from non-runtime analysis), reveal groups of neurons that are important and coherent. These results suggest that graph-based partitioning can reveal local specialization and that statistical methods can be used to automatedly screen for sets of neurons that can be understood abstractly.

0 citations0 reviewsNo code linkedOpen access
preprint2021arXiv

Adversarial Policies: Attacking Deep Reinforcement Learning

Deep reinforcement learning (RL) policies are known to be vulnerable to adversarial perturbations to their observations, similar to adversarial examples for classifiers. However, an attacker is not usually able to directly modify another agent's observations. This might lead one to wonder: is it possible to attack an RL agent simply by choosing an adversarial policy acting in a multi-agent environment so as to create natural observations that are adversarial? We demonstrate the existence of adversarial policies in zero-sum games between simulated humanoid robots with proprioceptive observations, against state-of-the-art victims trained via self-play to be robust to opponents. The adversarial policies reliably win against the victims but generate seemingly random and uncoordinated behavior. We find that these policies are more successful in high-dimensional environments, and induce substantially different activations in the victim policy network than when the victim plays against a normal opponent. Videos are available at https://adversarialpolicies.github.io/.

0 citations0 reviewsNo code linkedOpen access
preprint2021arXiv

Clusterability in Neural Networks

The learned weights of a neural network have often been considered devoid of scrutable internal structure. In this paper, however, we look for structure in the form of clusterability: how well a network can be divided into groups of neurons with strong internal connectivity but weak external connectivity. We find that a trained neural network is typically more clusterable than randomly initialized networks, and often clusterable relative to random networks with the same distribution of weights. We also exhibit novel methods to promote clusterability in neural network training, and find that in multi-layer perceptrons they lead to more clusterable networks with little reduction in accuracy. Understanding and controlling the clusterability of neural networks will hopefully render their inner workings more interpretable to engineers by facilitating partitioning into meaningful clusters.

0 citations0 reviewsNo code linkedOpen access
preprint2021arXiv

Emergent Complexity and Zero-shot Transfer via Unsupervised Environment Design

A wide range of reinforcement learning (RL) problems - including robustness, transfer learning, unsupervised RL, and emergent complexity - require specifying a distribution of tasks or environments in which a policy will be trained. However, creating a useful distribution of environments is error prone, and takes a significant amount of developer time and effort. We propose Unsupervised Environment Design (UED) as an alternative paradigm, where developers provide environments with unknown parameters, and these parameters are used to automatically produce a distribution over valid, solvable environments. Existing approaches to automatically generating environments suffer from common failure modes: domain randomization cannot generate structure or adapt the difficulty of the environment to the agent's learning progress, and minimax adversarial training leads to worst-case environments that are often unsolvable. To generate structured, solvable environments for our protagonist agent, we introduce a second, antagonist agent that is allied with the environment-generating adversary. The adversary is motivated to generate environments which maximize regret, defined as the difference between the protagonist and antagonist agent's return. We call our technique Protagonist Antagonist Induced Regret Environment Design (PAIRED). Our experiments demonstrate that PAIRED produces a natural curriculum of increasingly complex environments, and PAIRED agents achieve higher zero-shot transfer performance when tested in highly novel environments.

0 citations0 reviewsNo code linkedOpen access
preprint2020arXiv

Multi-Principal Assistance Games

Assistance games (also known as cooperative inverse reinforcement learning games) have been proposed as a model for beneficial AI, wherein a robotic agent must act on behalf of a human principal but is initially uncertain about the humans payoff function. This paper studies multi-principal assistance games, which cover the more general case in which the robot acts on behalf of N humans who may have widely differing payoffs. Impossibility theorems in social choice theory and voting theory can be applied to such games, suggesting that strategic behavior by the human principals may complicate the robots task in learning their payoffs. We analyze in particular a bandit apprentice game in which the humans act first to demonstrate their individual preferences for the arms and then the robot acts to maximize the sum of human payoffs. We explore the extent to which the cost of choosing suboptimal arms reduces the incentive to mislead, a form of natural mechanism design. In this context we propose a social choice method that uses shared control of a system to combine preference inference with social welfare optimization.

0 citations0 reviewsNo code linkedOpen access
preprint2020arXiv

Multi-Principal Assistance Games: Definition and Collegial Mechanisms

We introduce the concept of a multi-principal assistance game (MPAG), and circumvent an obstacle in social choice theory, Gibbard's theorem, by using a sufficiently collegial preference inference mechanism. In an MPAG, a single agent assists N human principals who may have widely different preferences. MPAGs generalize assistance games, also known as cooperative inverse reinforcement learning games. We analyze in particular a generalization of apprenticeship learning in which the humans first perform some work to obtain utility and demonstrate their preferences, and then the robot acts to further maximize the sum of human payoffs. We show in this setting that if the game is sufficiently collegial, i.e. if the humans are responsible for obtaining a sufficient fraction of the rewards through their own actions, then their preferences are straightforwardly revealed through their work. This revelation mechanism is non-dictatorial, does not limit the possible outcomes to two alternatives, and is dominant-strategy incentive-compatible.

0 citations0 reviewsNo code linkedOpen access