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Source author record

Arnaud Fickinger

Arnaud Fickinger appears in the imported research catalog. Authorship, coauthor and topic links are available while profile ownership is still unclaimed.

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Artificial IntelligenceComputational GeometryComputer Science and Game TheoryGraphicsMachine Learningmath.OCRobotics

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Published work

4 published item(s)

preprint2026arXiv

Cross-Domain Imitation Learning via Optimal Transport

Cross-domain imitation learning studies how to leverage expert demonstrations of one agent to train an imitation agent with a different embodiment or morphology. Comparing trajectories and stationary distributions between the expert and imitation agents is challenging because they live on different systems that may not even have the same dimensionality. We propose Gromov-Wasserstein Imitation Learning (GWIL), a method for cross-domain imitation that uses the Gromov-Wasserstein distance to align and compare states between the different spaces of the agents. Our theory formally characterizes the scenarios where GWIL preserves optimality, revealing its possibilities and limitations. We demonstrate the effectiveness of GWIL in non-trivial continuous control domains ranging from simple rigid transformation of the expert domain to arbitrary transformation of the state-action space.

0 citations0 reviewsNo code linkedOpen access
preprint2026arXiv

Towards Scalable Persistence-Based Topological Optimization

Persistence-based topological optimization deforms a point cloud $X \subset \mathbb{R}^d$ by minimizing objectives of the form $L(X) = \ell(\mathrm{Dgm}(X))$, where $\mathrm{Dgm}(X)$ is a persistence diagram. In practice, optimization is limited by two coupled issues: persistent homology is typically computed on subsamples, and the resulting topological gradients are highly sparse, with only a few anchor points receiving nonzero updates. Motivated by diffeomorphic interpolation, which extends sparse gradients to smooth ambient vector fields via Reproducing Kernel Hilbert Space (RKHS) interpolation, we propose a more scalable pipeline that improves both subsampling and gradient extension. We introduce subsampling via random slicing, a lightweight scheme that promotes iteration-wise geometric coverage and mitigates density bias. We further replace the costly kernel solve with a fast Nadaraya-Watson (NW) Gaussian convolution, producing a globally defined smooth update field at a fraction of the computational cost, while being more suited for topological optimization tasks. We provide theoretical guarantees for NW smoothing, including anchor approximation bounds and global Lipschitz estimates. Experiments in $2$D and $3$D show that combining random slicing with NW smoothing yields consistent speedups and improved objective values over other baselines on common persistence losses.

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preprint2020arXiv

Multi-Principal Assistance Games

Assistance games (also known as cooperative inverse reinforcement learning games) have been proposed as a model for beneficial AI, wherein a robotic agent must act on behalf of a human principal but is initially uncertain about the humans payoff function. This paper studies multi-principal assistance games, which cover the more general case in which the robot acts on behalf of N humans who may have widely differing payoffs. Impossibility theorems in social choice theory and voting theory can be applied to such games, suggesting that strategic behavior by the human principals may complicate the robots task in learning their payoffs. We analyze in particular a bandit apprentice game in which the humans act first to demonstrate their individual preferences for the arms and then the robot acts to maximize the sum of human payoffs. We explore the extent to which the cost of choosing suboptimal arms reduces the incentive to mislead, a form of natural mechanism design. In this context we propose a social choice method that uses shared control of a system to combine preference inference with social welfare optimization.

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preprint2020arXiv

Multi-Principal Assistance Games: Definition and Collegial Mechanisms

We introduce the concept of a multi-principal assistance game (MPAG), and circumvent an obstacle in social choice theory, Gibbard's theorem, by using a sufficiently collegial preference inference mechanism. In an MPAG, a single agent assists N human principals who may have widely different preferences. MPAGs generalize assistance games, also known as cooperative inverse reinforcement learning games. We analyze in particular a generalization of apprenticeship learning in which the humans first perform some work to obtain utility and demonstrate their preferences, and then the robot acts to further maximize the sum of human payoffs. We show in this setting that if the game is sufficiently collegial, i.e. if the humans are responsible for obtaining a sufficient fraction of the rewards through their own actions, then their preferences are straightforwardly revealed through their work. This revelation mechanism is non-dictatorial, does not limit the possible outcomes to two alternatives, and is dominant-strategy incentive-compatible.

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