Researcher profile

Reihaneh Safavi-Naini

Reihaneh Safavi-Naini contributes to research discovery and scholarly infrastructure.

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Published work

7 published item(s)

preprint2026arXiv

Hybrid Encryption with Certified Deletion in Preprocessing Model

Certified deletion allows Alice to outsource data to Bob and, at a later time, obtain a verifiable guarantee that the file has been irreversibly deleted at her request. The functionality, while impossible using classical information alone, can be achieved using quantum information. Existing approaches rely either on one-time pad (OTP) encryption, or on computational hardness assumptions that may be vulnerable to future advances in classical or quantum computing. In this work, we introduce and formalize hybrid encryption with certified deletion in the preprocessing model (pHE-CD) and propose two constructions. Each construction composes an information-theoretic key encapsulation mechanism (iKEM) with a data encapsulation mechanism that provides certified deletion (DEM-CD) security, offering different types of security depending on the security properties of DEM-CD. When DEM-CD is one-time information theoretically secure, the composition provides {\em information-theoretic security} for both encryption and certified deletion. When DEM-CD is computationally secure, the composed construction offers computationally secure (post-quantum) encryption and {\em everlasting certified deletion} where confidentiality is computational up to the point that the deletion certificate is verified, and after successful verification of the certificate, becomes unconditional. That is, successful verification of deletion certificate guarantees that the data has been removed information-theoretically from the adversary's view. Both pHE-CD schemes are for encryption of arbitrarily long messages. Construction 2 is key efficient and uses a DEM-CD that is constructed using quantum coding and AES, providing quantum-safe security for encryption. We discuss our results and directions for future work.

preprint2026arXiv

MAGIQ: A Post-Quantum Multi-Agentic AI Governance System with Provable Security

Our computing ecosystem is being transformed by two emerging paradigms: the increased deployment of agentic AI systems and advancements in quantum computing. With respect to agentic AI systems, one of the most critical problems is creating secure governing architectures that ensure agents follow their owners' communication and interaction policies and can be held accountable for the messages they exchange with other agents. With respect to quantum computing, existing systems must be retrofitted and new cryptographic mechanisms must be designed to ensure long-term security and quantum resistance. In fact, NIST recommends that standard public-key cryptographic algorithms, including RSA, Diffie-Hellman (DH), and elliptic-curve constructions (ECC), be deprecated starting in 2030 and disallowed after 2035. In this paper, we present MAGIQ, a framework for policy definition and enforcement in multi-agent AI systems using novel, highly efficient, quantum-resistant cryptographic protocols with proven security guarantees. MAGIQ (i) allows users to define rich communication and access-control policy budgets for agent-to-agent sessions and tasks, including global budgets for one-to-many agent sessions; (ii) enforces such policies using post-quantum cryptographic primitives; (iii) supports session-based enforcement of policies for agent-to-agent and one-to-many agent sessions; and (iv) provides accountability of agents to their users through message attribution. We formally model and prove the correctness and security of the system using the Universal Composability (UC) framework. We evaluate the computation and communication overhead of our framework and compare it with the state-of-the-art agentic AI framework SAGA. MAGIQ is a first step toward post-quantum-secure solutions for agentic AI systems.

preprint2025arXiv

Secure Composition of Quantum Key Distribution and Symmetric Key Encryption

Quantum key distribution (QKD) allows Alice and Bob to share a secret key over an insecure channel with proven information-theoretic security against an adversary whose strategy is bounded only by the laws of physics. Composability-based security proofs of QKD ensure that using the established key with a one-time-pad encryption scheme provides information theoretic secrecy for the message. In this paper, we consider the problem of using the QKD established key with a secure symmetric key-based encryption algorithm and use an approach based on hybrid encryption to provide a proof of security for the composition. Hybrid encryption was first proposed as a public key cryptographic algorithm with proven security for messages of unrestricted length. We use an extension of this framework to correlated randomness setting (Sharifian et al. in ISIT 2021) to propose a quantum-enabled Key Encapsulation Mechanism (qKEM) and quantum-enabled hybrid encryption (qHE), and prove a composition theorem for the security of the qHE. We construct a qKEM with proven security using an existing QKD (Portmann et al. in Rev. of Mod. Physics 2022). Using this qKEM with a secure Data Encapsulation Mechanism (DEM), that can be constructed using a one-time symmetric key encryption scheme, results in an efficient encryption system for unrestricted length messages with proved security against an adversary with access to efficient computations on a quantum computer (i.e. post-quantum secure encryption without using any computational assumptions.)

preprint2022arXiv

Wiretap Secret Key Capacity of Tree-PIN

We consider the problem of multiterminal secret key agreement (SKA) in wiretapped source model where terminals have access to samples of correlated random variables from a publicly known joint probability distribution. The adversary has access to a side information variable, that is correlated with terminals' variables. We focus on a special type of terminal variables in this model, known as Tree-PIN, where the relation between variables of the terminals can be represented by a tree. The study of Tree-PIN source model is of practical importance as it can be realized in wireless network environments. We derive the wiretap secret key capacity of Tree-PIN with independent leakage, and give lower and upper bounds on the maximum achievable secret key length in finite-length regime. We then prove an upper bound and a lower bound for the wiretap secret key capacity of a wiretapped PIN and give two conditions for which these bounds are tight. We also extend our main result to two other related models and prove their corresponding capacities. At the end, we argue how our analysis suggests that public interaction is required for achieving the multiterminal WSK capacity.

preprint2020arXiv

A Capacity-achieving One-message Key Agreement With Finite Blocklength Analysis

Information-theoretic secret key agreement (SKA) protocols are a fundamental cryptographic primitive that are used to establish a shared secret key between two or more parties. In a two-party SKA in source model, Alice and Bob have samples of two correlated variables, that are partially leaked to Eve, and their goal is to establish a shared secret key by communicating over a reliable public channel. Eve must have no information about the established key. In this paper, we study the problem of one-message secret key agreement where the key is established by Alice sending a single message to Bob. We propose a one-message SKA (OM-SKA) protocol, prove that it achieves the one-way secret key capacity, and derive finite blocklength approximations of the achievable secret key length. We compare our results with existing OM-SKAs and show the protocol has a unique combination of desirable properties.

preprint2020arXiv

A Channel Model of Transceivers for Multiterminal Secret Key Agreement

Information theoretic secret key agreement is impossible without making initial assumptions. One type of initial assumption is correlated random variables that are generated by using a noisy channel that connects the terminals. Terminals use the correlated random variables and communication over a reliable public channel to arrive at a shared secret key. Previous channel models assume that each terminal either controls one input to the channel, or receives one output variable of the channel. In this paper, we propose a new channel model of transceivers where each terminal simultaneously controls an input variable and observes an output variable of the (noisy) channel. We give upper and lower bounds for the secret key capacity (i.e., highest achievable key rate) of this transceiver model, and prove the secret key capacity under the conditions that the public communication is noninteractive and input variables of the noisy channel are independent.

preprint2020arXiv

Traceable Policy-Based Signatures and Instantiation from Lattices

Policy-based signatures (PBS) were proposed by Bellare and Fuchsbauer (PKC 2014) to allow an {\em authorized} member of an organization to sign a message on behalf of the organization. The user's authorization is determined by a policy managed by the organization's trusted authority, while the signature preserves the privacy of the organization's policy. Signing keys in PBS do not include user identity information and thus can be passed to others, violating the intention of employing PBS to restrict users' signing capability. In this paper, we introduce the notion of {\em traceability} for PBS by including user identity in the signing key such that the trusted authority will be able to open a suspicious signature and recover the signer's identity should the needs arise. We provide rigorous definitions and stringent security notions of traceable PBS (TPBS), capturing the properties of PBS suggested by Bellare-Fuchsbauer and resembling the "full traceability" requirement for group signatures put forward by Bellare-Micciancio-Warinschi (Eurocrypt 2003). As a proof of concept, we provide a modular construction of TPBS, based on a signature scheme, an encryption scheme and a zero-knowledge proof system. Furthermore, to demonstrate the feasibility of achieving TPBS from concrete, quantum-resistant assumptions, we give an instantiation based on lattices.