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Pinyan Lu

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Published work

33 published item(s)

preprint2026arXiv

Unveiling Memorization-Generalization Coexistence: A Case Study on Arithmetic Tasks with Label Noise

Highly over-parameterized models can simultaneously memorize noisy labels and generalize well, yet how these behaviors coexist remains poorly understood. In this work, we investigate the underlying mechanisms of this coexistence using modular arithmetic tasks under heavy label noise. Through extensive experiments on two-layer neural networks, we find that larger models tend to generalize better under appropriate optimization and model configurations, while noisy labels are memorized faster than clean data. Over-parameterized models internally form a generalization structure, but its expression in the output is suppressed by the need to fit noisy labels. Remarkably, even with 80\% label noise, near-perfect test accuracy can be achieved by extracting this internal structure using frequency-based methods. We further propose a task-agnostic method to partition networks into generalization and memorization components. Although this subnetwork improves generalization, it is limited compared with frequency-based extraction, indicating that the generalization structure is distributed across neurons and motivating the development of new tools to retrieve generalizable knowledge from over-parameterized networks.

preprint2023arXiv

Mechanism Design with Predictions

Improving algorithms via predictions is a very active research topic in recent years. This paper initiates the systematic study of mechanism design in this model. In a number of well-studied mechanism design settings, we make use of imperfect predictions to design mechanisms that perform much better than traditional mechanisms if the predictions are accurate (consistency), while always retaining worst-case guarantees even with very imprecise predictions (robustness). Furthermore, we refer to the largest prediction error sufficient to give a good performance as the error tolerance of a mechanism, and observe that an intrinsic tradeoff among consistency, robustness and error tolerance is common for mechanism design with predictions.

preprint2022arXiv

The Price of Stability for First Price Auction

This paper establishes the Price of Stability (PoS) for First Price Auctions, for all equilibrium concepts that have been studied in the literature: Bayes Nash Equilibrium $\subsetneq$ Bayes Correlated Equilibrium $\subsetneq$ Bayes Coarse Correlated Equilibrium} $\bullet$ Bayes Nash Equilibrium: For independent valuations, the tight PoS is $1 - 1/ e^{2} \approx 0.8647$, matching the counterpart Price of Anarchy (PoA) bound \cite{JL22}. For correlated valuations, the tight $\PoS$ is $1 - 1 / e \approx 0.6321$, matching the counterpart PoA bound \cite{ST13,S14}. This result indicates that, in the worst cases, efficiency degradation depends not on different selections among Bayes Nash Equilibria. $\bullet$ Bayesian Coarse Correlated Equilibrium: For independent or correlated valuations, the tight PoS is always $1 = 100\%$, i.e., no efficiency degradation, different from the counterpart PoA bound $1 - 1 / e \approx 0.6321$ \cite{ST13,S14}. This result indicates that First Price Auctions can be fully efficient when we allow the more general equilibrium concepts.

preprint2022arXiv

Tight Revenue Gaps among Multi-Unit Mechanisms

This paper considers Bayesian revenue maximization in the $k$-unit setting, where a monopolist seller has $k$ copies of an indivisible item and faces $n$ unit-demand buyers (whose value distributions can be non-identical). Four basic mechanisms among others have been widely employed in practice and widely studied in the literature: {\sf Myerson Auction}, {\sf Sequential Posted-Pricing}, {\sf $(k + 1)$-th Price Auction with Anonymous Reserve}, and {\sf Anonymous Pricing}. Regarding a pair of mechanisms, we investigate the largest possible ratio between the two revenues (a.k.a.\ the revenue gap), over all possible value distributions of the buyers. Divide these four mechanisms into two groups: (i)~the discriminating mechanism group, {\sf Myerson Auction} and {\sf Sequential Posted-Pricing}, and (ii)~the anonymous mechanism group, {\sf Anonymous Reserve} and {\sf Anonymous Pricing}. Within one group, the involved two mechanisms have an asymptotically tight revenue gap of $1 + Θ(1 / \sqrt{k})$. In contrast, any two mechanisms from the different groups have an asymptotically tight revenue gap of $Θ(\log k)$.

preprint2020arXiv

Bayesian Auctions with Efficient Queries

Generating good revenue is one of the most important problems in Bayesian auction design, and many (approximately) optimal dominant-strategy incentive compatible (DSIC) Bayesian mechanisms have been constructed for various auction settings. However, most existing studies do not consider the complexity for the seller to carry out the mechanism. It is assumed that the seller knows "each single bit" of the distributions and is able to optimize perfectly based on the entire distributions. Unfortunately, this is a strong assumption and may not hold in reality: for example, when the value distributions have exponentially large supports or do not have succinct representations. In this work we consider, for the first time, the query complexity of Bayesian mechanisms. We only allow the seller to have limited oracle accesses to the players' value distributions, via quantile queries and value queries. For a large class of auction settings, we prove logarithmic lower-bounds for the query complexity for any DSIC Bayesian mechanism to be of any constant approximation to the optimal revenue. For single-item auctions and multi-item auctions with unit-demand or additive valuation functions, we prove tight upper-bounds via efficient query schemes, without requiring the distributions to be regular or have monotone hazard rate. Thus, in those auction settings the seller needs to access much less than the full distributions in order to achieve approximately optimal revenue.

preprint2020arXiv

Optimal Budget-Feasible Mechanisms for Additive Valuations

In this paper, we show a tight approximation guarantee for budget-feasible mechanisms with an additive buyer. We propose a new simple randomized mechanism with approximation ratio of $2$, improving the previous best known result of $3$. Our bound is tight with respect to either the optimal offline benchmark, or its fractional relaxation. We also present a simple deterministic mechanism with the tight approximation guarantee of $3$ against the fractional optimum, improving the best known result of $(2+ \sqrt{2})$ for the weaker integral benchmark.

preprint2020arXiv

Tight Revenue Gaps among Simple Mechanisms

We consider a fundamental problem in microeconomics: selling a single item to a number of potential buyers, whose values are drawn from known independent and regular (not necessarily identical) distributions. There are four widely-used and widely-studied mechanisms in the literature: {\sf Myerson Auction}~({\sf OPT}), {\sf Sequential Posted-Pricing}~({\sf SPM}), {\sf Second-Price Auction with Anonymous Reserve}~({\sf AR}), and {\sf Anonymous Pricing}~({\sf AP}). {\sf OPT} is revenue-optimal but complicated, which also experiences several issues in practice such as fairness; {\sf AP} is the simplest mechanism, but also generates the lowest revenue among these four mechanisms; {\sf SPM} and {\sf AR} are of intermediate complexity and revenue. We explore revenue gaps among these mechanisms, each of which is defined as the largest ratio between revenues from a pair of mechanisms. We establish two tight bounds and one improved bound: 1. {\sf SPM} vs.\ {\sf AP}: this ratio studies the power of discrimination in pricing schemes. We obtain the tight ratio of $\mathcal{C^*} \approx 2.62$, closing the gap between $\big[\frac{e}{e - 1}, e\big]$ left before. 2. {\sf AR} vs.\ {\sf AP}: this ratio measures the relative power of auction scheme vs.\ pricing scheme, when no discrimination is allowed. We attain the tight ratio of $\frac{π^2}{6} \approx 1.64$, closing the previously known bounds $\big[\frac{e}{e - 1}, e\big]$. 3. {\sf OPT} vs.\ {\sf AR}: this ratio quantifies the power of discrimination in auction schemes, and is previously known to be somewhere between $\big[2, e\big]$. The lower-bound of $2$ was conjectured to be tight by Hartline and Roughgarden (2009) and Alaei et al.\ (2015). We acquire a better lower-bound of $2.15$, and thus disprove this conjecture.

preprint2016arXiv

An FPTAS for Counting Proper Four-Colorings on Cubic Graphs

Graph coloring is arguably the most exhaustively studied problem in the area of approximate counting. It is conjectured that there is a fully polynomial-time (randomized) approximation scheme (FPTAS/FPRAS) for counting the number of proper colorings as long as $q \geq Δ+ 1$, where $q$ is the number of colors and $Δ$ is the maximum degree of the graph. The bound of $q = Δ+ 1$ is the uniqueness threshold for Gibbs measure on $Δ$-regular infinite trees. However, the conjecture remained open even for any fixed $Δ\geq 3$ (The cases of $Δ=1, 2$ are trivial). In this paper, we design an FPTAS for counting the number of proper $4$-colorings on graphs with maximum degree $3$ and thus confirm the conjecture in the case of $Δ=3$. This is the first time to achieve this optimal bound of $q = Δ+ 1$. Previously, the best FPRAS requires $q > \frac{11}{6} Δ$ and the best deterministic FPTAS requires $q > 2.581Δ+ 1$ for general graphs. In the case of $Δ=3$, the best previous result is an FPRAS for counting proper 5-colorings. We note that there is a barrier to go beyond $q = Δ+ 2$ for single-site Glauber dynamics based FPRAS and we overcome this by correlation decay approach. Moreover, we develop a number of new techniques for the correlation decay approach which can find applications in other approximate counting problems.

preprint2015arXiv

Canonical Paths for MCMC: from Art to Science

Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) method is a widely used algorithm design scheme with many applications. To make efficient use of this method, the key step is to prove that the Markov chain is rapid mixing. Canonical paths is one of the two main tools to prove rapid mixing. However, there are much fewer success examples comparing to coupling, the other main tool. The main reason is that there is no systematic approach or general recipe to design canonical paths. Building up on a previous exploration by McQuillan, we develop a general theory to design canonical paths for MCMC: We reduce the task of designing canonical paths to solving a set of linear equations, which can be automatically done even by a machine. Making use of this general approach, we obtain fully polynomial-time randomized approximation schemes (FPRAS) for counting the number of $b$-matching with $b\leq 7$ and $b$-edge-cover with $b\leq 2$. They are natural generalizations of matchings and edge covers for graphs. No polynomial time approximation was previously known for these problems.

preprint2015arXiv

FPTAS for #BIS with Degree Bounds on One Side

Counting the number of independent sets for a bipartite graph (#BIS) plays a crucial role in the study of approximate counting. It has been conjectured that there is no fully polynomial-time (randomized) approximation scheme (FPTAS/FPRAS) for #BIS, and it was proved that the problem for instances with a maximum degree of $6$ is already as hard as the general problem. In this paper, we obtain a surprising tractability result for a family of #BIS instances. We design a very simple deterministic fully polynomial-time approximation scheme (FPTAS) for #BIS when the maximum degree for one side is no larger than $5$. There is no restriction for the degrees on the other side, which do not even have to be bounded by a constant. Previously, FPTAS was only known for instances with a maximum degree of $5$ for both sides.

preprint2015arXiv

FPTAS for Hardcore and Ising Models on Hypergraphs

Hardcore and Ising models are two most important families of two state spin systems in statistic physics. Partition function of spin systems is the center concept in statistic physics which connects microscopic particles and their interactions with their macroscopic and statistical properties of materials such as energy, entropy, ferromagnetism, etc. If each local interaction of the system involves only two particles, the system can be described by a graph. In this case, fully polynomial-time approximation scheme (FPTAS) for computing the partition function of both hardcore and anti-ferromagnetic Ising model was designed up to the uniqueness condition of the system. These result are the best possible since approximately computing the partition function beyond this threshold is NP-hard. In this paper, we generalize these results to general physics systems, where each local interaction may involves multiple particles. Such systems are described by hypergraphs. For hardcore model, we also provide FPTAS up to the uniqueness condition, and for anti-ferromagnetic Ising model, we obtain FPTAS where a slightly stronger condition holds.

preprint2015arXiv

Improved Efficiency Guarantees in Auctions with Budgets

We study the efficiency guarantees in the simple auction environment where the auctioneer has one unit of divisible good to be distributed among a number of budget constrained agents. With budget constraints, the social welfare cannot be approximated by a better factor than the number of agents by any truthful mechanism. Thus, we follow a recent work by Dobzinski and Leme (ICALP 2014) to approximate the liquid welfare, which is the welfare of the agents each capped by her/his own budget. We design a new truthful auction with an approximation ratio of $\frac{\sqrt{5}+1}{2} \approx 1.618$, improving the best previous ratio of $2$ when the budgets for agents are public knowledge and their valuation is linear (additive). In private budget setting, we propose the first constant approximation auction with approximation ratio of $34$. Moreover, this auction works for any valuation function. Previously, only $O(\log n)$ approximation was known for linear and decreasing marginal (concave) valuations, and $O(\log^2 n)$ approximation was known for sub-additive valuations.

preprint2014arXiv

Competitive analysis via benchmark decomposition

We propose a uniform approach for the design and analysis of prior-free competitive auctions and online auctions. Our philosophy is to view the benchmark function as a variable parameter of the model and study a broad class of functions instead of a individual target benchmark. We consider a multitude of well-studied auction settings, and improve upon a few previous results. (1) Multi-unit auctions. Given a $β$-competitive unlimited supply auction, the best previously known multi-unit auction is $2β$-competitive. We design a $(1+β)$-competitive auction reducing the ratio from $4.84$ to $3.24$. These results carry over to matroid and position auctions. (2) General downward-closed environments. We design a $6.5$-competitive auction improving upon the ratio of $7.5$. Our auction is noticeably simpler than the previous best one. (3) Unlimited supply online auctions. Our analysis yields an auction with a competitive ratio of $4.12$, which significantly narrows the margin of $[4,4.84]$ previously known for this problem. A particularly important tool in our analysis is a simple decomposition lemma, which allows us to bound the competitive ratio against a sum of benchmark functions. We use this lemma in a "divide and conquer" fashion by dividing the target benchmark into the sum of simpler functions.

preprint2014arXiv

FPTAS for Counting Monotone CNF

A monotone CNF formula is a Boolean formula in conjunctive normal form where each variable appears positively. We design a deterministic fully polynomial-time approximation scheme (FPTAS) for counting the number of satisfying assignments for a given monotone CNF formula when each variable appears in at most $5$ clauses. Equivalently, this is also an FPTAS for counting set covers where each set contains at most $5$ elements. If we allow variables to appear in a maximum of $6$ clauses (or sets to contain $6$ elements), it is NP-hard to approximate it. Thus, this gives a complete understanding of the approximability of counting for monotone CNF formulas. It is also an important step towards a complete characterization of the approximability for all bounded degree Boolean #CSP problems. In addition, we study the hypergraph matching problem, which arises naturally towards a complete classification of bounded degree Boolean #CSP problems, and show an FPTAS for counting 3D matchings of hypergraphs with maximum degree $4$. Our main technique is correlation decay, a powerful tool to design deterministic FPTAS for counting problems defined by local constraints among a number of variables. All previous uses of this design technique fall into two categories: each constraint involves at most two variables, such as independent set, coloring, and spin systems in general; or each variable appears in at most two constraints, such as matching, edge cover, and holant problem in general. The CNF problems studied here have more complicated structures than these problems and require new design and proof techniques. As it turns out, the technique we developed for the CNF problem also works for the hypergraph matching problem. We believe that it may also find applications in other CSP or more general counting problems.

preprint2014arXiv

FPTAS for Weighted Fibonacci Gates and Its Applications

Fibonacci gate problems have severed as computation primitives to solve other problems by holographic algorithm and play an important role in the dichotomy of exact counting for Holant and CSP frameworks. We generalize them to weighted cases and allow each vertex function to have different parameters, which is a much boarder family and #P-hard for exactly counting. We design a fully polynomial-time approximation scheme (FPTAS) for this generalization by correlation decay technique. This is the first deterministic FPTAS for approximate counting in the general Holant framework without a degree bound. We also formally introduce holographic reduction in the study of approximate counting and these weighted Fibonacci gate problems serve as computation primitives for approximate counting. Under holographic reduction, we obtain FPTAS for other Holant problems and spin problems. One important application is developing an FPTAS for a large range of ferromagnetic two-state spin systems. This is the first deterministic FPTAS in the ferromagnetic range for two-state spin systems without a degree bound. Besides these algorithms, we also develop several new tools and techniques to establish the correlation decay property, which are applicable in other problems.

preprint2014arXiv

Optimal Competitive Auctions

We study the design of truthful auctions for selling identical items in unlimited supply (e.g., digital goods) to n unit demand buyers. This classic problem stands out from profit-maximizing auction design literature as it requires no probabilistic assumptions on buyers' valuations and employs the framework of competitive analysis. Our objective is to optimize the worst-case performance of an auction, measured by the ratio between a given benchmark and revenue generated by the auction. We establish a sufficient and necessary condition that characterizes competitive ratios for all monotone benchmarks. The characterization identifies the worst-case distribution of instances and reveals intrinsic relations between competitive ratios and benchmarks in the competitive analysis. With the characterization at hand, we show optimal competitive auctions for two natural benchmarks. The most well-studied benchmark $\mathcal{F}^{(2)}(\cdot)$ measures the envy-free optimal revenue where at least two buyers win. Goldberg et al. [13] showed a sequence of lower bounds on the competitive ratio for each number of buyers n. They conjectured that all these bounds are tight. We show that optimal competitive auctions match these bounds. Thus, we confirm the conjecture and settle a central open problem in the design of digital goods auctions. As one more application we examine another economically meaningful benchmark, which measures the optimal revenue across all limited-supply Vickrey auctions. We identify the optimal competitive ratios to be $(\frac{n}{n-1})^{n-1}-1$ for each number of buyers n, that is $e-1$ as $n$ approaches infinity.

preprint2014arXiv

The complexity of approximating conservative counting CSPs

We study the complexity of approximately solving the weighted counting constraint satisfaction problem #CSP(F). In the conservative case, where F contains all unary functions, there is a classification known for the case in which the domain of functions in F is Boolean. In this paper, we give a classification for the more general problem where functions in F have an arbitrary finite domain. We define the notions of weak log-modularity and weak log-supermodularity. We show that if F is weakly log-modular, then #CSP(F)is in FP. Otherwise, it is at least as difficult to approximate as #BIS, the problem of counting independent sets in bipartite graphs. #BIS is complete with respect to approximation-preserving reductions for a logically-defined complexity class #RHPi1, and is believed to be intractable. We further sub-divide the #BIS-hard case. If F is weakly log-supermodular, then we show that #CSP(F) is as easy as a (Boolean) log-supermodular weighted #CSP. Otherwise, we show that it is NP-hard to approximate. Finally, we give a full trichotomy for the arity-2 case, where #CSP(F) is in FP, or is #BIS-equivalent, or is equivalent in difficulty to #SAT, the problem of approximately counting the satisfying assignments of a Boolean formula in conjunctive normal form. We also discuss the algorithmic aspects of our classification.

preprint2014arXiv

The Complexity of Ferromagnetic Two-spin Systems with External Fields

We study the approximability of computing the partition function for ferromagnetic two-state spin systems. The remarkable algorithm by Jerrum and Sinclair showed that there is a fully polynomial-time randomized approximation scheme (FPRAS) for the special ferromagnetic Ising model with any given uniform external field. Later, Goldberg and Jerrum proved that it is #BIS-hard for Ising model if we allow inconsistent external fields on different nodes. In contrast to these two results, we prove that for any ferromagnetic two-state spin systems except the Ising model, there exists a threshold for external fields beyond which the problem is #BIS-hard, even if the external field is uniform.

preprint2013arXiv

A Simple FPTAS for Counting Edge Covers

An edge cover of a graph is a set of edges such that every vertex has at least an adjacent edge in it. Previously, approximation algorithm for counting edge covers is only known for 3 regular graphs and it is randomized. We design a very simple deterministic fully polynomial-time approximation scheme (FPTAS) for counting the number of edge covers for any graph. Our main technique is correlation decay, which is a powerful tool to design FPTAS for counting problems. In order to get FPTAS for general graphs without degree bound, we make use of a stronger notion called computationally efficient correlation decay, which is introduced in [Li, Lu, Yin SODA 2012].

preprint2012arXiv

Budget Feasible Mechanism Design via Random Sampling

Budget feasible mechanism considers algorithmic mechanism design questions where there is a budget constraint on the total payment of the mechanism. An important question in the field is that under which valuation domains there exist budget feasible mechanisms that admit `small' approximations (compared to a socially optimal solution). Singer \cite{PS10} showed that additive and submodular functions admit a constant approximation mechanism. Recently, Dobzinski, Papadimitriou, and Singer \cite{DPS11} gave an $O(\log^2n)$ approximation mechanism for subadditive functions and remarked that: "A fundamental question is whether, regardless of computational constraints, a constant-factor budget feasible mechanism exists for subadditive function." In this paper, we give the first attempt to this question. We give a polynomial time $O(\frac{\log n}{\log\log n})$ sub-logarithmic approximation ratio mechanism for subadditive functions, improving the best known ratio $O(\log^2 n)$. Further, we connect budget feasible mechanism design to the concept of approximate core in cooperative game theory, and show that there is a mechanism for subadditive functions whose approximation is, via a characterization of the integrality gap of a linear program, linear to the largest value to which an approximate core exists. Our result implies in particular that the class of XOS functions, which is a superclass of submodular functions, admits a constant approximation mechanism. We believe that our work could be a solid step towards solving the above fundamental problem eventually, and possibly, with an affirmative answer.

preprint2012arXiv

Budget Feasible Mechanism Design: From Prior-Free to Bayesian

Budget feasible mechanism design studies procurement combinatorial auctions where the sellers have private costs to produce items, and the buyer(auctioneer) aims to maximize a social valuation function on subsets of items, under the budget constraint on the total payment. One of the most important questions in the field is "which valuation domains admit truthful budget feasible mechanisms with `small' approximations (compared to the social optimum)?" Singer showed that additive and submodular functions have such constant approximations. Recently, Dobzinski, Papadimitriou, and Singer gave an O(log^2 n)-approximation mechanism for subadditive functions; they also remarked that: "A fundamental question is whether, regardless of computational constraints, a constant-factor budget feasible mechanism exists for subadditive functions." We address this question from two viewpoints: prior-free worst case analysis and Bayesian analysis. For the prior-free framework, we use an LP that describes the fractional cover of the valuation function; it is also connected to the concept of approximate core in cooperative game theory. We provide an O(I)-approximation mechanism for subadditive functions, via the worst case integrality gap I of LP. This implies an O(log n)-approximation for subadditive valuations, O(1)-approximation for XOS valuations, and for valuations with a constant I. XOS valuations are an important class of functions that lie between submodular and subadditive classes. We give another polynomial time O(log n/loglog n) sub-logarithmic approximation mechanism for subadditive valuations. For the Bayesian framework, we provide a constant approximation mechanism for all subadditive functions, using the above prior-free mechanism for XOS valuations as a subroutine. Our mechanism allows correlations in the distribution of private information and is universally truthful.

preprint2012arXiv

Dichotomy for Holant* Problems with a Function on Domain Size 3

Holant problems are a general framework to study the algorithmic complexity of counting problems. Both counting constraint satisfaction problems and graph homomorphisms are special cases. All previous results of Holant problems are over the Boolean domain. In this paper, we give the first dichotomy theorem for Holant problems for domain size $>2$. We discover unexpected tractable families of counting problems, by giving new polynomial time algorithms. This paper also initiates holographic reductions in domains of size $>2$. This is our main algorithmic technique, and is used for both tractable families and hardness reductions. The dichotomy theorem is the following: For any complex-valued symmetric function ${\bf F}$ with arity 3 on domain size 3, we give an explicit criterion on ${\bf F}$, such that if ${\bf F}$ satisfies the criterion then the problem ${\rm Holant}^*({\bf F})$ is computable in polynomial time, otherwise ${\rm Holant}^*({\bf F})$ is #P-hard.

preprint2012arXiv

Inapproximability After Uniqueness Phase Transition in Two-Spin Systems

A two-state spin system is specified by a 2 x 2 matrix A = {A_{0,0} A_{0,1}, A_{1,0} A_{1,1}} = {β1, 1 γ} where β, γ\ge 0. Given an input graph G=(V,E), the partition function Z_A(G) of a system is defined as Z_A(G) = \sum_{σ: V -> {0,1}} \prod_{(u,v) \in E} A_{σ(u), σ(v)} We prove inapproximability results for the partition function in the region specified by the non-uniqueness condition from phase transition for the Gibbs measure. More specifically, assuming NP \ne RP, for any fixed β, γin the unit square, there is no randomized polynomial-time algorithm that approximates Z_A(G) for d-regular graphs G with relative error ε= 10^{-4}, if d = Ω(Δ(β,γ)), where Δ(β,γ) > 1/(1-βγ) is the uniqueness threshold. Up to a constant factor, this hardness result confirms the conjecture that the uniqueness phase transition coincides with the transition from computational tractability to intractability for Z_A(G). We also show a matching inapproximability result for a region of parameters β, γoutside the unit square, and all our results generalize to partition functions with an external field.

preprint2011arXiv

Approximate Counting via Correlation Decay in Spin Systems

We give the first deterministic fully polynomial-time approximation scheme (FPTAS) for computing the partition function of a two-state spin system on an arbitrary graph, when the parameters of the system satisfy the uniqueness condition on infinite regular trees. This condition is of physical significance and is believed to be the right boundary between approximable and inapproximable. The FPTAS is based on the correlation decay technique introduced by Bandyopadhyay and Gamarnik [SODA 06] and Weitz [STOC 06]. The classic correlation decay is defined with respect to graph distance. Although this definition has natural physical meanings, it does not directly support an FPTAS for systems on arbitrary graphs, because for graphs with unbounded degrees, the local computation that provides a desirable precision by correlation decay may take super-polynomial time. We introduce a notion of computationally efficient correlation decay, in which the correlation decay is measured in a refined metric instead of graph distance. We use a potential method to analyze the amortized behavior of this correlation decay and establish a correlation decay that guarantees an inverse-polynomial precision by polynomial-time local computation. This gives us an FPTAS for spin systems on arbitrary graphs. This new notion of correlation decay properly reflects the algorithmic aspect of the spin systems, and may be used for designing FPTAS for other counting problems.

preprint2011arXiv

Competitive Auctions for Markets with Positive Externalities

In digital goods auctions, there is an auctioneer who sells an item with unlimited supply to a set of potential buyers, and the objective is to design truthful auction to maximize the total profit of the auctioneer. Motivated from an observation that the values of buyers for the item could be interconnected through social networks, we study digital goods auctions with positive externalities among the buyers. This defines a multi-parameter auction design problem where the private valuation of every buyer is a function of other winning buyers. The main contribution of this paper is a truthful competitive mechanism for subadditive valuations. Our competitive result is with respect to a new solution benchmark $\mathcal{F}^{(3)}$; on the other hand, we show a surprising impossibility result if comparing to the benchmark $\mathcal{F}^{(2)}$, where the latter has been used quite successfully in digital goods auctions without extenalities \cite{Goldberg2006}. Our results from $\mathcal{F}^{(2)}$ to $\mathcal{F}^{(3)}$ could be considered as the loss of optimal profit at the cost of externalities.

preprint2011arXiv

Graph Homomorphisms with Complex Values: A Dichotomy Theorem

Graph homomorphism has been studied intensively. Given an m x m symmetric matrix A, the graph homomorphism function is defined as \[Z_A (G) = \sum_{f:V->[m]} \prod_{(u,v)\in E} A_{f(u),f(v)}, \] where G = (V,E) is any undirected graph. The function Z_A can encode many interesting graph properties, including counting vertex covers and k-colorings. We study the computational complexity of Z_A for arbitrary symmetric matrices A with algebraic complex values. Building on work by Dyer and Greenhill, Bulatov and Grohe, and especially the recent beautiful work by Goldberg, Grohe, Jerrum and Thurley, we prove a complete dichotomy theorem for this problem. We show that Z_A is either computable in polynomial-time or #P-hard, depending explicitly on the matrix A. We further prove that the tractability criterion on A is polynomial-time decidable.

preprint2011arXiv

Mechanism Design without Money via Stable Matching

Mechanism design without money has a rich history in social choice literature. Due to the strong impossibility theorem by Gibbard and Satterthwaite, exploring domains in which there exist dominant strategy mechanisms is one of the central questions in the field. We propose a general framework, called the generalized packing problem (\gpp), to study the mechanism design questions without payment. The \gpp\ possesses a rich structure and comprises a number of well-studied models as special cases, including, e.g., matroid, matching, knapsack, independent set, and the generalized assignment problem. We adopt the agenda of approximate mechanism design where the objective is to design a truthful (or strategyproof) mechanism without money that can be implemented in polynomial time and yields a good approximation to the socially optimal solution. We study several special cases of \gpp, and give constant approximation mechanisms for matroid, matching, knapsack, and the generalized assignment problem. Our result for generalized assignment problem solves an open problem proposed in \cite{DG10}. Our main technical contribution is in exploitation of the approaches from stable matching, which is a fundamental solution concept in the context of matching marketplaces, in application to mechanism design. Stable matching, while conceptually simple, provides a set of powerful tools to manage and analyze self-interested behaviors of participating agents. Our mechanism uses a stable matching algorithm as a critical component and adopts other approaches like random sampling and online mechanisms. Our work also enriches the stable matching theory with a new knapsack constrained matching model.

preprint2011arXiv

Optimal Pricing in Social Networks with Incomplete Information

In revenue maximization of selling a digital product in a social network, the utility of an agent is often considered to have two parts: a private valuation, and linearly additive influences from other agents. We study the incomplete information case where agents know a common distribution about others' private valuations, and make decisions simultaneously. The "rational behavior" of agents in this case is captured by the well-known Bayesian Nash equilibrium. Two challenging questions arise: how to compute an equilibrium and how to optimize a pricing strategy accordingly to maximize the revenue assuming agents follow the equilibrium? In this paper, we mainly focus on the natural model where the private valuation of each agent is sampled from a uniform distribution, which turns out to be already challenging. Our main result is a polynomial-time algorithm that can exactly compute the equilibrium and the optimal price, when pairwise influences are non-negative. If negative influences are allowed, computing any equilibrium even approximately is PPAD-hard. Our algorithm can also be used to design an FPTAS for optimizing discriminative price profile.

preprint2010arXiv

From Holant To #CSP And Back: Dichotomy For Holant$^c$ Problems

We explore the intricate interdependent relationship among counting problems, considered from three frameworks for such problems: Holant Problems, counting CSP and weighted H-colorings. We consider these problems for general complex valued functions that take boolean inputs. We show that results from one framework can be used to derive results in another, and this happens in both directions. Holographic reductions discover an underlying unity, which is only revealed when these counting problems are investigated in the complex domain $\mathbb{C}$. We prove three complexity dichotomy theorems, leading to a general theorem for Holant$^c$ problems. This is the natural class of Holant problems where one can assign constants 0 or 1. More specifically, given any signature grid on $G=(V,E)$ over a set ${\mathscr F}$ of symmetric functions, we completely classify the complexity to be in P or #P-hard, according to ${\mathscr F}$, of \[\sum_{σ: E \rightarrow \{0,1\}} \prod_{v\in V} f_v(σ\mid_{E(v)}),\] where $f_v \in {\mathscr F} \cup \{{\bf 0}, {\bf 1}\}$ ({\bf 0}, {\bf 1} are the unary constant 0, 1 functions). Not only is holographic reduction the main tool, but also the final dichotomy can be only naturally stated in the language of holographic transformations. The proof goes through another dichotomy theorem on boolean complex weighted #CSP.

preprint2010arXiv

Holographic Algorithms with Matchgates Capture Precisely Tractable Planar #CSP

Valiant introduced matchgate computation and holographic algorithms. A number of seemingly exponential time problems can be solved by this novel algorithmic paradigm in polynomial time. We show that, in a very strong sense, matchgate computations and holographic algorithms based on them provide a universal methodology to a broad class of counting problems studied in statistical physics community for decades. They capture precisely those problems which are #P-hard on general graphs but computable in polynomial time on planar graphs. More precisely, we prove complexity dichotomy theorems in the framework of counting CSP problems. The local constraint functions take Boolean inputs, and can be arbitrary real-valued symmetric functions. We prove that, every problem in this class belongs to precisely three categories: (1) those which are tractable (i.e., polynomial time computable) on general graphs, or (2) those which are \#P-hard on general graphs but ractable on planar graphs, or (3) those which are #P-hard even on planar graphs. The classification criteria are explicit. Moreover, problems in category (2) are tractable on planar graphs precisely by holographic algorithms with matchgates.

preprint2010arXiv

Non-negative Weighted #CSPs: An Effective Complexity Dichotomy

We prove a complexity dichotomy theorem for all non-negative weighted counting Constraint Satisfaction Problems (CSP). This caps a long series of important results on counting problems including unweighted and weighted graph homomorphisms and the celebrated dichotomy theorem for unweighted #CSP. Our dichotomy theorem gives a succinct criterion for tractability. If a set F of constraint functions satisfies the criterion, then the counting CSP problem defined by F is solvable in polynomial time; if it does not satisfy the criterion, then the problem is #P-hard. We furthermore show that the question of whether F satisfies the criterion is decidable in NP. Surprisingly, our tractability criterion is simpler than the previous criteria for the more restricted classes of problems, although when specialized to those cases, they are logically equivalent. Our proof mainly uses Linear Algebra, and represents a departure from Universal Algebra, the dominant methodology in recent years.

preprint2010arXiv

On the Approximability of Budget Feasible Mechanisms

Budget feasible mechanisms, recently initiated by Singer (FOCS 2010), extend algorithmic mechanism design problems to a realistic setting with a budget constraint. We consider the problem of designing truthful budget feasible mechanisms for general submodular functions: we give a randomized mechanism with approximation ratio $7.91$ (improving the previous best-known result 112), and a deterministic mechanism with approximation ratio $8.34$. Further we study the knapsack problem, which is special submodular function, give a $2+\sqrt{2}$ approximation deterministic mechanism (improving the previous best-known result 6), and a 3 approximation randomized mechanism. We provide a similar result for an extended knapsack problem with heterogeneous items, where items are divided into groups and one can pick at most one item from each group. Finally we show a lower bound of approximation ratio of $1+\sqrt{2}$ for deterministic mechanisms and 2 for randomized mechanisms for knapsack, as well as the general submodular functions. Our lower bounds are unconditional, which do not rely on any computational or complexity assumptions.

preprint2010arXiv

On Tractable Exponential Sums

We consider the problem of evaluating certain exponential sums. These sums take the form $\sum_{x_1,...,x_n \in Z_N} e^{f(x_1,...,x_n) {2 πi / N}} $, where each x_i is summed over a ring Z_N, and f(x_1,...,x_n) is a multivariate polynomial with integer coefficients. We show that the sum can be evaluated in polynomial time in n and log N when f is a quadratic polynomial. This is true even when the factorization of N is unknown. Previously, this was known for a prime modulus N. On the other hand, for very specific families of polynomials of degree \ge 3, we show the problem is #P-hard, even for any fixed prime or prime power modulus. This leads to a complexity dichotomy theorem - a complete classification of each problem to be either computable in polynomial time or #P-hard - for a class of exponential sums. These sums arise in the classifications of graph homomorphisms and some other counting CSP type problems, and these results lead to complexity dichotomy theorems. For the polynomial-time algorithm, Gauss sums form the basic building blocks. For the hardness results, we prove group-theoretic necessary conditions for tractability. These tests imply that the problem is #P-hard for even very restricted families of simple cubic polynomials over fixed modulus N.