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Pedro A. Ortega

Pedro A. Ortega appears in the imported research catalog. Authorship, coauthor and topic links are available while profile ownership is still unclaimed.

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Artificial IntelligenceMachine Learningmath.STStatistics TheoryComputer Science and Game Theorymath.OCSystems and ControlInformation Theorymath.ITMethodologyNeurons and CognitionRobotics

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Published work

21 published item(s)

preprint2026arXiv

Bounded-Rationality, Hedging, and Generalization

A learner does not only fit data; it also determines how strongly the training sample may shape its output and how much distortion it can hedge. We study this relation as a bounded-rational decision problem whose primitive object is the induced channel from samples to outputs. The learner's response law determines which changes in this channel are cheap or costly, and therefore induces both a lower tradeoff curve between training loss and sample dependence and a matched upper certificate curve. When the response law is represented by an $f$-divergence regularizer, these curves live in the regularizer's native information geometry, with KL as the special case corresponding to Shannon mutual information. We show how the hedge and the two curves can be recovered from black-box behavior by observing responses to scaled losses and local loss perturbations. In learning, population loss is empirical loss plus the distortion induced by the particular training sample. The recovered hedge gives a practical certificate when it covers that distortion. Thus generalization is treated as a testable hedging property of the learner's own response law.

0 citations0 reviewsNo code linkedOpen access
preprint2022arXiv

Action and Perception as Divergence Minimization

To learn directed behaviors in complex environments, intelligent agents need to optimize objective functions. Various objectives are known for designing artificial agents, including task rewards and intrinsic motivation. However, it is unclear how the known objectives relate to each other, which objectives remain yet to be discovered, and which objectives better describe the behavior of humans. We introduce the Action Perception Divergence (APD), an approach for categorizing the space of possible objective functions for embodied agents. We show a spectrum that reaches from narrow to general objectives. While the narrow objectives correspond to domain-specific rewards as typical in reinforcement learning, the general objectives maximize information with the environment through latent variable models of input sequences. Intuitively, these agents use perception to align their beliefs with the world and use actions to align the world with their beliefs. They infer representations that are informative of past inputs, explore future inputs that are informative of their representations, and select actions or skills that maximally influence future inputs. This explains a wide range of unsupervised objectives from a single principle, including representation learning, information gain, empowerment, and skill discovery. Our findings suggest leveraging powerful world models for unsupervised exploration as a path toward highly adaptive agents that seek out large niches in their environments, rendering task rewards optional.

0 citations0 reviewsNo code linkedOpen access
preprint2022arXiv

Understanding Agent Incentives using Causal Influence Diagrams. Part I: Single Action Settings

Agents are systems that optimize an objective function in an environment. Together, the goal and the environment induce secondary objectives, incentives. Modeling the agent-environment interaction using causal influence diagrams, we can answer two fundamental questions about an agent's incentives directly from the graph: (1) which nodes can the agent have an incentivize to observe, and (2) which nodes can the agent have an incentivize to control? The answers tell us which information and influence points need extra protection. For example, we may want a classifier for job applications to not use the ethnicity of the candidate, and a reinforcement learning agent not to take direct control of its reward mechanism. Different algorithms and training paradigms can lead to different causal influence diagrams, so our method can be used to identify algorithms with problematic incentives and help in designing algorithms with better incentives.

0 citations0 reviewsNo code linkedOpen access
preprint2021arXiv

Causal Analysis of Agent Behavior for AI Safety

As machine learning systems become more powerful they also become increasingly unpredictable and opaque. Yet, finding human-understandable explanations of how they work is essential for their safe deployment. This technical report illustrates a methodology for investigating the causal mechanisms that drive the behaviour of artificial agents. Six use cases are covered, each addressing a typical question an analyst might ask about an agent. In particular, we show that each question cannot be addressed by pure observation alone, but instead requires conducting experiments with systematically chosen manipulations so as to generate the correct causal evidence.

0 citations0 reviewsNo code linkedOpen access
preprint2016arXiv

Human Decision-Making under Limited Time

Subjective expected utility theory assumes that decision-makers possess unlimited computational resources to reason about their choices; however, virtually all decisions in everyday life are made under resource constraints - i.e. decision-makers are bounded in their rationality. Here we experimentally tested the predictions made by a formalization of bounded rationality based on ideas from statistical mechanics and information-theory. We systematically tested human subjects in their ability to solve combinatorial puzzles under different time limitations. We found that our bounded-rational model accounts well for the data. The decomposition of the fitted model parameter into the subjects' expected utility function and resource parameter provide interesting insight into the subjects' information capacity limits. Our results confirm that humans gradually fall back on their learned prior choice patterns when confronted with increasing resource limitations.

0 citations0 reviewsNo code linkedOpen access
preprint2016arXiv

Memory shapes time perception and intertemporal choices

There is a consensus that human and non-human subjects experience temporal distortions in many stages of their perceptual and decision-making systems. Similarly, intertemporal choice research has shown that decision-makers undervalue future outcomes relative to immediate ones. Here we combine techniques from information theory and artificial intelligence to show how both temporal distortions and intertemporal choice preferences can be explained as a consequence of the coding efficiency of sensorimotor representation. In particular, the model implies that interactions that constrain future behavior are perceived as being both longer in duration and more valuable. Furthermore, using simulations of artificial agents, we investigate how memory constraints enforce a renormalization of the perceived timescales. Our results show that qualitatively different discount functions, such as exponential and hyperbolic discounting, arise as a consequence of an agent's probabilistic model of the world.

0 citations0 reviewsNo code linkedOpen access
preprint2015arXiv

Belief Flows of Robust Online Learning

This paper introduces a new probabilistic model for online learning which dynamically incorporates information from stochastic gradients of an arbitrary loss function. Similar to probabilistic filtering, the model maintains a Gaussian belief over the optimal weight parameters. Unlike traditional Bayesian updates, the model incorporates a small number of gradient evaluations at locations chosen using Thompson sampling, making it computationally tractable. The belief is then transformed via a linear flow field which optimally updates the belief distribution using rules derived from information theoretic principles. Several versions of the algorithm are shown using different constraints on the flow field and compared with conventional online learning algorithms. Results are given for several classification tasks including logistic regression and multilayer neural networks.

0 citations0 reviewsNo code linkedOpen access
preprint2015arXiv

Information-Theoretic Bounded Rationality

Bounded rationality, that is, decision-making and planning under resource limitations, is widely regarded as an important open problem in artificial intelligence, reinforcement learning, computational neuroscience and economics. This paper offers a consolidated presentation of a theory of bounded rationality based on information-theoretic ideas. We provide a conceptual justification for using the free energy functional as the objective function for characterizing bounded-rational decisions. This functional possesses three crucial properties: it controls the size of the solution space; it has Monte Carlo planners that are exact, yet bypass the need for exhaustive search; and it captures model uncertainty arising from lack of evidence or from interacting with other agents having unknown intentions. We discuss the single-step decision-making case, and show how to extend it to sequential decisions using equivalence transformations. This extension yields a very general class of decision problems that encompass classical decision rules (e.g. EXPECTIMAX and MINIMAX) as limit cases, as well as trust- and risk-sensitive planning.

0 citations0 reviewsNo code linkedOpen access
preprint2015arXiv

Subjectivity, Bayesianism, and Causality

Bayesian probability theory is one of the most successful frameworks to model reasoning under uncertainty. Its defining property is the interpretation of probabilities as degrees of belief in propositions about the state of the world relative to an inquiring subject. This essay examines the notion of subjectivity by drawing parallels between Lacanian theory and Bayesian probability theory, and concludes that the latter must be enriched with causal interventions to model agency. The central contribution of this work is an abstract model of the subject that accommodates causal interventions in a measure-theoretic formalisation. This formalisation is obtained through a game-theoretic Ansatz based on modelling the inside and outside of the subject as an extensive-form game with imperfect information between two players. Finally, I illustrate the expressiveness of this model with an example of causal induction.

0 citations0 reviewsNo code linkedOpen access
preprint2014arXiv

An Adversarial Interpretation of Information-Theoretic Bounded Rationality

Recently, there has been a growing interest in modeling planning with information constraints. Accordingly, an agent maximizes a regularized expected utility known as the free energy, where the regularizer is given by the information divergence from a prior to a posterior policy. While this approach can be justified in various ways, including from statistical mechanics and information theory, it is still unclear how it relates to decision-making against adversarial environments. This connection has previously been suggested in work relating the free energy to risk-sensitive control and to extensive form games. Here, we show that a single-agent free energy optimization is equivalent to a game between the agent and an imaginary adversary. The adversary can, by paying an exponential penalty, generate costs that diminish the decision maker's payoffs. It turns out that the optimal strategy of the adversary consists in choosing costs so as to render the decision maker indifferent among its choices, which is a definining property of a Nash equilibrium, thus tightening the connection between free energy optimization and game theory.

0 citations0 reviewsNo code linkedOpen access
preprint2013arXiv

Generalized Thompson Sampling for Sequential Decision-Making and Causal Inference

Recently, it has been shown how sampling actions from the predictive distribution over the optimal action-sometimes called Thompson sampling-can be applied to solve sequential adaptive control problems, when the optimal policy is known for each possible environment. The predictive distribution can then be constructed by a Bayesian superposition of the optimal policies weighted by their posterior probability that is updated by Bayesian inference and causal calculus. Here we discuss three important features of this approach. First, we discuss in how far such Thompson sampling can be regarded as a natural consequence of the Bayesian modeling of policy uncertainty. Second, we show how Thompson sampling can be used to study interactions between multiple adaptive agents, thus, opening up an avenue of game-theoretic analysis. Third, we show how Thompson sampling can be applied to infer causal relationships when interacting with an environment in a sequential fashion. In summary, our results suggest that Thompson sampling might not merely be a useful heuristic, but a principled method to address problems of adaptive sequential decision-making and causal inference.

0 citations0 reviewsNo code linkedOpen access
preprint2012arXiv

A Nonparametric Conjugate Prior Distribution for the Maximizing Argument of a Noisy Function

We propose a novel Bayesian approach to solve stochastic optimization problems that involve finding extrema of noisy, nonlinear functions. Previous work has focused on representing possible functions explicitly, which leads to a two-step procedure of first, doing inference over the function space and second, finding the extrema of these functions. Here we skip the representation step and directly model the distribution over extrema. To this end, we devise a non-parametric conjugate prior based on a kernel regressor. The resulting posterior distribution directly captures the uncertainty over the maximum of the unknown function. We illustrate the effectiveness of our model by optimizing a noisy, high-dimensional, non-convex objective function.

0 citations0 reviewsNo code linkedOpen access
preprint2012arXiv

Free Energy and the Generalized Optimality Equations for Sequential Decision Making

The free energy functional has recently been proposed as a variational principle for bounded rational decision-making, since it instantiates a natural trade-off between utility gains and information processing costs that can be axiomatically derived. Here we apply the free energy principle to general decision trees that include both adversarial and stochastic environments. We derive generalized sequential optimality equations that not only include the Bellman optimality equations as a limit case, but also lead to well-known decision-rules such as Expectimax, Minimax and Expectiminimax. We show how these decision-rules can be derived from a single free energy principle that assigns a resource parameter to each node in the decision tree. These resource parameters express a concrete computational cost that can be measured as the amount of samples that are needed from the distribution that belongs to each node. The free energy principle therefore provides the normative basis for generalized optimality equations that account for both adversarial and stochastic environments.

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preprint2012arXiv

Thermodynamics as a theory of decision-making with information processing costs

Perfectly rational decision-makers maximize expected utility, but crucially ignore the resource costs incurred when determining optimal actions. Here we propose an information-theoretic formalization of bounded rational decision-making where decision-makers trade off expected utility and information processing costs. Such bounded rational decision-makers can be thought of as thermodynamic machines that undergo physical state changes when they compute. Their behavior is governed by a free energy functional that trades off changes in internal energy-as a proxy for utility-and entropic changes representing computational costs induced by changing states. As a result, the bounded rational decision-making problem can be rephrased in terms of well-known concepts from statistical physics. In the limit when computational costs are ignored, the maximum expected utility principle is recovered. We discuss the relation to satisficing decision-making procedures as well as links to existing theoretical frameworks and human decision-making experiments that describe deviations from expected utility theory. Since most of the mathematical machinery can be borrowed from statistical physics, the main contribution is to axiomatically derive and interpret the thermodynamic free energy as a model of bounded rational decision-making.

0 citations0 reviewsNo code linkedOpen access
preprint2011arXiv

Bayesian Causal Induction

Discovering causal relationships is a hard task, often hindered by the need for intervention, and often requiring large amounts of data to resolve statistical uncertainty. However, humans quickly arrive at useful causal relationships. One possible reason is that humans extrapolate from past experience to new, unseen situations: that is, they encode beliefs over causal invariances, allowing for sound generalization from the observations they obtain from directly acting in the world. Here we outline a Bayesian model of causal induction where beliefs over competing causal hypotheses are modeled using probability trees. Based on this model, we illustrate why, in the general case, we need interventions plus constraints on our causal hypotheses in order to extract causal information from our experience.

0 citations0 reviewsNo code linkedOpen access
preprint2011arXiv

Information, Utility & Bounded Rationality

Perfectly rational decision-makers maximize expected utility, but crucially ignore the resource costs incurred when determining optimal actions. Here we employ an axiomatic framework for bounded rational decision-making based on a thermodynamic interpretation of resource costs as information costs. This leads to a variational "free utility" principle akin to thermodynamical free energy that trades off utility and information costs. We show that bounded optimal control solutions can be derived from this variational principle, which leads in general to stochastic policies. Furthermore, we show that risk-sensitive and robust (minimax) control schemes fall out naturally from this framework if the environment is considered as a bounded rational and perfectly rational opponent, respectively. When resource costs are ignored, the maximum expected utility principle is recovered.

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preprint2010arXiv

A Minimum Relative Entropy Controller for Undiscounted Markov Decision Processes

Adaptive control problems are notoriously difficult to solve even in the presence of plant-specific controllers. One way to by-pass the intractable computation of the optimal policy is to restate the adaptive control as the minimization of the relative entropy of a controller that ignores the true plant dynamics from an informed controller. The solution is given by the Bayesian control rule-a set of equations characterizing a stochastic adaptive controller for the class of possible plant dynamics. Here, the Bayesian control rule is applied to derive BCR-MDP, a controller to solve undiscounted Markov decision processes with finite state and action spaces and unknown dynamics. In particular, we derive a non-parametric conjugate prior distribution over the policy space that encapsulates the agent's whole relevant history and we present a Gibbs sampler to draw random policies from this distribution. Preliminary results show that BCR-MDP successfully avoids sub-optimal limit cycles due to its built-in mechanism to balance exploration versus exploitation.

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preprint2010arXiv

A Minimum Relative Entropy Principle for Learning and Acting

This paper proposes a method to construct an adaptive agent that is universal with respect to a given class of experts, where each expert is an agent that has been designed specifically for a particular environment. This adaptive control problem is formalized as the problem of minimizing the relative entropy of the adaptive agent from the expert that is most suitable for the unknown environment. If the agent is a passive observer, then the optimal solution is the well-known Bayesian predictor. However, if the agent is active, then its past actions need to be treated as causal interventions on the I/O stream rather than normal probability conditions. Here it is shown that the solution to this new variational problem is given by a stochastic controller called the Bayesian control rule, which implements adaptive behavior as a mixture of experts. Furthermore, it is shown that under mild assumptions, the Bayesian control rule converges to the control law of the most suitable expert.

0 citations0 reviewsNo code linkedOpen access
preprint2010arXiv

An axiomatic formalization of bounded rationality based on a utility-information equivalence

Classic decision-theory is based on the maximum expected utility (MEU) principle, but crucially ignores the resource costs incurred when determining optimal decisions. Here we propose an axiomatic framework for bounded decision-making that considers resource costs. Agents are formalized as probability measures over input-output streams. We postulate that any such probability measure can be assigned a corresponding conjugate utility function based on three axioms: utilities should be real-valued, additive and monotonic mappings of probabilities. We show that these axioms enforce a unique conversion law between utility and probability (and thereby, information). Moreover, we show that this relation can be characterized as a variational principle: given a utility function, its conjugate probability measure maximizes a free utility functional. Transformations of probability measures can then be formalized as a change in free utility due to the addition of new constraints expressed by a target utility function. Accordingly, one obtains a criterion to choose a probability measure that trades off the maximization of a target utility function and the cost of the deviation from a reference distribution. We show that optimal control, adaptive estimation and adaptive control problems can be solved this way in a resource-efficient way. When resource costs are ignored, the MEU principle is recovered. Our formalization might thus provide a principled approach to bounded rationality that establishes a close link to information theory.

0 citations0 reviewsNo code linkedOpen access
preprint2010arXiv

Convergence of Bayesian Control Rule

Recently, new approaches to adaptive control have sought to reformulate the problem as a minimization of a relative entropy criterion to obtain tractable solutions. In particular, it has been shown that minimizing the expected deviation from the causal input-output dependencies of the true plant leads to a new promising stochastic control rule called the Bayesian control rule. This work proves the convergence of the Bayesian control rule under two sufficient assumptions: boundedness, which is an ergodicity condition; and consistency, which is an instantiation of the sure-thing principle.

0 citations0 reviewsNo code linkedOpen access
preprint2010arXiv

Logic, Reasoning under Uncertainty and Causality

A simple framework for reasoning under uncertainty and intervention is introduced. This is achieved in three steps. First, logic is restated in set-theoretic terms to obtain a framework for reasoning under certainty. Second, this framework is extended to model reasoning under uncertainty. Finally, causal spaces are introduced and shown how they provide enough information to model knowledge containing causal information about the world.

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