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Hao Peng

Hao Peng contributes to research discovery and scholarly infrastructure.

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Published work

2 published item(s)

preprint2026arXiv

RoPE Distinguishes Neither Positions Nor Tokens in Long Contexts, Provably

We identify intrinsic limitations of Rotary Positional Embeddings (RoPE) in Transformer-based long-context language models. Our theoretical analysis abstracts away from the specific content of the context and depends only on its length. We prove that as context length increases, RoPE-based attention becomes unpredictable and loses two properties that are central to its effectiveness. First, it loses its locality bias: RoPE is no more likely to favor nearer positions than substantially farther ones. Second, it loses consistency in token relevance: a key vector that receives a higher attention score than an alternative at one position may receive a lower score at another. In both cases, the probability of failure approaches 0.5, no better than random guessing. We further prove that the attention score can remain unchanged when a key token is moved to a different position, or even replaced by a different token, indicating a failure to distinguish positions or tokens. Adjusting the RoPE base trades off distinguishing positions against distinguishing tokens but cannot preserve both at the same time. Increasing the RoPE base hyperparameter, a common practice in today's long-context models, helps distinguish different tokens, but inevitably sacrifices the ability to distinguish positions. Our empirical analysis shows that multi-head, multi-layer architectures are insufficient to overcome these limitations. Our findings suggest that fundamentally new mechanisms for encoding position and token order may be needed in future Transformer long-context language models.

preprint2026arXiv

SafeHarbor: Hierarchical Memory-Augmented Guardrail for LLM Agent Safety

With the rapid evolution of foundation models, Large Language Model (LLM) agents have demonstrated increasingly powerful tool-use capabilities. However, this proficiency introduces significant security risks, as malicious actors can manipulate agents into executing tools to generate harmful content. While existing defensive mechanisms are effective, they frequently suffer from the over-refusal problem, where increased safety strictness compromises the agent's utility on benign tasks. To mitigate this trade-off, we propose \textsc{SafeHarbor}, a novel framework designed to establish precise decision boundaries for LLM agents. Unlike static guidelines, \textsc{SafeHarbor} extracts context-aware defense rules through enhanced adversarial generation. We design a local hierarchical memory system for dynamic rule injection, offering a training-free, efficient, and plug-and-play solution. Furthermore, we introduce an information entropy-based self-evolution mechanism that continuously optimizes the memory structure through dynamic node splitting and merging. Extensive experiments demonstrate that \textsc{SafeHarbor} achieves state-of-the-art performance on both ambiguous benign tasks and explicit malicious attacks, notably attaining a peak benign utility of 63.6\% on GPT-4o while maintaining a robust refusal rate exceeding 93\% against harmful requests. The source code is publicly available at https://github.com/ljj-cyber/SafeHarbor.