Abstract

Decentralized machine learning often relies on outsourcing computations, such as gradient evaluations, to untrusted worker nodes. Existing robust aggregation methods can mitigate malicious behavior under honest-majority assumptions, but may fail when adversaries control a majority of the workers. We study this adversary-dominated setting through an incentive-oriented framework in which reports are accepted and rewarded only when they are mutually consistent up to a threshold. This turns the adversary from a pure saboteur into a rational agent that trades off increasing estimation error against the risk of rejection and loss of reward. We consider iterative optimization under this model. Unlike one-shot computation, iterative learning requires long-horizon decisions: permissive acceptance rules enable faster early progress but admit more adversarial corruption, while strict rules improve estimation accuracy but cause frequent rejections. We propose \mathsf{VISTA}, an adaptive algorithm that tunes the acceptance threshold using the optimization history. Numerical results show that \mathsf{VISTA} improves convergence over static thresholds. We also provide a rigorous convergence analysis showing that, with suitable incentive-aware adaptation, adversary-dominated decentralized learning can retain the asymptotic convergence behavior of standard SGD without relying on an honest majority.

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