Paper detail

Information cascade on networks

In this paper, we discuss a voting model by considering three different kinds of networks: a random graph, the Barabási-Albert(BA) model, and a fitness model. A voting model represents the way in which public perceptions are conveyed to voters. Our voting model is constructed by using two types of voters--herders and independents--and two candidates. Independents conduct voting based on their fundamental values; on the other hand, herders base their voting on the number of previous votes. Hence, herders vote for the majority candidates and obtain information relating to previous votes from their networks. We discuss the difference between the phases on which the networks depend. Two kinds of phase transitions, an information cascade transition and a super-normal transition, were identified. The first of these is a transition between a state in which most voters make the correct choices and a state in which most of them are wrong. The second is a transition of convergence speed. The information cascade transition prevails when herder effects are stronger than the super-normal transition. In the BA and fitness models, the critical point of the information cascade transition is the same as that of the random network model. However, the critical point of the super-normal transition disappears when these two models are used. In conclusion, the influence of networks is shown to only affect the convergence speed and not the information cascade transition. We are therefore able to conclude that the influence of hubs on voters' perceptions is limited.