Paper detail

Exploring Adversarial Robustness of Multi-Sensor Perception Systems in Self Driving

Modern self-driving perception systems have been shown to improve upon processing complementary inputs such as LiDAR with images. In isolation, 2D images have been found to be extremely vulnerable to adversarial attacks. Yet, there have been limited studies on the adversarial robustness of multi-modal models that fuse LiDAR features with image features. Furthermore, existing works do not consider physically realizable perturbations that are consistent across the input modalities. In this paper, we showcase practical susceptibilities of multi-sensor detection by placing an adversarial object on top of a host vehicle. We focus on physically realizable and input-agnostic attacks as they are feasible to execute in practice, and show that a single universal adversary can hide different host vehicles from state-of-the-art multi-modal detectors. Our experiments demonstrate that successful attacks are primarily caused by easily corrupted image features. Furthermore, we find that in modern sensor fusion methods which project image features into 3D, adversarial attacks can exploit the projection process to generate false positives across distant regions in 3D. Towards more robust multi-modal perception systems, we show that adversarial training with feature denoising can boost robustness to such attacks significantly. However, we find that standard adversarial defenses still struggle to prevent false positives which are also caused by inaccurate associations between 3D LiDAR points and 2D pixels.