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Xinyue Xie

Xinyue Xie contributes to research discovery and scholarly infrastructure.

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Published work

2 published item(s)

preprint2026arXiv

Omni-scale Learning-based Sequential Decision Framework for Order Fulfillment of Tote-handling Robotic Systems

Driven by the rapid expansion of e-commerce and small-batch production, the size of the intralogistics load unit of finished goods, semi-finished goods and raw materials is steadily shrinking. Totes are gradually replacing pallets as the primary handling and storage container. This shift has propelled tote-handling robotic systems to the forefront of automation order fulfillment centers. The order-fulfillment decisions of tote-handling robotic systems share a common order-tote-robot sequential decision-making nature. Existing studies primarily focus on decision mechanisms tailored to particular systems, making it difficult to generalize or transfer them to other contexts. We propose an Omni-scale Learning-based Sequential Decision Framework for Order Fulfillment of Tote-handling Robotic Systems (OLSF-TRS), a generalized and scalable sequential decision framework that combines structured combinatorial optimization with multi-agent reinforcement learning to coordinate order,tote, and robot decisions. On small-scale tote-handling robotic systems, OLSF-TRS achieves near-optimal performance with average optimality gaps below 3.5% across two distinct system configurations. In large-scale scenarios, OLSF-TRS consistently outperforms heuristic baselines across two different system types, reducing total tote movements by 8-12% and over 30% compared to SOTA rule-based approaches, while maintaining real-time responsiveness. These improvements translate into tangible operational benefits, including cost reduction, lower energy consumption, and enhanced throughput stability. The proposed framework delivers an efficient and unified order fulfillment decision-making framework for widely deployed tote-handling robotic systems,supporting high-quality order fulfillment in both e-commerce and industrial logistics sectors.

preprint2022arXiv

A Two-Step Approach to Optimal Dynamic Pricing in Multi-Demand Combinatorial Markets

Online markets are a part of everyday life, and their rules are governed by algorithms. Assuming participants are inherently self-interested, well designed rules can help to increase social welfare. Many algorithms for online markets are based on prices: the seller is responsible for posting prices while buyers make purchases which are most profitable given the posted prices. To make adjustments to the market the seller is allowed to update prices at certain timepoints. Posted prices are an intuitive way to design a market. Despite the fact that each buyer acts selfishly, the seller's goal is often assumed to be that of social welfare maximization. Berger, Eden and Feldman recently considered the case of a market with only three buyers where each buyer has a fixed number of goods to buy and the profit of a bought bundle of items is the sum of profits of the items in the bundle. For such markets, Berger et. al. showed that the seller can maximize social welfare by dynamically updating posted prices before arrival of each buyer. Bérczi, Bérczi-Kovács and Szögi showed that the social welfare can be maximized also when each buyer is ready to buy at most two items. We study the power of posted prices with dynamical updates in more general cases. First, we show that the result of Berger et. al. can be generalized from three to four buyers. Then we show that the result of Bérczi, Bérczi-Kovács and Szögi can be generalized to the case when each buyer is ready to buy up to three items. We also show that a dynamic pricing is possible whenever there are at most two allocations maximizing social welfare.