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Trust 21 - EmergingVerification L1Unclaimed author
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Published work

12 published item(s)

preprint2026arXiv

An Information-Theoretic Criterion for Efficient Data Synthesis

Synthetic data becomes crucial for large language model training, but its effectiveness is highly inconsistent. We provide an information-theoretic account of this inconsistency: synthetic data improves a model only when the generation-training loop is information-open, i.e., shaped by external signals (verifiers, environments, or rubrics) that inject task-relevant information beyond the model's current distribution. When the loop is information-closed (relying on the model's own outputs without such signals), the data processing inequality ensures that task-relevant information can only decrease, making collapse a predicted outcome. Among information-open pipelines, both efficiency and generalization hinge on the meta-level of supervision: a coarser signal such as binary correctness treats all acceptable outputs as equivalent, so the behavior it teaches is not tied to any particular domain or surface form and generalizes naturally across tasks and domains. These observations lead to a guiding thesis: learning preferentially converges to the most information-efficient signal component available, which accelerates learning when that component is the intended one, but causes reward hacking when a spurious pattern happens to be simpler.

preprint2026arXiv

LERA: LLM-Enhanced RAG for Ad Auction in Generative Chatbots

The integration of advertising auction mechanisms into large language model (LLM)-based chatbots presents a significant opportunity for commercialization, yet poses unique challenges in balancing relevance, efficiency, and user experience. Recently, Feizi et al.~\citep{feizi2023online} and Hajiaghayi et al.~\citep{hajiaghayi2024ad} outlined a retrieve-then-generate paradigm that decouples retrieval and generation, offering lightweight ad insertion and payment determination. However, current retrieval relies solely on text embedding similarity, which may lead to commercial misinterpretation and issues such as repetitive insertions. In this paper, we propose LERA, a two-stage retrieve-then-generate auction framework tailored for LLM chatbots. In the first stage, embedding-based coarse filtering pre-selects a small set of candidate advertisers. In the second stage, the LLM itself is queried with a carefully designed prompt to produce logits over candidates, which serve as refined organic relevance scores. These scores are combined with bids, and a critical-value payment rule accounts for both the coarse-filtering and fine-ranking thresholds, ensuring truthfulness for utility-maximizing advertisers. The framework naturally extends to multiple ad insertions within dynamic dialogue flows and long responses. Experiments on a synthetic advertiser-query benchmark show that LERA substantially improves ad selection accuracy and insertion diversity while incurring only controllable latency overhead.

preprint2026arXiv

State Beyond Appearance: Diagnosing and Improving State Consistency in Dial-Based Measurement Reading

Multimodal large language models (MLLMs) have achieved impressive progress on general multimodal tasks, yet they remain brittle on dial-based measurement reading. In this paper, we study this problem through controlled benchmarks and feature-space probing, and show that current MLLMs not only achieve unsatisfactory accuracy on dial-based readout, but also suffer sharp performance drops under viewpoint and illumination changes even when the underlying dial state remains fixed. Our probing analysis further reveals that same-state samples under appearance variation are not consistently clustered, while neighboring states fail to preserve the local structure implied by continuous dial values. These findings suggest that existing MLLMs largely ignore the intrinsic state geometry of dial measurement tasks and instead rely on superficial appearance cues. Motivated by this diagnosis, we propose TriSCA, a tri-level state-consistent alignment framework for dial-based measurement reading. Specifically, TriSCA consists of state-distance-aware representation alignment, metadata-grounded observation-to-state supervision, and state-aware objective alignment. Extensive ablation studies and evaluation experiments on controlled clock and gauge benchmarks, together with evaluation on an external real-world benchmark, demonstrate the effectiveness of our method.

preprint2023arXiv

On the Complexity of Computing Markov Perfect Equilibrium in General-Sum Stochastic Games

Similar to the role of Markov decision processes in reinforcement learning, Stochastic Games (SGs) lay the foundation for the study of multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL) and sequential agent interactions. In this paper, we derive that computing an approximate Markov Perfect Equilibrium (MPE) in a finite-state discounted Stochastic Game within the exponential precision is \textbf{PPAD}-complete. We adopt a function with a polynomially bounded description in the strategy space to convert the MPE computation to a fixed-point problem, even though the stochastic game may demand an exponential number of pure strategies, in the number of states, for each agent. The completeness result follows the reduction of the fixed-point problem to {\sc End of the Line}. Our results indicate that finding an MPE in SGs is highly unlikely to be \textbf{NP}-hard unless \textbf{NP}=\textbf{co-NP}. Our work offers confidence for MARL research to study MPE computation on general-sum SGs and to develop fruitful algorithms as currently on zero-sum SGs.

preprint2022arXiv

ABSNFT: Securitization and Repurchase Scheme for Non-Fungible Tokens Based on Game Theoretical Analysis

The Non-Fungible Token (NFT) is viewed as one of the important applications of blockchain technology. Although NFT has a large market scale and multiple practical standards, several limitations of the existing mechanism in NFT markets exist. This work proposes a novel securitization and repurchase scheme for NFT to overcome these limitations. We first provide an Asset-Backed Securities (ABS) solution to settle the limitations of non-fungibility of NFT. Our securitization design aims to enhance the liquidity of NFTs and enable Oracles and Automatic Market Makers (AMMs) for NFTs. Then we propose a novel repurchase protocol for a participant owing a portion of NFT to repurchase other shares to obtain the complete ownership. As participants may strategically bid during the acquisition process, our repurchase process is formulated as a Stackelberg game to explore the equilibrium prices. We also provide solutions to handle difficulties at market such as budget constraints and lazy bidders.

preprint2022arXiv

Insightful Mining Equilibria

The selfish mining attack, arguably the most famous game-theoretic attack in blockchain, indicates that the Bitcoin protocol is not incentive-compatible. Most subsequent works mainly focus on strengthening the selfish mining strategy, thus enabling a single strategic agent more likely to deviate. In sharp contrast, little attention has been paid to the resistant behavior against the selfish mining attack, let alone further equilibrium analysis for miners and mining pools in the blockchain as a multi-agent system. In this paper, first, we propose a strategy called insightful mining to counteract selfish mining. By infiltrating an undercover miner into the selfish pool, the insightful pool could acquire the number of its hidden blocks. We prove that, with this extra insight, the utility of the insightful pool could be strictly greater than the selfish pool's when they have the same mining power. Then we investigate the mining game where all pools can either choose to be honest or take the insightful mining strategy. We characterize the Nash equilibrium of this mining game, and derive three corollaries: (a) each mining game has a pure Nash equilibrium; (b) honest mining is a Nash equilibrium if the largest mining pool has a fraction of mining power no more than 1/3; (c) there are at most two insightful pools under equilibrium no matter how the mining power is distributed.

preprint2022arXiv

No-regret Learning in Repeated First-Price Auctions with Budget Constraints

Recently the online advertising market has exhibited a gradual shift from second-price auctions to first-price auctions. Although there has been a line of works concerning online bidding strategies in first-price auctions, it still remains open how to handle budget constraints in the problem. In the present paper, we initiate the study for a buyer with budgets to learn online bidding strategies in repeated first-price auctions. We propose an RL-based bidding algorithm against the optimal non-anticipating strategy under stationary competition. Our algorithm obtains $\widetilde O(\sqrt T)$-regret if the bids are all revealed at the end of each round. With the restriction that the buyer only sees the winning bid after each round, our modified algorithm obtains $\widetilde O(T^{\frac{7}{12}})$-regret by techniques developed from survival analysis. Our analysis extends to the more general scenario where the buyer has any bounded instantaneous utility function with regrets of the same order.

preprint2022arXiv

On Convergence Lemma and Convergence Stability for Piecewise Analytic Functions

In this work, a convergence lemma for function $f$ being finite compositions of analytic mappings and the maximum operator is proved. The lemma shows that the set of $δ$-stationary points near an isolated local minimum point $x^*$ is shrinking to $x^*$ as $δ\to 0$. It is a natural extension of the version for strongly convex $C^1$ functions. However, the correctness of the lemma is subtle. Analytic mappings are necessary for the lemma in the sense that replacing it with differentiable or $C^\infty$ mappings makes the lemma false. The proof is based on stratification theorems of semi-analytic sets by Łojasiewicz. An extension of this proof presents a geometric characterization of the set of stationary points of $f$. Finally, a notion of stability on stationary points, called convergence stability, is proposed. It asks, under small numerical errors, whether a reasonable convergent optimization method started near a stationary point should eventually converge to the same stationary point. The concept of convergence stability becomes nontrivial qualitatively only when the objective function is both nonsmooth and nonconvex. Via the convergence lemma, an intuitive equivalent condition for convergence stability of $f$ is proved. These results together provide a new geometric perspective to study the problem of "where-to-converge" in nonsmooth nonconvex optimization.

preprint2022arXiv

On the Convergence of Fictitious Play: A Decomposition Approach

Fictitious play (FP) is one of the most fundamental game-theoretical learning frameworks for computing Nash equilibrium in $n$-player games, which builds the foundation for modern multi-agent learning algorithms. Although FP has provable convergence guarantees on zero-sum games and potential games, many real-world problems are often a mixture of both and the convergence property of FP has not been fully studied yet. In this paper, we extend the convergence results of FP to the combinations of such games and beyond. Specifically, we derive new conditions for FP to converge by leveraging game decomposition techniques. We further develop a linear relationship unifying cooperation and competition in the sense that these two classes of games are mutually transferable. Finally, we analyze a non-convergent example of FP, the Shapley game, and develop sufficient conditions for FP to converge.

preprint2021arXiv

An Efficient and Robust Committee Structure for Sharding Blockchain

Nowadays, sharding is deemed as a promising way to save traditional blockchain protocols from their low scalability. However, such technique also brings several potential risks and huge communication overheads. An improper design may give rise to the inconsistent state among different committees. Further, the communication overheads arising from cross-shard transactions unfortunately reduce the system's performance. In this paper, we first summarize five essential issues that all sharding blockchain designers face. For each issue, we discuss its key challenge and propose our suggested solutions. In order to break the performance bottlenecks, we propose a reputation mechanism for selecting leaders. The term of reputation in our design reflects each node's honest computation resources. In addition, we introduce a referee committee and partial sets in each committee, and design a recovery procedure in case the leader is malicious. Under the design, we prove that malicious leaders will not hurt the system and will be evicted. Furthermore, we conduct a series of simulations to evaluate our design. The results show that selecting leaders by the reputation can dramatically improve the system performance.

preprint2021arXiv

An Efficient Permissioned Blockchain with Provable Reputation Mechanism

The design of permissioned blockchains places an access control requirement for members to read, access, and write information over the blockchains. In this paper, we study a hierarchical scenario to include three types of participants: providers, collectors, and governors. To be specific, providers forward transactions, collected from terminals, to collectors; collectors upload received transactions to governors after verifying and labeling them; and governors validate a part of received labeled transactions, pack valid ones into a block, and append a new block on the ledger. Collectors in the hierarchical model play a crucial role in the design: they have connections with both providers and governors, and are responsible for collecting, verifying, and uploading transactions. However, collectors are rational and some of them may behave maliciously (not necessarily for their own benefits). In this paper, we introduce a reputation protocol as a measure of the reliability of collectors in the permissioned blockchain environment. Its objective is to encourage collectors to behave truthfully and, in addition, to reduce the verification cost. The verification cost on provider $p$ is defined as the total number of invalid transactions provided by $p$ and checked by governors. Through theoretical analysis, our protocol with the reputation mechanism has a significant improvement in efficiency. Specifically, the verification loss that governors suffer is proved to be asymptotically $O(\sqrt{T_{total}})$ ($T_{total}$, representing the number of transactions verified by governors and provided by $p$), as long as there exists at least one collector who behaves well. At last, two typical cases where our model can be well applied are also demonstrated.

preprint2020arXiv

CycLedger: A Scalable and Secure Parallel Protocol for Distributed Ledger via Sharding

Traditional public distributed ledgers have not been able to scale-out well and work efficiently. Sharding is deemed as a promising way to solve this problem. By partitioning all nodes into small committees and letting them work in parallel, we can significantly lower the amount of communication and computation, reduce the overhead on each node's storage, as well as enhance the throughput of the distributed ledger. Existing sharding-based protocols still suffer from several serious drawbacks. The first thing is that all non-faulty nodes must connect well with each other, which demands a huge number of communication channels in the network. Moreover, previous protocols have faced great loss in efficiency in the case where the honesty of each committee's leader is in question. At the same time, no explicit incentive is provided for nodes to actively participate in the protocol. We present CycLedger, a scalable and secure parallel protocol for distributed ledger via sharding. Our protocol selects a leader and a partial set for each committee, who are in charge of maintaining intra-shard consensus and communicating with other committees, to reduce the amortized complexity of communication, computation, and storage on all nodes. We introduce a novel semi-commitment scheme between committees and a recovery procedure to prevent the system from crashing even when leaders of committees are malicious. To add incentive for the network, we use the concept of reputation, which measures each node's trusty computing power. As nodes with a higher reputation receive more rewards, there is an encouragement for nodes with strong computing ability to work honestly to gain reputation. In this way, we strike out a new path to establish scalability, security, and incentive for the sharding-based distributed ledger.