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Vasilis Syrgkanis

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Published work

32 published item(s)

preprint2026arXiv

Sharp Structure-Agnostic Lower Bounds for General Linear Functional Estimation

We establish a general statistical optimality theory for estimation problems where the target parameter is a linear functional of an unknown nuisance component that must be estimated from data. This formulation covers many causal and predictive parameters and has applications to numerous disciplines. We adopt the structure-agnostic framework introduced by \citet{balakrishnan2023fundamental}, which poses no structural properties on the nuisance functions other than access to black-box estimators that achieve some statistical estimation rate. This framework is particularly appealing when one is only willing to consider estimation strategies that use non-parametric regression and classification oracles as black-box sub-processes. Within this framework, we first prove the statistical optimality of the celebrated and widely used doubly robust estimators for the Average Treatment Effect (ATE), the most central parameter in causal inference. We then characterize the minimax optimal rate under the general formulation. Notably, we differentiate between two regimes in which double robustness can and cannot be achieved and in which first-order debiasing yields different error rates. Our result implies that first-order debiasing is simultaneously optimal in both regimes. We instantiate our theory by deriving optimal error rates that recover existing results and extend to various settings of interest, including the case when the nuisance is defined by generalized regressions and when covariate shift exists for training and test distribution.

preprint2026arXiv

The Partial Testimony of Logs: Evaluation of Language Model Generation under Confounded Model Choice

Offline evaluation of language models from usage logs is biased when model choice is confounded: the same user-side factors that influence which model is used can also influence how its output is judged, so raw comparisons of logged scores mix self-selected populations rather than estimating a common quantity of interest. A small randomized experiment can break this bias by overriding model choice, but in practice such experiments are scarce and costly. We study a three-source design that combines a large confounded observational log (OBS) for scale, a small randomized experiment (EXP) for unconfounded scoring, and an offline simulator (SIM) that replays candidate models on cached contexts. Our main result is an identification theorem showing that the randomized experiment and the simulator are together enough to recover causal model values; the observational log enters only afterward, to reduce estimation error rather than to make the causal comparison valid. Six estimator families are evaluated in a controlled semi-synthetic validation and in two real-task cached benchmarks for summarization and coding. No family dominates every regime; relative performance depends on the amount of unbiased EXP supervision and on how closely the target reward aligns with OBS-derived structure.

preprint2022arXiv

Estimating the Long-Term Effects of Novel Treatments

Policy makers typically face the problem of wanting to estimate the long-term effects of novel treatments, while only having historical data of older treatment options. We assume access to a long-term dataset where only past treatments were administered and a short-term dataset where novel treatments have been administered. We propose a surrogate based approach where we assume that the long-term effect is channeled through a multitude of available short-term proxies. Our work combines three major recent techniques in the causal machine learning literature: surrogate indices, dynamic treatment effect estimation and double machine learning, in a unified pipeline. We show that our method is consistent and provides root-n asymptotically normal estimates under a Markovian assumption on the data and the observational policy. We use a data-set from a major corporation that includes customer investments over a three year period to create a semi-synthetic data distribution where the major qualitative properties of the real dataset are preserved. We evaluate the performance of our method and discuss practical challenges of deploying our formal methodology and how to address them.

preprint2022arXiv

RieszNet and ForestRiesz: Automatic Debiased Machine Learning with Neural Nets and Random Forests

Many causal and policy effects of interest are defined by linear functionals of high-dimensional or non-parametric regression functions. $\sqrt{n}$-consistent and asymptotically normal estimation of the object of interest requires debiasing to reduce the effects of regularization and/or model selection on the object of interest. Debiasing is typically achieved by adding a correction term to the plug-in estimator of the functional, which leads to properties such as semi-parametric efficiency, double robustness, and Neyman orthogonality. We implement an automatic debiasing procedure based on automatically learning the Riesz representation of the linear functional using Neural Nets and Random Forests. Our method only relies on black-box evaluation oracle access to the linear functional and does not require knowledge of its analytic form. We propose a multitasking Neural Net debiasing method with stochastic gradient descent minimization of a combined Riesz representer and regression loss, while sharing representation layers for the two functions. We also propose a Random Forest method which learns a locally linear representation of the Riesz function. Even though our method applies to arbitrary functionals, we experimentally find that it performs well compared to the state of art neural net based algorithm of Shi et al. (2019) for the case of the average treatment effect functional. We also evaluate our method on the problem of estimating average marginal effects with continuous treatments, using semi-synthetic data of gasoline price changes on gasoline demand.

preprint2020arXiv

Accurate Inference for Adaptive Linear Models

Estimators computed from adaptively collected data do not behave like their non-adaptive brethren. Rather, the sequential dependence of the collection policy can lead to severe distributional biases that persist even in the infinite data limit. We develop a general method -- $\mathbf{W}$-decorrelation -- for transforming the bias of adaptive linear regression estimators into variance. The method uses only coarse-grained information about the data collection policy and does not need access to propensity scores or exact knowledge of the policy. We bound the finite-sample bias and variance of the $\mathbf{W}$-estimator and develop asymptotically correct confidence intervals based on a novel martingale central limit theorem. We then demonstrate the empirical benefits of the generic $\mathbf{W}$-decorrelation procedure in two different adaptive data settings: the multi-armed bandit and the autoregressive time series.

preprint2020arXiv

Learning and Efficiency in Games with Dynamic Population

We study the quality of outcomes in repeated games when the population of players is dynamically changing and participants use learning algorithms to adapt to the changing environment. Game theory classically considers Nash equilibria of one-shot games, while in practice many games are played repeatedly, and in such games players often use algorithmic tools to learn to play in the given environment. Most previous work on learning in repeated games assumes that the population playing the game is static over time. We analyze the efficiency of repeated games in dynamically changing environments, motivated by application domains such as Internet ad-auctions and packet routing. We prove that, in many classes of games, if players choose their strategies in a way that guarantees low adaptive regret, then high social welfare is ensured, even under very frequent changes. In fact, in large markets learning players achieve asymptotically optimal social welfare despite high turnover. Previous work has only showed that high welfare is guaranteed for learning outcomes in static environments. Our work extends these results to more realistic settings when participation is drastically evolving over time.

preprint2020arXiv

Minimax Estimation of Conditional Moment Models

We develop an approach for estimating models described via conditional moment restrictions, with a prototypical application being non-parametric instrumental variable regression. We introduce a min-max criterion function, under which the estimation problem can be thought of as solving a zero-sum game between a modeler who is optimizing over the hypothesis space of the target model and an adversary who identifies violating moments over a test function space. We analyze the statistical estimation rate of the resulting estimator for arbitrary hypothesis spaces, with respect to an appropriate analogue of the mean squared error metric, for ill-posed inverse problems. We show that when the minimax criterion is regularized with a second moment penalty on the test function and the test function space is sufficiently rich, then the estimation rate scales with the critical radius of the hypothesis and test function spaces, a quantity which typically gives tight fast rates. Our main result follows from a novel localized Rademacher analysis of statistical learning problems defined via minimax objectives. We provide applications of our main results for several hypothesis spaces used in practice such as: reproducing kernel Hilbert spaces, high dimensional sparse linear functions, spaces defined via shape constraints, ensemble estimators such as random forests, and neural networks. For each of these applications we provide computationally efficient optimization methods for solving the corresponding minimax problem (e.g. stochastic first-order heuristics for neural networks). In several applications, we show how our modified mean squared error rate, combined with conditions that bound the ill-posedness of the inverse problem, lead to mean squared error rates. We conclude with an extensive experimental analysis of the proposed methods.

preprint2016arXiv

Efficient Algorithms for Adversarial Contextual Learning

We provide the first oracle efficient sublinear regret algorithms for adversarial versions of the contextual bandit problem. In this problem, the learner repeatedly makes an action on the basis of a context and receives reward for the chosen action, with the goal of achieving reward competitive with a large class of policies. We analyze two settings: i) in the transductive setting the learner knows the set of contexts a priori, ii) in the small separator setting, there exists a small set of contexts such that any two policies behave differently in one of the contexts in the set. Our algorithms fall into the follow the perturbed leader family \cite{Kalai2005} and achieve regret $O(T^{3/4}\sqrt{K\log(N)})$ in the transductive setting and $O(T^{2/3} d^{3/4} K\sqrt{\log(N)})$ in the separator setting, where $K$ is the number of actions, $N$ is the number of baseline policies, and $d$ is the size of the separator. We actually solve the more general adversarial contextual semi-bandit linear optimization problem, whilst in the full information setting we address the even more general contextual combinatorial optimization. We provide several extensions and implications of our algorithms, such as switching regret and efficient learning with predictable sequences.

preprint2016arXiv

Improved Regret Bounds for Oracle-Based Adversarial Contextual Bandits

We give an oracle-based algorithm for the adversarial contextual bandit problem, where either contexts are drawn i.i.d. or the sequence of contexts is known a priori, but where the losses are picked adversarially. Our algorithm is computationally efficient, assuming access to an offline optimization oracle, and enjoys a regret of order $O((KT)^{\frac{2}{3}}(\log N)^{\frac{1}{3}})$, where $K$ is the number of actions, $T$ is the number of iterations and $N$ is the number of baseline policies. Our result is the first to break the $O(T^{\frac{3}{4}})$ barrier that is achieved by recently introduced algorithms. Breaking this barrier was left as a major open problem. Our analysis is based on the recent relaxation based approach of (Rakhlin and Sridharan, 2016).

preprint2016arXiv

Learning in Auctions: Regret is Hard, Envy is Easy

A line of recent work provides welfare guarantees of simple combinatorial auction formats, such as selling m items via simultaneous second price auctions (SiSPAs) (Christodoulou et al. 2008, Bhawalkar and Roughgarden 2011, Feldman et al. 2013). These guarantees hold even when the auctions are repeatedly executed and players use no-regret learning algorithms. Unfortunately, off-the-shelf no-regret algorithms for these auctions are computationally inefficient as the number of actions is exponential. We show that this obstacle is insurmountable: there are no polynomial-time no-regret algorithms for SiSPAs, unless RP$\supseteq$ NP, even when the bidders are unit-demand. Our lower bound raises the question of how good outcomes polynomially-bounded bidders may discover in such auctions. To answer this question, we propose a novel concept of learning in auctions, termed "no-envy learning." This notion is founded upon Walrasian equilibrium, and we show that it is both efficiently implementable and results in approximately optimal welfare, even when the bidders have fractionally subadditive (XOS) valuations (assuming demand oracles) or coverage valuations (without demand oracles). No-envy learning outcomes are a relaxation of no-regret outcomes, which maintain their approximate welfare optimality while endowing them with computational tractability. Our results extend to other auction formats that have been studied in the literature via the smoothness paradigm. Our results for XOS valuations are enabled by a novel Follow-The-Perturbed-Leader algorithm for settings where the number of experts is infinite, and the payoff function of the learner is non-linear. This algorithm has applications outside of auction settings, such as in security games. Our result for coverage valuations is based on a novel use of convex rounding schemes and a reduction to online convex optimization.

preprint2016arXiv

Optimal Auctions with Convex Perceived Payments

Myerson derived a simple and elegant solution to the single-parameter revenue-maximization problem in his seminal work on optimal auction design assuming the usual model of quasi-linear utilities. In this paper, we consider a slight generalization of this usual model---from linear to convex "perceived" payments. This more general problem does not appear to admit a solution as simple and elegant as Myerson's. While some of Myerson's results extend to our setting, like his payment formula (suitably adjusted), others do not. For example, we observe that the solutions to the Bayesian and the robust (i.e., non-Bayesian) optimal auction design problems in the convex perceived payment setting do not coincide like they do in the case of linear payments. We therefore study the two problems in turn. We derive an upper and a heuristic lower bound on expected revenue in our setting. These bounds are easily computed pointwise, and yield monotonic allocation rules, so can be supported by Myerson payments (suitably adjusted). In this way, our bounds yield heuristics that approximate the optimal robust auction, assuming convex perceived payments. We close with experiments, the final set of which massages the output of one of the closed-form heuristics for the robust problem into an extremely fast, near-optimal heuristic solution to the Bayesian optimal auction design problem.

preprint2016arXiv

The Price of Anarchy in Auctions

This survey outlines a general and modular theory for proving approximation guarantees for equilibria of auctions in complex settings. This theory complements traditional economic techniques, which generally focus on exact and optimal solutions and are accordingly limited to relatively stylized settings. We highlight three user-friendly analytical tools: smoothness-type inequalities, which immediately yield approximation guarantees for many auction formats of interest in the special case of complete information and deterministic strategies; extension theorems, which extend such guarantees to randomized strategies, no-regret learning outcomes, and incomplete-information settings; and composition theorems, which extend such guarantees from simpler to more complex auctions. Combining these tools yields tight worst-case approximation guarantees for the equilibria of many widely-used auction formats.

preprint2015arXiv

Econometrics for Learning Agents

The main goal of this paper is to develop a theory of inference of player valuations from observed data in the generalized second price auction without relying on the Nash equilibrium assumption. Existing work in Economics on inferring agent values from data relies on the assumption that all participant strategies are best responses of the observed play of other players, i.e. they constitute a Nash equilibrium. In this paper, we show how to perform inference relying on a weaker assumption instead: assuming that players are using some form of no-regret learning. Learning outcomes emerged in recent years as an attractive alternative to Nash equilibrium in analyzing game outcomes, modeling players who haven't reached a stable equilibrium, but rather use algorithmic learning, aiming to learn the best way to play from previous observations. In this paper we show how to infer values of players who use algorithmic learning strategies. Such inference is an important first step before we move to testing any learning theoretic behavioral model on auction data. We apply our techniques to a dataset from Microsoft's sponsored search ad auction system.

preprint2015arXiv

Fast Convergence of Regularized Learning in Games

We show that natural classes of regularized learning algorithms with a form of recency bias achieve faster convergence rates to approximate efficiency and to coarse correlated equilibria in multiplayer normal form games. When each player in a game uses an algorithm from our class, their individual regret decays at $O(T^{-3/4})$, while the sum of utilities converges to an approximate optimum at $O(T^{-1})$--an improvement upon the worst case $O(T^{-1/2})$ rates. We show a black-box reduction for any algorithm in the class to achieve $\tilde{O}(T^{-1/2})$ rates against an adversary, while maintaining the faster rates against algorithms in the class. Our results extend those of [Rakhlin and Shridharan 2013] and [Daskalakis et al. 2014], who only analyzed two-player zero-sum games for specific algorithms.

preprint2015arXiv

Greedy Algorithms make Efficient Mechanisms

We study mechanisms that use greedy allocation rules and pay-your-bid pricing to allocate resources subject to a matroid constraint. We show that all such mechanisms obtain a constant fraction of the optimal welfare at any equilibrium of bidder behavior, via a smoothness argument. This unifies numerous recent results on the price of anarchy of simple auctions. Our results extend to polymatroid and matching constraints, and we discuss extensions to more general matroid intersections.

preprint2015arXiv

No-Regret Learning in Bayesian Games

Recent price-of-anarchy analyses of games of complete information suggest that coarse correlated equilibria, which characterize outcomes resulting from no-regret learning dynamics, have near-optimal welfare. This work provides two main technical results that lift this conclusion to games of incomplete information, a.k.a., Bayesian games. First, near-optimal welfare in Bayesian games follows directly from the smoothness-based proof of near-optimal welfare in the same game when the private information is public. Second, no-regret learning dynamics converge to Bayesian coarse correlated equilibrium in these incomplete information games. These results are enabled by interpretation of a Bayesian game as a stochastic game of complete information.

preprint2015arXiv

Price of Stability in Games of Incomplete Information

We address the question of whether price of stability results (existence of equilibria with low social cost) are robust to incomplete information. We show that this is the case in potential games, if the underlying algorithmic social cost minimization problem admits a constant factor approximation algorithm via strict cost-sharing schemes. Roughly, if the existence of an $α$-approximate equilibrium in the complete information setting was proven via the potential method, then there also exists a $α\cdot β$-approximate Bayes-Nash equilibrium in the incomplete information setting, where $β$ is the approximation factor of the strict-cost sharing scheme algorithm. We apply our approach to Bayesian versions of the archetypal, in the price of stability analysis, network design models and show the existence of $O(\log(n))$-approximate Bayes-Nash equilibria in several games whose complete information counterparts have been well-studied, such as undirected network design games, multi-cast games and covering games.

preprint2015arXiv

Pricing Queries Approximately Optimally

Data as a commodity has always been purchased and sold. Recently, web services that are data marketplaces have emerged that match data buyers with data sellers. So far there are no guidelines how to price queries against a database. We consider the recently proposed query-based pricing framework of Koutris et al and ask the question of computing optimal input prices in this framework by formulating a buyer utility model. We establish the interesting and deep equivalence between arbitrage-freeness in the query-pricing framework and envy-freeness in pricing theory for appropriately chosen buyer valuations. Given the approximation hardness results from envy-free pricing we then develop logarithmic approximation pricing algorithms exploiting the max flow interpretation of the arbitrage-free pricing for the restricted query language proposed by Koutris et al. We propose a novel polynomial-time logarithmic approximation pricing scheme and show that our new scheme performs better than the existing envy-free pricing algorithms instance-by-instance. We also present a faster pricing algorithm that is always greater than the existing solutions, but worse than our previous scheme. We experimentally show how our pricing algorithms perform with respect to the existing envy-free pricing algorithms and to the optimal exponentially computable solution, and our experiments show that our approximation algorithms consistently arrive at about 99% of the optimal.

preprint2015arXiv

The Price of Anarchy in Large Games

Game-theoretic models relevant for computer science applications usually feature a large number of players. The goal of this paper is to develop an analytical framework for bounding the price of anarchy in such models. We demonstrate the wide applicability of our framework through instantiations for several well-studied models, including simultaneous single-item auctions, greedy combinatorial auctions, and routing games. In all cases, we identify conditions under which the POA of large games is much better than that of worst-case instances. Our results also give new senses in which simple auctions can perform almost as well as optimal ones in realistic settings.

preprint2014arXiv

A Unifying Hierarchy of Valuations with Complements and Substitutes

We introduce a new hierarchy over monotone set functions, that we refer to as $\mathcal{MPH}$ (Maximum over Positive Hypergraphs). Levels of the hierarchy correspond to the degree of complementarity in a given function. The highest level of the hierarchy, $\mathcal{MPH}$-$m$ (where $m$ is the total number of items) captures all monotone functions. The lowest level, $\mathcal{MPH}$-$1$, captures all monotone submodular functions, and more generally, the class of functions known as $\mathcal{XOS}$. Every monotone function that has a positive hypergraph representation of rank $k$ (in the sense defined by Abraham, Babaioff, Dughmi and Roughgarden [EC 2012]) is in $\mathcal{MPH}$-$k$. Every monotone function that has supermodular degree $k$ (in the sense defined by Feige and Izsak [ITCS 2013]) is in $\mathcal{MPH}$-$(k+1)$. In both cases, the converse direction does not hold, even in an approximate sense. We present additional results that demonstrate the expressiveness power of $\mathcal{MPH}$-$k$. One can obtain good approximation ratios for some natural optimization problems, provided that functions are required to lie in low levels of the $\mathcal{MPH}$ hierarchy. We present two such applications. One shows that the maximum welfare problem can be approximated within a ratio of $k+1$ if all players hold valuation functions in $\mathcal{MPH}$-$k$. The other is an upper bound of $2k$ on the price of anarchy of simultaneous first price auctions. Being in $\mathcal{MPH}$-$k$ can be shown to involve two requirements -- one is monotonicity and the other is a certain requirement that we refer to as $\mathcal{PLE}$ (Positive Lower Envelope). Removing the monotonicity requirement, one obtains the $\mathcal{PLE}$ hierarchy over all non-negative set functions (whether monotone or not), which can be fertile ground for further research.

preprint2014arXiv

Social Status and Badge Design

Many websites rely on user-generated content to provide value to consumers. These websites typically incentivize participation by awarding users badges based on their contributions. While these badges typically have no explicit value, they act as symbols of social status within a community. In this paper, we consider the design of badge mechanisms for the objective of maximizing the total contributions made to a website. Users exert costly effort to make contributions and, in return, are awarded with badges. A badge is only valued to the extent that it signals social status and thus badge valuations are determined endogenously by the number of users who earn each badge. The goal of this paper is to study the design of optimal and approximately badge mechanisms under these status valuations. We characterize badge mechanisms by whether they use a coarse partitioning scheme, i.e. awarding the same badge to many users, or use a fine partitioning scheme, i.e. awarding a unique badge to most users. We find that the optimal mechanism uses both fine partitioning and coarse partitioning. When status valuations exhibit a decreasing marginal value property, we prove that coarse partitioning is a necessary feature of any approximately optimal mechanism. Conversely, when status valuations exhibit an increasing marginal value property, we prove that fine partitioning is necessary for approximate optimality.

preprint2013arXiv

Cost-Recovering Bayesian Algorithmic Mechanism Design

We study the design of Bayesian incentive compatible mechanisms in single parameter domains, for the objective of optimizing social efficiency as measured by social cost. In the problems we consider, a group of participants compete to receive service from a mechanism that can provide such services at a cost. The mechanism wishes to choose which agents to serve in order to maximize social efficiency, but is not willing to suffer an expected loss: the agents' payments should cover the cost of service in expectation. We develop a general method for converting arbitrary approximation algorithms for the underlying optimization problem into Bayesian incentive compatible mechanisms that are cost-recovering in expectation. In particular, we give polynomial time black-box reductions from the mechanism design problem to the problem of designing a social cost minimization algorithm without incentive constraints. Our reduction increases the expected social cost of the given algorithm by a factor of O(log(min{n, h})), where n is the number of agents and h is the ratio between the highest and lowest nonzero valuations in the support. We also provide a lower bound illustrating that this inflation of the social cost is essential: no BIC cost-recovering mechanism can achieve an approximation factor better than Ω(log(n)) or Ω(log(h)) in general. Our techniques extend to show that a certain class of truthful algorithms can be made cost-recovering in the non-Bayesian setting, in such a way that the approximation factor degrades by at most O(log(min{n, h})). This is an improvement over previously-known constructions with inflation factor O(log n).

preprint2013arXiv

Draft Auctions

We introduce draft auctions, which is a sequential auction format where at each iteration players bid for the right to buy items at a fixed price. We show that draft auctions offer an exponential improvement in social welfare at equilibrium over sequential item auctions where predetermined items are auctioned at each time step. Specifically, we show that for any subadditive valuation the social welfare at equilibrium is an $O(\log^2(m))$-approximation to the optimal social welfare, where $m$ is the number of items. We also provide tighter approximation results for several subclasses. Our welfare guarantees hold for Bayes-Nash equilibria and for no-regret learning outcomes, via the smooth-mechanism framework. Of independent interest, our techniques show that in a combinatorial auction setting, efficiency guarantees of a mechanism via smoothness for a very restricted class of cardinality valuations, extend with a small degradation, to subadditive valuations, the largest complement-free class of valuations. Variants of draft auctions have been used in practice and have been experimentally shown to outperform other auctions. Our results provide a theoretical justification.

preprint2013arXiv

Incentives and Efficiency in Uncertain Collaborative Environments

We consider collaborative systems where users make contributions across multiple available projects and are rewarded for their contributions in individual projects according to a local sharing of the value produced. This serves as a model of online social computing systems such as online Q&A forums and of credit sharing in scientific co-authorship settings. We show that the maximum feasible produced value can be well approximated by simple local sharing rules where users are approximately rewarded in proportion to their marginal contributions and that this holds even under incomplete information about the player's abilities and effort constraints. For natural instances we show almost 95% optimality at equilibrium. When players incur a cost for their effort, we identify a threshold phenomenon: the efficiency is a constant fraction of the optimal when the cost is strictly convex and decreases with the number of players if the cost is linear.

preprint2013arXiv

Limits of Efficiency in Sequential Auctions

We study the efficiency of sequential first-price item auctions at (subgame perfect) equilibrium. This auction format has recently attracted much attention, with previous work establishing positive results for unit-demand valuations and negative results for submodular valuations. This leaves a large gap in our understanding between these valuation classes. In this work we resolve this gap on the negative side. In particular, we show that even in the very restricted case in which each bidder has either an additive valuation or a unit-demand valuation, there exist instances in which the inefficiency at equilibrium grows linearly with the minimum of the number of items and the number of bidders. Moreover, these inefficient equilibria persist even under iterated elimination of weakly dominated strategies. Our main result implies linear inefficiency for many natural settings, including auctions with gross substitute valuations, capacitated valuations, budget-additive valuations, and additive valuations with hard budget constraints on the payments. Another implication is that the inefficiency in sequential auctions is driven by the maximum number of items contained in any player's optimal set, and this is tight. For capacitated valuations, our results imply a lower bound that equals the maximum capacity of any bidder, which is tight following the upper-bound technique established by Paes Leme et al. \cite{PaesLeme2012}.

preprint2013arXiv

Strong Price of Anarchy and Coalitional Dynamics

We introduce a framework for studying the effect of cooperation on the quality of outcomes in utility games. Our framework is a coalitional analog of the smoothness framework of non-cooperative games. Coalitional smoothness implies bounds on the strong price of anarchy, the loss of quality of coalitionally stable outcomes, as well as bounds on coalitional versions of coarse correlated equilibria and sink equilibria, which we define as out-of-equilibrium myopic behavior as determined by a natural coalitional version of best-response dynamics. Our coalitional smoothness framework captures existing results bounding the strong price of anarchy of network design games. We show that in any monotone utility-maximization game, if each player's utility is at least his marginal contribution to the welfare, then the strong price of anarchy is at most 2. This captures a broad class of games, including games with a very high price of anarchy. Additionally, we show that in potential games the strong price of anarchy is close to the price of stability, the quality of the best Nash equilibrium.

preprint2013arXiv

Vickrey Auctions for Irregular Distributions

The classic result of Bulow and Klemperer \cite{BK96} says that in a single-item auction recruiting one more bidder and running the Vickrey auction achieves a higher revenue than the optimal auction's revenue on the original set of bidders, when values are drawn i.i.d. from a regular distribution. We give a version of Bulow and Klemperer's result in settings where bidders' values are drawn from non-i.i.d. irregular distributions. We do this by modeling irregular distributions as some convex combination of regular distributions. The regular distributions that constitute the irregular distribution correspond to different population groups in the bidder population. Drawing a bidder from this collection of population groups is equivalent to drawing from some convex combination of these regular distributions. We show that recruiting one extra bidder from each underlying population group and running the Vickrey auction gives at least half of the optimal auction's revenue on the original set of bidders.

preprint2012arXiv

Bayesian Games and the Smoothness Framework

We consider a general class of Bayesian Games where each players utility depends on his type (possibly multidimensional) and on the strategy profile and where players' types are distributed independently. We show that if their full information version for any fixed instance of the type profile is a smooth game then the Price of Anarchy bound implied by the smoothness property, carries over to the Bayes-Nash Price of Anarchy. We show how some proofs from the literature (item bidding auctions, greedy auctions) can be cast as smoothness proofs or be simplified using smoothness. For first price item bidding with fractionally subadditive bidders we actually manage to improve by much the existing result \cite{Hassidim2011a} from 4 to $\frac{e}{e-1}\approx 1.58$. This also shows a very interesting separation between first and second price item bidding since second price item bidding has PoA at least 2 even under complete information. For a larger class of Bayesian Games where the strategy space of a player also changes with his type we are able to show that a slightly stronger definition of smoothness also implies a Bayes-Nash PoA bound. We show how weighted congestion games actually satisfy this stronger definition of smoothness. This allows us to show that the inefficiency bounds of weighted congestion games known in the literature carry over to incomplete versions where the weights of the players are private information. We also show how an incomplete version of a natural class of monotone valid utility games, called effort market games are universally $(1,1)$-smooth. Hence, we show that incomplete versions of effort market games where the abilities of the players and their budgets are private information has Bayes-Nash PoA at most 2.

preprint2012arXiv

Bayesian Sequential Auctions

In many natural settings agents participate in multiple different auctions that are not simultaneous. In such auctions, future opportunities affect strategic considerations of the players. The goal of this paper is to develop a quantitative understanding of outcomes of such sequential auctions. In earlier work (Paes Leme et al. 2012) we initiated the study of the price of anarchy in sequential auctions. We considered sequential first price auctions in the full information model, where players are aware of all future opportunities, as well as the valuation of all players. In this paper, we study efficiency in sequential auctions in the Bayesian environment, relaxing the informational assumption on the players. We focus on two environments, both studied in the full information model in Paes Leme et al. 2012, matching markets and matroid auctions. In the full information environment, a sequential first price cut auction for matroid settings is efficient. In Bayesian environments this is no longer the case, as we show using a simple example with three players. Our main result is a bound of $1+\frac{e}{e-1}\approx 2.58$ on the price of anarchy in both matroid auctions and single-value matching markets (even with correlated types) and a bound of $2\frac{e}{e-1}\approx 3.16$ for general matching markets with independent types. To bound the price of anarchy we need to consider possible deviations at an equilibrium. In a sequential Bayesian environment the effect of deviations is more complex than in one-shot games; early bids allow others to infer information about the player's value. We create effective deviations despite the presence of this difficulty by introducing a bluffing technique of independent interest.

preprint2012arXiv

Composable and Efficient Mechanisms

We initiate the study of efficient mechanism design with guaranteed good properties even when players participate in multiple different mechanisms simultaneously or sequentially. We define the class of smooth mechanisms, related to smooth games defined by Roughgarden, that can be thought of as mechanisms that generate approximately market clearing prices. We show that smooth mechanisms result in high quality outcome in equilibrium both in the full information setting and in the Bayesian setting with uncertainty about participants, as well as in learning outcomes. Our main result is to show that such mechanisms compose well: smoothness locally at each mechanism implies efficiency globally. For mechanisms where good performance requires that bidders do not bid above their value, we identify the notion of a weakly smooth mechanism. Weakly smooth mechanisms, such as the Vickrey auction, are approximately efficient under the no-overbidding assumption. Similar to smooth mechanisms, weakly smooth mechanisms behave well in composition, and have high quality outcome in equilibrium (assuming no overbidding) both in the full information setting and in the Bayesian setting, as well as in learning outcomes. In most of the paper we assume participants have quasi-linear valuations. We also extend some of our results to settings where participants have budget constraints.

preprint2012arXiv

Lower Bounds on Revenue of Approximately Optimal Auctions

We obtain revenue guarantees for the simple pricing mechanism of a single posted price, in terms of a natural parameter of the distribution of buyers' valuations. Our revenue guarantee applies to the single item n buyers setting, with values drawn from an arbitrary joint distribution. Specifically, we show that a single price drawn from the distribution of the maximum valuation Vmax = max {V_1, V_2, ...,V_n} achieves a revenue of at least a 1/e fraction of the geometric expecation of Vmax. This generic bound is a measure of how revenue improves/degrades as a function of the concentration/spread of Vmax. We further show that in absence of buyers' valuation distributions, recruiting an additional set of identical bidders will yield a similar guarantee on revenue. Finally, our bound also gives a measure of the extent to which one can simultaneously approximate welfare and revenue in terms of the concentration/spread of Vmax.

preprint2011arXiv

Sequential Auctions and Externalities

In many settings agents participate in multiple different auctions that are not necessarily implemented simultaneously. Future opportunities affect strategic considerations of the players in each auction, introducing externalities. Motivated by this consideration, we study a setting of a market of buyers and sellers, where each seller holds one item, bidders have combinatorial valuations and sellers hold item auctions sequentially. Our results are qualitatively different from those of simultaneous auctions, proving that simultaneity is a crucial aspect of previous work. We prove that if sellers hold sequential first price auctions then for unit-demand bidders (matching market) every subgame perfect equilibrium achieves at least half of the optimal social welfare, while for submodular bidders or when second price auctions are used, the social welfare can be arbitrarily worse than the optimal. We also show that a first price sequential auction for buying or selling a base of a matroid is always efficient, and implements the VCG outcome. An important tool in our analysis is studying first and second price auctions with externalities (bidders have valuations for each possible winner outcome), which can be of independent interest. We show that a Pure Nash Equilibrium always exists in a first price auction with externalities.