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Researcher profile

Thodoris Lykouris

Thodoris Lykouris contributes to research discovery and scholarly infrastructure.

ResearcherAffiliation not importedOpen to collaborate
Computer Science and Game TheoryMachine LearningData Structures and AlgorithmsArtificial Intelligenceecon.GNecon.THq-fin.EC

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Published work

6 published item(s)

preprint2026arXiv

Human-AI Productivity Paradoxes: Modeling the Interplay of Skill, Effort, and AI Assistance

Generative Artificial Intelligence (AI) tools are rapidly adopted in the workplace and in education, yet the empirical evidence on AI's impact remains mixed. We propose a model of human-AI interaction to better understand and analyze several mechanisms by which AI affects productivity. In our setup, human agents with varying skill levels exert utility-maximizing effort to produce certain task outcomes with AI assistance. We find that incorporating either endogeneity in skill development or in AI unreliability can induce a productivity paradox: increased levels of AI assistance may degrade productivity, leading to potentially significant shortfalls. Moreover, we examine the long-term distributional effect of AI on skill, and demonstrate that skill polarization can emerge in steady state when accounting for heterogeneity in AI literacy -- the agent's capability to identify and adapt to inaccurate AI outputs. Our results elucidate several mechanisms that may explain the emergence of human-AI productivity paradoxes and skill polarization, and identify simple measures that characterize when they arise.

0 citations0 reviewsNo code linkedOpen access
preprint2022arXiv

Contextual Search in the Presence of Adversarial Corruptions

We study contextual search, a generalization of binary search in higher dimensions, which captures settings such as feature-based dynamic pricing. Standard formulations of this problem assume that agents act in accordance with a specific homogeneous response model. In practice, however, some responses may be adversarially corrupted. Existing algorithms heavily depend on the assumed response model being (approximately) accurate for all agents and have poor performance in the presence of even a few such arbitrary misspecifications. We initiate the study of contextual search when some of the agents can behave in ways inconsistent with the underlying response model. In particular, we provide two algorithms, one based on multidimensional binary search methods and one based on gradient descent. We show that these algorithms attain near-optimal regret in the absence of adversarial corruptions and their performance degrades gracefully with the number of such agents, providing the first results for contextual search in any adversarial noise model. Our techniques draw inspiration from learning theory, game theory, high-dimensional geometry, and convex analysis.

0 citations0 reviewsNo code linkedOpen access
preprint2020arXiv

Bandits with adversarial scaling

We study "adversarial scaling", a multi-armed bandit model where rewards have a stochastic and an adversarial component. Our model captures display advertising where the "click-through-rate" can be decomposed to a (fixed across time) arm-quality component and a non-stochastic user-relevance component (fixed across arms). Despite the relative stochasticity of our model, we demonstrate two settings where most bandit algorithms suffer. On the positive side, we show that two algorithms, one from the action elimination and one from the mirror descent family are adaptive enough to be robust to adversarial scaling. Our results shed light on the robustness of adaptive parameter selection in stochastic bandits, which may be of independent interest.

0 citations0 reviewsNo code linkedOpen access
preprint2020arXiv

Competitive caching with machine learned advice

Traditional online algorithms encapsulate decision making under uncertainty, and give ways to hedge against all possible future events, while guaranteeing a nearly optimal solution as compared to an offline optimum. On the other hand, machine learning algorithms are in the business of extrapolating patterns found in the data to predict the future, and usually come with strong guarantees on the expected generalization error. In this work we develop a framework for augmenting online algorithms with a machine learned oracle to achieve competitive ratios that provably improve upon unconditional worst case lower bounds when the oracle has low error. Our approach treats the oracle as a complete black box, and is not dependent on its inner workings, or the exact distribution of its errors. We apply this framework to the traditional caching problem -- creating an eviction strategy for a cache of size $k$. We demonstrate that naively following the oracle's recommendations may lead to very poor performance, even when the average error is quite low. Instead we show how to modify the Marker algorithm to take into account the oracle's predictions, and prove that this combined approach achieves a competitive ratio that both (i) decreases as the oracle's error decreases, and (ii) is always capped by $O(\log k)$, which can be achieved without any oracle input. We complement our results with an empirical evaluation of our algorithm on real world datasets, and show that it performs well empirically even using simple off-the-shelf predictions.

0 citations0 reviewsNo code linkedOpen access
preprint2020arXiv

Feedback graph regret bounds for Thompson Sampling and UCB

We study the stochastic multi-armed bandit problem with the graph-based feedback structure introduced by Mannor and Shamir. We analyze the performance of the two most prominent stochastic bandit algorithms, Thompson Sampling and Upper Confidence Bound (UCB), in the graph-based feedback setting. We show that these algorithms achieve regret guarantees that combine the graph structure and the gaps between the means of the arm distributions. Surprisingly this holds despite the fact that these algorithms do not explicitly use the graph structure to select arms; they observe the additional feedback but do not explore based on it. Towards this result we introduce a "layering technique" highlighting the commonalities in the two algorithms.

0 citations0 reviewsNo code linkedOpen access
preprint2020arXiv

Learning and Efficiency in Games with Dynamic Population

We study the quality of outcomes in repeated games when the population of players is dynamically changing and participants use learning algorithms to adapt to the changing environment. Game theory classically considers Nash equilibria of one-shot games, while in practice many games are played repeatedly, and in such games players often use algorithmic tools to learn to play in the given environment. Most previous work on learning in repeated games assumes that the population playing the game is static over time. We analyze the efficiency of repeated games in dynamically changing environments, motivated by application domains such as Internet ad-auctions and packet routing. We prove that, in many classes of games, if players choose their strategies in a way that guarantees low adaptive regret, then high social welfare is ensured, even under very frequent changes. In fact, in large markets learning players achieve asymptotically optimal social welfare despite high turnover. Previous work has only showed that high welfare is guaranteed for learning outcomes in static environments. Our work extends these results to more realistic settings when participation is drastically evolving over time.

0 citations0 reviewsNo code linkedOpen access