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Swapnil Dhamal

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Computer Science and Game Theory Artificial Intelligence Machine Learning Social and Information Networks Multiagent Systems physics.soc-ph

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preprint2026arXiv

Meritocratic Fairness in Budgeted Combinatorial Multi-armed Bandits via Shapley Values

We propose a new framework for meritocratic fairness in budgeted combinatorial multi-armed bandits with full-bandit feedback (BCMAB-FBF). Unlike semi-bandit feedback, the contribution of individual arms is not received in full-bandit feedback, making the setting significantly more challenging. To compute arm contributions in BCMAB-FBF, we first extend the Shapley value, a classical solution concept from cooperative game theory, to the $K$-Shapley value, which captures the marginal contribution of an agent restricted to a set of size at most $K$. We show that $K$-Shapley value is a unique solution concept that satisfies Symmetry, Linearity, Null player, and efficiency properties. We next propose K-SVFair-FBF, a fairness-aware bandit algorithm that adaptively estimates $K$-Shapley value with unknown valuation function. Unlike standard bandit literature on full bandit feedback, K-SVFair-FBF not only learns the valuation function under full feedback setting but also mitigates the noise arising from Monte Carlo approximations. Theoretically, we prove that K-SVFair-FBF achieves $O(T^{3/4})$ regret bound on fairness regret. Through experiments on federated learning and social influence maximization datasets, we demonstrate that our approach achieves fairness and performs more effectively than existing baselines.

preprint2022arXiv

Individual Fairness in Feature-Based Pricing for Monopoly Markets

We study fairness in the context of feature-based price discrimination in monopoly markets. We propose a new notion of individual fairness, namely, α-fairness, which guarantees that individuals with similar features face similar prices. First, we study discrete valuation space and give an analytical solution for optimal fair feature-based pricing. We show that the cost of fair pricing is defined as the ratio of expected revenue in an optimal feature-based pricing to the expected revenue in an optimal fair feature-based pricing (CoF) can be arbitrarily large in general. When the revenue function is continuous and concave with respect to the prices, we show that one can achieve CoF strictly less than 2, irrespective of the model parameters. Finally, we provide an algorithm to compute fair feature-based pricing strategy that achieves this CoF.

preprint2021arXiv

Ballooning Multi-Armed Bandits

In this paper, we introduce Ballooning Multi-Armed Bandits (BL-MAB), a novel extension of the classical stochastic MAB model. In the BL-MAB model, the set of available arms grows (or balloons) over time. In contrast to the classical MAB setting where the regret is computed with respect to the best arm overall, the regret in a BL-MAB setting is computed with respect to the best available arm at each time. We first observe that the existing stochastic MAB algorithms result in linear regret for the BL-MAB model. We prove that, if the best arm is equally likely to arrive at any time instant, a sub-linear regret cannot be achieved. Next, we show that if the best arm is more likely to arrive in the early rounds, one can achieve sub-linear regret. Our proposed algorithm determines (1) the fraction of the time horizon for which the newly arriving arms should be explored and (2) the sequence of arm pulls in the exploitation phase from among the explored arms. Making reasonable assumptions on the arrival distribution of the best arm in terms of the thinness of the distribution's tail, we prove that the proposed algorithm achieves sub-linear instance-independent regret. We further quantify explicit dependence of regret on the arrival distribution parameters. We reinforce our theoretical findings with extensive simulation results. We conclude by showing that our algorithm would achieve sub-linear regret even if (a) the distributional parameters are not exactly known, but are obtained using a reasonable learning mechanism or (b) the best arm is not more likely to arrive early, but a large fraction of arms is likely to arrive relatively early.

preprint2015arXiv

A Multi-phase Approach for Improving Information Diffusion in Social Networks

For maximizing influence spread in a social network, given a certain budget on the number of seed nodes, we investigate the effects of selecting and activating the seed nodes in multiple phases. In particular, we formulate an appropriate objective function for two-phase influence maximization under the independent cascade model, investigate its properties, and propose algorithms for determining the seed nodes in the two phases. We also study the problem of determining an optimal budget-split and delay between the two phases.

preprint2014arXiv

Sufficient Conditions for Formation of a Network Topology by Self-interested Agents

Networks such as organizational network of a global company play an important role in a variety of knowledge management and information diffusion tasks. The nodes in these networks correspond to individuals who are self-interested. The topology of these networks often plays a crucial role in deciding the ease and speed with which certain tasks can be accomplished using these networks. Consequently, growing a stable network having a certain topology is of interest. Motivated by this, we study the following important problem: given a certain desired network topology, under what conditions would best response (link addition/deletion) strategies played by self-interested agents lead to formation of a pairwise stable network with only that topology. We study this interesting reverse engineering problem by proposing a natural model of recursive network formation. In this model, nodes enter the network sequentially and the utility of a node captures principal determinants of network formation, namely (1) benefits from immediate neighbors, (2) costs of maintaining links with immediate neighbors, (3) benefits from indirect neighbors, (4) bridging benefits, and (5) network entry fee. Based on this model, we analyze relevant network topologies such as star graph, complete graph, bipartite Turan graph, and multiple stars with interconnected centers, and derive a set of sufficient conditions under which these topologies emerge as pairwise stable networks. We also study the social welfare properties of the above topologies.

preprint2012arXiv

Pattern Clustering using Cooperative Game Theory

In this paper, we approach the classical problem of clustering using solution concepts from cooperative game theory such as Nucleolus and Shapley value. We formulate the problem of clustering as a characteristic form game and develop a novel algorithm DRAC (Density-Restricted Agglomerative Clustering) for clustering. With extensive experimentation on standard data sets, we compare the performance of DRAC with that of well known algorithms. We show an interesting result that four prominent solution concepts, Nucleolus, Shapley value, Gately point and τ-value coincide for the defined characteristic form game. This vindicates the choice of the characteristic function of the clustering game and also provides strong intuitive foundation for our approach.