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Sreenivas Gollapudi

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Published work

11 published item(s)

preprint2026arXiv

Efficient Online Conformal Selection with Limited Feedback

We address the problem of conformal selection, where an agent must select a minimal subset of options to ensure that at least one ``success'' is identified with a pre-specified target probability $φ$. While traditional online conformal prediction focuses on maintaining validity for the observed sequence, minimizing the resource cost (efficiency) of such selections, especially under limited feedback, remains a significant challenge. In this work, we consider settings with the most limited ``bandit'' feedback, and demonstrate that the simple Adaptive Conformal Inference (ACI) update rule, when applied to the appropriate control parameter or dual variable, is both adversarially valid, ensuring the success target is met on average for any input sequence (and hence under distribution shifts), and stochastically efficient, achieving sublinear efficiency regret for $i.i.d.$ inputs against an appropriate stochastic benchmark. We show such guarantees under canonical models capturing bandit and semi-bandit feedback to the agent via a unifying algorithmic technique, and analytic framework involving Lyapunov functions. Our approach handles more complex settings than prior work, while requiring significantly less feedback, and our results provide a new theoretical bridge between efficient online learning with limited feedback and distribution-free uncertainty quantification.

preprint2022arXiv

Affinity-Aware Graph Networks

Graph Neural Networks (GNNs) have emerged as a powerful technique for learning on relational data. Owing to the relatively limited number of message passing steps they perform -- and hence a smaller receptive field -- there has been significant interest in improving their expressivity by incorporating structural aspects of the underlying graph. In this paper, we explore the use of affinity measures as features in graph neural networks, in particular measures arising from random walks, including effective resistance, hitting and commute times. We propose message passing networks based on these features and evaluate their performance on a variety of node and graph property prediction tasks. Our architecture has lower computational complexity, while our features are invariant to the permutations of the underlying graph. The measures we compute allow the network to exploit the connectivity properties of the graph, thereby allowing us to outperform relevant benchmarks for a wide variety of tasks, often with significantly fewer message passing steps. On one of the largest publicly available graph regression datasets, OGB-LSC-PCQM4Mv1, we obtain the best known single-model validation MAE at the time of writing.

preprint2020arXiv

Almost Envy-free Repeated Matching in Two-sided Markets

A two-sided market consists of two sets of agents, each of whom have preferences over the other (Airbnb, Upwork, Lyft, Uber, etc.). We propose and analyze a repeated matching problem, where some set of matches occur on each time step, and our goal is to ensure fairness with respect to the cumulative allocations over an infinite time horizon. Our main result is a polynomial-time algorithm for additive, symmetric (v_i(j) = v_j(i)), and binary (v_i(j) \in \{a,1\}) valuations that both (1) guarantees "envy-freeness up to a single match" (EF1) and (2) selects a maximum weight matching on each time step. Thus for this class of valuations, fairness can be achieved without sacrificing economic efficiency. This result holds even for "dynamic valuations", i.e., valuations that change over time. Although symmetry is a strong assumption, we show that this result cannot be extended to asymmetric binary valuations: (1) and (2) together are impossible even when valuations do not change over time, and for dynamic valuations, even (1) alone is impossible. To our knowledge, this is the first analysis of envy-freeness in a repeated matching setting.

preprint2020arXiv

Predict and Match: Prophet Inequalities with Uncertain Supply

We consider the problem of selling perishable items to a stream of buyers in order to maximize social welfare. A seller starts with a set of identical items, and each arriving buyer wants any one item, and has a valuation drawn i.i.d. from a known distribution. Each item, however, disappears after an a priori unknown amount of time that we term the horizon for that item. The seller knows the (possibly different) distribution of the horizon for each item, but not its realization till the item actually disappears. As with the classic prophet inequalities, the goal is to design an online pricing scheme that competes with the prophet that knows the horizon and extracts full social surplus (or welfare). Our main results are for the setting where items have independent horizon distributions satisfying the monotone-hazard-rate (MHR) condition. Here, for any number of items, we achieve a constant-competitive bound via a conceptually simple policy that balances the rate at which buyers are accepted with the rate at which items are removed from the system. We implement this policy via a novel technique of matching via probabilistically simulating departures of the items at future times. Moreover, for a single item and MHR horizon distribution with mean $μ$, we show a tight result: There is a fixed pricing scheme that has competitive ratio at most $2 - 1/μ$, and this is the best achievable in this class. We further show that our results are best possible. First, we show that the competitive ratio is unbounded without the MHR assumption even for one item. Further, even when the horizon distributions are i.i.d. MHR and the number of items becomes large, the competitive ratio of any policy is lower bounded by a constant greater than $1$, which is in sharp contrast to the setting with identical deterministic horizons.

preprint2013arXiv

Optimal Auctions via the Multiplicative Weight Method

We show that the multiplicative weight update method provides a simple recipe for designing and analyzing optimal Bayesian Incentive Compatible (BIC) auctions, and reduces the time complexity of the problem to pseudo-polynomial in parameters that depend on single agent instead of depending on the size of the joint type space. We use this framework to design computationally efficient optimal auctions that satisfy ex-post Individual Rationality in the presence of constraints such as (hard, private) budgets and envy-freeness. We also design optimal auctions when buyers and a seller's utility functions are non-linear. Scenarios with such functions include (a) auctions with "quitting rights", (b) cost to borrow money beyond budget, (c) a seller's and buyers' risk aversion. Finally, we show how our framework also yields optimal auctions for variety of auction settings considered in Cai et al, Alaei et al, albeit with pseudo-polynomial running times.

preprint2012arXiv

Ranked bandits in metric spaces: learning optimally diverse rankings over large document collections

Most learning to rank research has assumed that the utility of different documents is independent, which results in learned ranking functions that return redundant results. The few approaches that avoid this have rather unsatisfyingly lacked theoretical foundations, or do not scale. We present a learning-to-rank formulation that optimizes the fraction of satisfied users, with several scalable algorithms that explicitly takes document similarity and ranking context into account. Our formulation is a non-trivial common generalization of two multi-armed bandit models from the literature: "ranked bandits" (Radlinski et al., ICML 2008) and "Lipschitz bandits" (Kleinberg et al., STOC 2008). We present theoretical justifications for this approach, as well as a near-optimal algorithm. Our evaluation adds optimizations that improve empirical performance, and shows that our algorithms learn orders of magnitude more quickly than previous approaches.

preprint2012arXiv

Structured Query Reformulations in Commerce Search

Recent work in commerce search has shown that understanding the semantics in user queries enables more effective query analysis and retrieval of relevant products. However, due to lack of sufficient domain knowledge, user queries often include terms that cannot be mapped directly to any product attribute. For example, a user looking for {\tt designer handbags} might start with such a query because she is not familiar with the manufacturers, the price ranges, and/or the material that gives a handbag designer appeal. Current commerce search engines treat terms such as {\tt designer} as keywords and attempt to match them to contents such as product reviews and product descriptions, often resulting in poor user experience. In this study, we propose to address this problem by reformulating queries involving terms such as {\tt designer}, which we call \emph{modifiers}, to queries that specify precise product attributes. We learn to rewrite the modifiers to attribute values by analyzing user behavior and leveraging structured data sources such as the product catalog that serves the queries. We first produce a probabilistic mapping between the modifiers and attribute values based on user behavioral data. These initial associations are then used to retrieve products from the catalog, over which we infer sets of attribute values that best describe the semantics of the modifiers. We evaluate the effectiveness of our approach based on a comprehensive Mechanical Turk study. We find that users agree with the attribute values selected by our approach in about 95% of the cases and they prefer the results surfaced for our reformulated queries to ones for the original queries in 87% of the time.

preprint2011arXiv

Efficient Query Rewrite for Structured Web Queries

Web search engines and specialized online verticals are increasingly incorporating results from structured data sources to answer semantically rich user queries. For example, the query \WebQuery{Samsung 50 inch led tv} can be answered using information from a table of television data. However, the users are not domain experts and quite often enter values that do not match precisely the underlying data. Samsung makes 46- or 55- inch led tvs, but not 50-inch ones. So a literal execution of the above mentioned query will return zero results. For optimal user experience, a search engine would prefer to return at least a minimum number of results as close to the original query as possible. Furthermore, due to typical fast retrieval speeds in web-search, a search engine query execution is time-bound. In this paper, we address these challenges by proposing algorithms that rewrite the user query in a principled manner, surfacing at least the required number of results while satisfying the low-latency constraint. We formalize these requirements and introduce a general formulation of the problem. We show that under a natural formulation, the problem is NP-Hard to solve optimally, and present approximation algorithms that produce good rewrites. We empirically validate our algorithms on large-scale data obtained from a commercial search engine's shopping vertical.

preprint2010arXiv

Budget Constrained Auctions with Heterogeneous Items

In this paper, we present the first approximation algorithms for the problem of designing revenue optimal Bayesian incentive compatible auctions when there are multiple (heterogeneous) items and when bidders can have arbitrary demand and budget constraints. Our mechanisms are surprisingly simple: We show that a sequential all-pay mechanism is a 4 approximation to the revenue of the optimal ex-interim truthful mechanism with discrete correlated type space for each bidder. We also show that a sequential posted price mechanism is a O(1) approximation to the revenue of the optimal ex-post truthful mechanism when the type space of each bidder is a product distribution that satisfies the standard hazard rate condition. We further show a logarithmic approximation when the hazard rate condition is removed, and complete the picture by showing that achieving a sub-logarithmic approximation, even for regular distributions and one bidder, requires pricing bundles of items. Our results are based on formulating novel LP relaxations for these problems, and developing generic rounding schemes from first principles. We believe this approach will be useful in other Bayesian mechanism design contexts.

preprint2010arXiv

Revisiting the Examination Hypothesis with Query Specific Position Bias

Click through rates (CTR) offer useful user feedback that can be used to infer the relevance of search results for queries. However it is not very meaningful to look at the raw click through rate of a search result because the likelihood of a result being clicked depends not only on its relevance but also the position in which it is displayed. One model of the browsing behavior, the {\em Examination Hypothesis} \cite{RDR07,Craswell08,DP08}, states that each position has a certain probability of being examined and is then clicked based on the relevance of the search snippets. This is based on eye tracking studies \cite{Claypool01, GJG04} which suggest that users are less likely to view results in lower positions. Such a position dependent variation in the probability of examining a document is referred to as {\em position bias}. Our main observation in this study is that the position bias tends to differ with the kind of information the user is looking for. This makes the position bias {\em query specific}. In this study, we present a model for analyzing a query specific position bias from the click data and use these biases to derive position independent relevance values of search results. Our model is based on the assumption that for a given query, the positional click through rate of a document is proportional to the product of its relevance and a {\em query specific} position bias. We compare our model with the vanilla examination hypothesis model (EH) on a set of queries obtained from search logs of a commercial search engine. We also compare it with the User Browsing Model (UBM) \cite{DP08} which extends the cascade model of Craswell et al\cite{Craswell08} by incorporating multiple clicks in a query session. We show that the our model, although much simpler to implement, consistently outperforms both EH and UBM on well-used measures such as relative error and cross entropy.

preprint2010arXiv

Understanding Fashion Cycles as a Social Choice

We present a formal model for studying fashion trends, in terms of three parameters of fashionable items: (1) their innate utility; (2) individual boredom associated with repeated usage of an item; and (3) social influences associated with the preferences from other people. While there are several works that emphasize the effect of social influence in understanding fashion trends, in this paper we show how boredom plays a strong role in both individual and social choices. We show how boredom can be used to explain the cyclic choices in several scenarios such as an individual who has to pick a restaurant to visit every day, or a society that has to repeatedly `vote' on a single fashion style from a collection. We formally show that a society that votes for a single fashion style can be viewed as a single individual cycling through different choices. In our model, the utility of an item gets discounted by the amount of boredom that has accumulated over the past; this boredom increases with every use of the item and decays exponentially when not used. We address the problem of optimally choosing items for usage, so as to maximize over-all satisfaction, i.e., composite utility, over a period of time. First we show that the simple greedy heuristic of always choosing the item with the maximum current composite utility can be arbitrarily worse than the optimal. Second, we prove that even with just a single individual, determining the optimal strategy for choosing items is NP-hard. Third, we show that a simple modification to the greedy algorithm that simply doubles the boredom of each item is a provably close approximation to the optimal strategy. Finally, we present an experimental study over real-world data collected from query logs to compare our algorithms.