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Kostas Kollias

Kostas Kollias contributes to research discovery and scholarly infrastructure.

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Published work

3 published item(s)

preprint2026arXiv

Efficient Online Conformal Selection with Limited Feedback

We address the problem of conformal selection, where an agent must select a minimal subset of options to ensure that at least one ``success'' is identified with a pre-specified target probability $φ$. While traditional online conformal prediction focuses on maintaining validity for the observed sequence, minimizing the resource cost (efficiency) of such selections, especially under limited feedback, remains a significant challenge. In this work, we consider settings with the most limited ``bandit'' feedback, and demonstrate that the simple Adaptive Conformal Inference (ACI) update rule, when applied to the appropriate control parameter or dual variable, is both adversarially valid, ensuring the success target is met on average for any input sequence (and hence under distribution shifts), and stochastically efficient, achieving sublinear efficiency regret for $i.i.d.$ inputs against an appropriate stochastic benchmark. We show such guarantees under canonical models capturing bandit and semi-bandit feedback to the agent via a unifying algorithmic technique, and analytic framework involving Lyapunov functions. Our approach handles more complex settings than prior work, while requiring significantly less feedback, and our results provide a new theoretical bridge between efficient online learning with limited feedback and distribution-free uncertainty quantification.

preprint2022arXiv

Improved Price of Anarchy via Predictions

A central goal in algorithmic game theory is to analyze the performance of decentralized multiagent systems, like communication and information networks. In the absence of a central planner who can enforce how these systems are utilized, the users can strategically interact with the system, aiming to maximize their own utility, possibly leading to very inefficient outcomes, and thus a high price of anarchy. To alleviate this issue, the system designer can use decentralized mechanisms that regulate the use of each resource (e.g., using local queuing protocols or scheduling mechanisms), but with only limited information regarding the state of the system. These information limitations have a severe impact on what such decentralized mechanisms can achieve, so most of the success stories in this literature have had to make restrictive assumptions (e.g., by either restricting the structure of the networks or the types of cost functions). In this paper, we overcome some of the obstacles that the literature has imposed on decentralized mechanisms, by designing mechanisms that are enhanced with predictions regarding the missing information. Specifically, inspired by the big success of the literature on "algorithms with predictions", we design decentralized mechanisms with predictions and evaluate their price of anarchy as a function of the prediction error, focusing on two very well-studied classes of games: scheduling games and multicast network formation games.

preprint2020arXiv

Almost Envy-free Repeated Matching in Two-sided Markets

A two-sided market consists of two sets of agents, each of whom have preferences over the other (Airbnb, Upwork, Lyft, Uber, etc.). We propose and analyze a repeated matching problem, where some set of matches occur on each time step, and our goal is to ensure fairness with respect to the cumulative allocations over an infinite time horizon. Our main result is a polynomial-time algorithm for additive, symmetric (v_i(j) = v_j(i)), and binary (v_i(j) \in \{a,1\}) valuations that both (1) guarantees "envy-freeness up to a single match" (EF1) and (2) selects a maximum weight matching on each time step. Thus for this class of valuations, fairness can be achieved without sacrificing economic efficiency. This result holds even for "dynamic valuations", i.e., valuations that change over time. Although symmetry is a strong assumption, we show that this result cannot be extended to asymmetric binary valuations: (1) and (2) together are impossible even when valuations do not change over time, and for dynamic valuations, even (1) alone is impossible. To our knowledge, this is the first analysis of envy-freeness in a repeated matching setting.