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Saurabh Amin

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Published work

15 published item(s)

preprint2026arXiv

Budget-Efficient Automatic Algorithm Design via Code Graph

Large language models (LLMs) have emerged as powerful tools for automatic algorithm design (AAD). However, existing pipelines remain inefficient. They operate at the granularity of full algorithms, redundantly rewriting recurring substructures and discarding low-fitness candidates that may contain valuable algorithmic features. We formalize budget-efficient automatic algorithm design, wherein the search policy maximizes realized fitness subject to limited computational cost. We propose a directed acyclic graph representation of algorithms and build a search framework that fully exploits the LLM's output. Instead of querying the LLM for full algorithms, we use it to obtain corrections: compact operators that add, replace, or remove code blocks. Each correction augments the graph, yielding new algorithms that compose with prior corrections. This graph structure decomposes algorithms into sets of corrections, enabling correction-level credit assignment that informs subsequent queries. We complement this framework with theoretical insights into the ideal balance between search depth and breadth at different budget levels. We validate our method empirically on three combinatorial optimization problems, demonstrating consistent superiority of our graph-based search over full-algorithm search at equal token budget. Finally, our experiments suggest that rich contexts help only when the LLM's prior knowledge is shallow, and can hinder performance otherwise.

preprint2022arXiv

Green Routing Game: Strategic Logistical Planning using Mixed Fleets of ICEVs and EVs

This paper introduces a "green" routing game between multiple logistic operators (players), each owning a mixed fleet of internal combustion engine vehicle (ICEV) and electric vehicle (EV) trucks. Each player faces the cost of delayed delivery (due to charging requirements of EVs) and a pollution cost levied on the ICEVs. This cost structure models: 1) limited battery capacity of EVs and their charging requirement; 2) shared nature of charging facilities; 3) pollution cost levied by regulatory agency on the use of ICEVs. We characterize Nash equilibria of this game and derive a condition for its uniqueness. We also use the gradient projection method to compute this equilibrium in a distributed manner. Our equilibrium analysis is useful to analyze the trade-off faced by players in incurring higher delay due to congestion at charging locations when the share of EVs increases versus a higher pollution cost when the share of ICEVs increases. A numerical example suggests that to increase marginal pollution cost can dramatically reduce inefficiency of equilibria.

preprint2022arXiv

Optimal Information Provision for Strategic Hybrid Workers

We study the problem of information provision by a strategic central planner who can publicly signal about an uncertain infectious risk parameter. Signalling leads to an updated public belief over the parameter, and agents then make equilibrium choices on whether to work remotely or in-person. The planner maintains a set of desirable outcomes for each realization of the uncertain parameter and seeks to maximize the probability that agents choose an acceptable outcome for the true parameter. We distinguish between stateless and stateful objectives. In the former, the set of desirable outcomes does not change as a function of the risk parameter, whereas in the latter it does. For stateless objectives, we reduce the problem to maximizing the probability of inducing mean beliefs that lie in intervals computable from the set of desirable outcomes. We derive the optimal signalling mechanism and show that it partitions the parameter domain into at most two intervals with the signals generated according to an interval-specific distribution. For the stateful case, we consider a practically relevant situation in which the planner can enforce in-person work capacity limits that progressively get more stringent as the risk parameter increases. We show that the optimal signalling mechanism for this case can be obtained by solving a linear program. We numerically verify the improvement in achieving desirable outcomes using our information design relative to no information and full information benchmarks.

preprint2022arXiv

Resilient Ramp Control for Highways Facing Stochastic Perturbations

Highway capacity is often subject to stochastic perturbations due to the combined effects of weather, traffic mixture, driver behavior, etc. This paper is motivated by the need of a systematic approach to traffic control with performance guarantees in the face of such perturbations. We develop a novel control-theoretic method for designing perturbation-resilient ramp metering. We consider a cell-transmission model with 1) Markovian cell capacities and 2) buffers representing on-ramps and upstream mainline. Using this model, we analyze the stability of on-ramp queues by constructing piecewise Lyapunov functions that consider the nature of nonlinear traffic dynamics. Then, we design ramp controllers that guarantee bounds for throughput and queue sizes. We also formulate the problem of coordinated ramp metering as a bi-level optimization with non-convex inner sub-problems. To address the computational issue in solving this problem, we also consider localized and partially coordinated reformulations. A case study of a 18.1-km highway in Los Angeles, USA indicates a 8.3\% (resp. 9.9\%) reduction of vehicle-hours-traveled obtained by the localized (resp. partially coordinated) control, both outperforming the classical ALINEA and METALINE controllers.

preprint2021arXiv

Efficient Carpooling and Toll Pricing for Autonomous Transportation

In this paper, we address the existence and computation of competitive equilibrium in the transportation market for autonomous carpooling first proposed by [Ostrovsky and Schwarz, 2019]. At equilibrium, the market organizes carpooled trips over a transportation network in a socially optimal manner and sets the corresponding payments for individual riders and toll prices on edges. The market outcome ensures individual rationality, stability of carpooled trips, budget balance, and market clearing properties under heterogeneous rider preferences. We show that the question of market's existence can be resolved by proving the existence of an integer optimal solution of a linear programming problem. We characterize conditions on the network topology and riders' disutility for carpooling under which a market equilibrium can be computed in polynomial time. This characterization relies on ideas from the theory of combinatorial auctions and minimum cost network flow problem. Finally, we characterize a market equilibrium that achieves strategyproofness and maximizes welfare of individual riders.

preprint2020arXiv

Network Inspection for Detecting Strategic Attacks

This article studies a problem of strategic network inspection, in which a defender (agency) is tasked with detecting the presence of multiple attacks in the network. An inspection strategy entails monitoring the network components, possibly in a randomized manner, using a given number of detectors. We formulate the network inspection problem $(\mathcal{P})$ as a large-scale bilevel optimization problem, in which the defender seeks to determine an inspection strategy with minimum number of detectors that ensures a target expected detection rate under worst-case attacks. We show that optimal solutions of $(\mathcal{P})$ can be obtained from the equilibria of a large-scale zero-sum game. Our equilibrium analysis involves both game-theoretic and combinatorial arguments, and leads to a computationally tractable approach to solve $(\mathcal{P})$. Firstly, we construct an approximate solution by utilizing solutions of minimum set cover (MSC) and maximum set packing (MSP) problems, and evaluate its detection performance. In fact, this construction generalizes some of the known results in network security games. Secondly, we leverage properties of the optimal detection rate to iteratively refine our MSC/MSP-based solution through a column generation procedure. Computational results on benchmark water networks demonstrate the scalability, performance, and operational feasibility of our approach. The results indicate that utilities can achieve a high level of protection in large-scale networks by strategically positioning a small number of detectors.

preprint2020arXiv

Probability Distributions on Partially Ordered Sets and Network Interdiction Games

This article poses the following problem: Does there exist a probability distribution over subsets of a finite partially ordered set (poset), such that a set of constraints involving marginal probabilities of the poset's elements and maximal chains is satisfied? We present a combinatorial algorithm to positively resolve this question. The algorithm can be implemented in polynomial time in the special case where maximal chain probabilities are affine functions of their elements. This existence problem is relevant for the equilibrium characterization of a generic strategic interdiction game on a capacitated flow network. The game involves a routing entity that sends its flow through the network while facing path transportation costs, and an interdictor who simultaneously interdicts one or more edges while facing edge interdiction costs. Using our existence result on posets and strict complementary slackness in linear programming, we show that the Nash equilibria of this game can be fully described using primal and dual solutions of a minimum-cost circulation problem. Our analysis provides a new characterization of the critical components in the interdiction game. It also leads to a polynomial-time approach for equilibrium computation.

preprint2020arXiv

Stochastic Resource Allocation for Electricity Distribution Network Resilience

In recent years, it has become crucial to improve the resilience of electricity distribution networks (DNs) against storm-induced failures. Microgrids enabled by Distributed Energy Resources (DERs) can significantly help speed up re-energization of loads, particularly in the complete absence of bulk power supply. We describe an integrated approach which considers a pre-storm DER allocation problem under the uncertainty of failure scenarios as well as a post-storm dispatch problem in microgrids during the multi-period repair of the failed components. This problem is computationally challenging because the number of scenarios (resp. binary variables) increases exponentially (resp. quadratically) in the network size. Our overall solution approach for solving the resulting two-stage mixed-integer linear program (MILP) involves implementing the sample average approximation (SAA) method and Benders Decomposition. Additionally, we implement a greedy approach to reduce the computational time requirements of the post-storm repair scheduling and dispatch problem. The optimality of the resulting solution is evaluated on a modified IEEE 36-node network.

preprint2020arXiv

Value of Information in Bayesian Routing Games

We study a routing game in an environment with multiple heterogeneous information systems and an uncertain state that affects edge costs of a congested network. Each information system sends a noisy signal about the state to its subscribed traveler population. Travelers make route choices based on their private beliefs about the state and other populations' signals. The question then arises, "How does the presence of asymmetric and incomplete information affect the travelers' equilibrium route choices and costs?'' We develop a systematic approach to characterize the equilibrium structure, and determine the effect of population sizes on the relative value of information (i.e. difference in expected traveler costs) between any two populations. This effect can be evaluated using a population-specific size threshold. One population enjoys a strictly positive value of information in comparison to the other if and only if its size is below the corresponding threshold. We also consider the situation when travelers may choose an information system based on its value, and characterize the set of equilibrium adoption rates delineating the sizes of subscribed traveler populations. The resulting routing strategies are such that all travelers face an identical expected cost and no traveler has the incentive to change her subscription.

preprint2016arXiv

Effects of Information Heterogeneity in Bayesian Routing Games

This article studies the value of information in route choice decisions when a fraction of players have access to high accuracy information about traffic incidents relative to others. To model such environments, we introduce a Bayesian congestion game, in which players have private information about incidents, and each player chooses her route on a network of parallel links. The links are prone to incidents that occur with an ex-ante known probability. The demand is comprised of two player populations: one with access to high accuracy incident information and another with low accuracy information, i.e. the populations differ only by their access to information. The common knowledge includes: (i) the demand and route cost functions, (ii) the fraction of highly-informed players, (iii) the incident probability, and (iv) the marginal type distributions induced by the information structure of the game. We present a full characterization of the Bayesian Wardrop Equilibrium of this game under the assumption that low information players receive no additional information beyond common knowledge. We also compute the cost to individual players and the social cost as a function of the fraction of highly-informed players when they receive perfectly accurate information. Our first result suggests that below a certain threshold of highly-informed players, both populations experience a reduction in individual cost, with the highly-informed players receiving a greater reduction. However, above this threshold, both populations realize the same equilibrium cost. Secondly, there exists another (lower or equal) threshold above which a further increase in the fraction of highly-informed players does not reduce the expected social costs. Thus, once a sufficiently large number of players are highly informed, wider distribution of more accurate information is ineffective at best, and otherwise socially harmful.

preprint2016arXiv

Network Flow Routing under Strategic Link Disruptions

This paper considers a 2-player strategic game for network routing under link disruptions. Player 1 (defender) routes flow through a network to maximize her value of effective flow while facing transportation costs. Player 2 (attacker) simultaneously disrupts one or more links to maximize her value of lost flow but also faces cost of disrupting links. This game is strategically equivalent to a zero-sum game. Linear programming duality and the max-flow min-cut theorem are applied to obtain properties that are satisfied in any mixed Nash equilibrium. In any equilibrium, both players achieve identical payoffs. While the defender's expected transportation cost decreases in attacker's marginal value of lost flow, the attacker's expected cost of attack increases in defender's marginal value of effective flow. Interestingly, the expected amount of effective flow decreases in both these parameters. These results can be viewed as a generalization of the classical max-flow with minimum transportation cost problem to adversarial environments.

preprint2016arXiv

Security Assessment of Electricity Distribution Networks under DER Node Compromises

This article focuses on the security assessment of electricity Distribution Networks (DNs) with vulnerable Distributed Energy Resource (DER) nodes. The adversary model is simultaneous compromise of DER nodes by strategic manipulation of generation set-points. The loss to the defender (DN operator) includes loss of voltage regulation and cost of induced load control under supply-demand mismatch caused by the attack. A 3-stage Defender-Attacker-Defender (DAD) game is formulated: in Stage 1, the defender chooses a security strategy to secure a subset of DER nodes; in Stage 2, the attacker compromises a set of vulnerable DERs and injects false generation set-points; in Stage 3, the defender responds by controlling loads and uncompromised DERs. Solving this trilevel optimization problem is hard due to nonlinear power flows and mixed-integer decision variables. To address this challenge, the problem is approximated by a tractable formulation based on linear power flows. The set of critical DER nodes and the set-point manipulations characterizing the optimal attack strategy are computed. An iterative greedy approach to compute attacker-defender strategies for the original nonlinear problem is proposed. These results provide guidelines for optimal security investment and defender response in pre- and post-attack conditions, respectively.

preprint2016arXiv

Sensor placement for fault location identification in water networks: A minimum test cover approach

This paper focuses on the optimal sensor placement problem for the identification of pipe failure locations in large-scale urban water systems. The problem involves selecting the minimum number of sensors such that every pipe failure can be uniquely localized. This problem can be viewed as a minimum test cover (MTC) problem, which is NP-hard. We consider two approaches to obtain approximate solutions to this problem. In the first approach, we transform the MTC problem to a minimum set cover (MSC) problem and use the greedy algorithm that exploits the submodularity property of the MSC problem to compute the solution to the MTC problem. In the second approach, we develop a new \textit{augmented greedy} algorithm for solving the MTC problem. This approach does not require the transformation of the MTC to MSC. Our augmented greedy algorithm provides in a significant computational improvement while guaranteeing the same approximation ratio as the first approach. We propose several metrics to evaluate the performance of the sensor placement designs. Finally, we present detailed computational experiments for a number of real water distribution networks.

preprint2013arXiv

Incentive Mechanisms for Internet Congestion Management: Fixed-Budget Rebate versus Time-of-Day Pricing

Mobile data traffic has been steadily rising in the past years. This has generated a significant interest in the deployment of incentive mechanisms to reduce peak-time congestion. Typically, the design of these mechanisms requires information about user demand and sensitivity to prices. Such information is naturally imperfect. In this paper, we propose a \emph{fixed-budget rebate mechanism} that gives each user a reward proportional to his percentage contribution to the aggregate reduction in peak time demand. For comparison, we also study a time-of-day pricing mechanism that gives each user a fixed reward per unit reduction of his peak-time demand. To evaluate the two mechanisms, we introduce a game-theoretic model that captures the \emph{public good} nature of decongestion. For each mechanism, we demonstrate that the socially optimal level of decongestion is achievable for a specific choice of the mechanism's parameter. We then investigate how imperfect information about user demand affects the mechanisms' effectiveness. From our results, the fixed-budget rebate pricing is more robust when the users' sensitivity to congestion is "sufficiently" convex. This feature of the fixed-budget rebate mechanism is attractive for many situations of interest and is driven by its closed-loop property, i.e., the unit reward decreases as the peak-time demand decreases.

preprint2010arXiv

Mean-square boundedness of stochastic networked control systems with bounded control inputs

We consider the problem of controlling marginally stable linear systems using bounded control inputs for networked control settings in which the communication channel between the remote controller and the system is unreliable. We assume that the states are perfectly observed, but the control inputs are transmitted over a noisy communication channel. Under mild hypotheses on the noise introduced by the control communication channel and large enough control authority, we construct a control policy that renders the state of the closed-loop system mean-square bounded.