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Manxi Wu

Manxi Wu contributes to research discovery and scholarly infrastructure.

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Published work

4 published item(s)

preprint2026arXiv

Budget-Efficient Automatic Algorithm Design via Code Graph

Large language models (LLMs) have emerged as powerful tools for automatic algorithm design (AAD). However, existing pipelines remain inefficient. They operate at the granularity of full algorithms, redundantly rewriting recurring substructures and discarding low-fitness candidates that may contain valuable algorithmic features. We formalize budget-efficient automatic algorithm design, wherein the search policy maximizes realized fitness subject to limited computational cost. We propose a directed acyclic graph representation of algorithms and build a search framework that fully exploits the LLM's output. Instead of querying the LLM for full algorithms, we use it to obtain corrections: compact operators that add, replace, or remove code blocks. Each correction augments the graph, yielding new algorithms that compose with prior corrections. This graph structure decomposes algorithms into sets of corrections, enabling correction-level credit assignment that informs subsequent queries. We complement this framework with theoretical insights into the ideal balance between search depth and breadth at different budget levels. We validate our method empirically on three combinatorial optimization problems, demonstrating consistent superiority of our graph-based search over full-algorithm search at equal token budget. Finally, our experiments suggest that rich contexts help only when the LLM's prior knowledge is shallow, and can hinder performance otherwise.

preprint2022arXiv

Inducing Social Optimality in Games via Adaptive Incentive Design

How can a social planner adaptively incentivize selfish agents who are learning in a strategic environment to induce a socially optimal outcome in the long run? We propose a two-timescale learning dynamics to answer this question in both atomic and non-atomic games. In our learning dynamics, players adopt a class of learning rules to update their strategies at a faster timescale, while a social planner updates the incentive mechanism at a slower timescale. In particular, the update of the incentive mechanism is based on each player's externality, which is evaluated as the difference between the player's marginal cost and the society's marginal cost in each time step. We show that any fixed point of our learning dynamics corresponds to the optimal incentive mechanism such that the corresponding Nash equilibrium also achieves social optimality. We also provide sufficient conditions for the learning dynamics to converge to a fixed point so that the adaptive incentive mechanism eventually induces a socially optimal outcome. Finally, we demonstrate that the sufficient conditions for convergence are satisfied in a variety of games, including (i) atomic networked quadratic aggregative games, (ii) atomic Cournot competition, and (iii) non-atomic network routing games.

preprint2021arXiv

Efficient Carpooling and Toll Pricing for Autonomous Transportation

In this paper, we address the existence and computation of competitive equilibrium in the transportation market for autonomous carpooling first proposed by [Ostrovsky and Schwarz, 2019]. At equilibrium, the market organizes carpooled trips over a transportation network in a socially optimal manner and sets the corresponding payments for individual riders and toll prices on edges. The market outcome ensures individual rationality, stability of carpooled trips, budget balance, and market clearing properties under heterogeneous rider preferences. We show that the question of market's existence can be resolved by proving the existence of an integer optimal solution of a linear programming problem. We characterize conditions on the network topology and riders' disutility for carpooling under which a market equilibrium can be computed in polynomial time. This characterization relies on ideas from the theory of combinatorial auctions and minimum cost network flow problem. Finally, we characterize a market equilibrium that achieves strategyproofness and maximizes welfare of individual riders.

preprint2020arXiv

Value of Information in Bayesian Routing Games

We study a routing game in an environment with multiple heterogeneous information systems and an uncertain state that affects edge costs of a congested network. Each information system sends a noisy signal about the state to its subscribed traveler population. Travelers make route choices based on their private beliefs about the state and other populations' signals. The question then arises, "How does the presence of asymmetric and incomplete information affect the travelers' equilibrium route choices and costs?'' We develop a systematic approach to characterize the equilibrium structure, and determine the effect of population sizes on the relative value of information (i.e. difference in expected traveler costs) between any two populations. This effect can be evaluated using a population-specific size threshold. One population enjoys a strictly positive value of information in comparison to the other if and only if its size is below the corresponding threshold. We also consider the situation when travelers may choose an information system based on its value, and characterize the set of equilibrium adoption rates delineating the sizes of subscribed traveler populations. The resulting routing strategies are such that all travelers face an identical expected cost and no traveler has the incentive to change her subscription.