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Rachel Cummings

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Published work

12 published item(s)

preprint2026arXiv

Integrating Feature Correlation in Differential Privacy with Applications in DP-ERM

Standard differential privacy imposes uniform privacy constraints across all features, overlooking the inherent distinction between sensitive and insensitive features in practice. In this paper, we introduce a relaxed definition of differential privacy that accounts for such heterogeneity, allowing certain features to be treated as insensitive even when correlated with sensitive ones. We propose a correlation-aware framework, $\textsf{CorrDP}$, which relaxes privacy for insensitive features while accounting for their correlations with sensitive features, with the correlations quantified using total variation distance. We design algorithms for differentially private empirical risk minimization (DP-ERM) under the $\textsf{CorrDP}$ framework, incorporating distance-dependent noise into gradients for improved theoretical utility guarantees. When the correlation distance is unknown, we estimate it from the dataset and show that it achieves a comparable privacy-utility guarantee. We perform experiments on synthetic and real-world datasets and show that $\textsf{CorrDP}$-based DP-ERM algorithms consistently outperform the standard DP framework in the presence of insensitive features.

preprint2022arXiv

Optimal Data Acquisition with Privacy-Aware Agents

We study the problem faced by a data analyst or platform that wishes to collect private data from privacy-aware agents. To incentivize participation, in exchange for this data, the platform provides a service to the agents in the form of a statistic computed using all agents' submitted data. The agents decide whether to join the platform (and truthfully reveal their data) or not participate by considering both the privacy costs of joining and the benefit they get from obtaining the statistic. The platform must ensure the statistic is computed differentially privately and chooses a central level of noise to add to the computation, but can also induce personalized privacy levels (or costs) by giving different weights to different agents in the computation as a function of their heterogeneous privacy preferences (which are known to the platform). We assume the platform aims to optimize the accuracy of the statistic, and must pick the privacy level of each agent to trade-off between i) incentivizing more participation and ii) adding less noise to the estimate. We provide a semi-closed form characterization of the optimal choice of agent weights for the platform in two variants of our model. In both of these models, we identify a common nontrivial structure in the platform's optimal solution: an instance-specific number of agents with the least stringent privacy requirements are pooled together and given the same weight, while the weights of the remaining agents decrease as a function of the strength of their privacy requirement. We also provide algorithmic results on how to find the optimal value of the noise parameter used by the platform and of the weights given to the agents.

preprint2022arXiv

Private Sequential Hypothesis Testing for Statisticians: Privacy, Error Rates, and Sample Size

The sequential hypothesis testing problem is a class of statistical analyses where the sample size is not fixed in advance. Instead, the decision-process takes in new observations sequentially to make real-time decisions for testing an alternative hypothesis against a null hypothesis until some stopping criterion is satisfied. In many common applications of sequential hypothesis testing, the data can be highly sensitive and may require privacy protection; for example, sequential hypothesis testing is used in clinical trials, where doctors sequentially collect data from patients and must determine when to stop recruiting patients and whether the treatment is effective. The field of differential privacy has been developed to offer data analysis tools with strong privacy guarantees, and has been commonly applied to machine learning and statistical tasks. In this work, we study the sequential hypothesis testing problem under a slight variant of differential privacy, known as Renyi differential privacy. We present a new private algorithm based on Wald's Sequential Probability Ratio Test (SPRT) that also gives strong theoretical privacy guarantees. We provide theoretical analysis on statistical performance measured by Type I and Type II error as well as the expected sample size. We also empirically validate our theoretical results on several synthetic databases, showing that our algorithms also perform well in practice. Unlike previous work in private hypothesis testing that focused only on the classical fixed sample setting, our results in the sequential setting allow a conclusion to be reached much earlier, and thus saving the cost of collecting additional samples.

preprint2021arXiv

Advances and Open Problems in Federated Learning

Federated learning (FL) is a machine learning setting where many clients (e.g. mobile devices or whole organizations) collaboratively train a model under the orchestration of a central server (e.g. service provider), while keeping the training data decentralized. FL embodies the principles of focused data collection and minimization, and can mitigate many of the systemic privacy risks and costs resulting from traditional, centralized machine learning and data science approaches. Motivated by the explosive growth in FL research, this paper discusses recent advances and presents an extensive collection of open problems and challenges.

preprint2016arXiv

Adaptive Learning with Robust Generalization Guarantees

The traditional notion of generalization---i.e., learning a hypothesis whose empirical error is close to its true error---is surprisingly brittle. As has recently been noted in [DFH+15b], even if several algorithms have this guarantee in isolation, the guarantee need not hold if the algorithms are composed adaptively. In this paper, we study three notions of generalization---increasing in strength---that are robust to postprocessing and amenable to adaptive composition, and examine the relationships between them. We call the weakest such notion Robust Generalization. A second, intermediate, notion is the stability guarantee known as differential privacy. The strongest guarantee we consider we call Perfect Generalization. We prove that every hypothesis class that is PAC learnable is also PAC learnable in a robustly generalizing fashion, with almost the same sample complexity. It was previously known that differentially private algorithms satisfy robust generalization. In this paper, we show that robust generalization is a strictly weaker concept, and that there is a learning task that can be carried out subject to robust generalization guarantees, yet cannot be carried out subject to differential privacy. We also show that perfect generalization is a strictly stronger guarantee than differential privacy, but that, nevertheless, many learning tasks can be carried out subject to the guarantees of perfect generalization.

preprint2016arXiv

Coordination Complexity: Small Information Coordinating Large Populations

We initiate the study of a quantity that we call coordination complexity. In a distributed optimization problem, the information defining a problem instance is distributed among $n$ parties, who need to each choose an action, which jointly will form a solution to the optimization problem. The coordination complexity represents the minimal amount of information that a centralized coordinator, who has full knowledge of the problem instance, needs to broadcast in order to coordinate the $n$ parties to play a nearly optimal solution. We show that upper bounds on the coordination complexity of a problem imply the existence of good jointly differentially private algorithms for solving that problem, which in turn are known to upper bound the price of anarchy in certain games with dynamically changing populations. We show several results. We fully characterize the coordination complexity for the problem of computing a many-to-one matching in a bipartite graph by giving almost matching lower and upper bounds.Our upper bound in fact extends much more generally, to the problem of solving a linearly separable convex program. We also give a different upper bound technique, which we use to bound the coordination complexity of coordinating a Nash equilibrium in a routing game, and of computing a stable matching.

preprint2016arXiv

The Possibilities and Limitations of Private Prediction Markets

We consider the design of private prediction markets, financial markets designed to elicit predictions about uncertain events without revealing too much information about market participants' actions or beliefs. Our goal is to design market mechanisms in which participants' trades or wagers influence the market's behavior in a way that leads to accurate predictions, yet no single participant has too much influence over what others are able to observe. We study the possibilities and limitations of such mechanisms using tools from differential privacy. We begin by designing a private one-shot wagering mechanism in which bettors specify a belief about the likelihood of a future event and a corresponding monetary wager. Wagers are redistributed among bettors in a way that more highly rewards those with accurate predictions. We provide a class of wagering mechanisms that are guaranteed to satisfy truthfulness, budget balance in expectation, and other desirable properties while additionally guaranteeing epsilon-joint differential privacy in the bettors' reported beliefs, and analyze the trade-off between the achievable level of privacy and the sensitivity of a bettor's payment to her own report. We then ask whether it is possible to obtain privacy in dynamic prediction markets, focusing our attention on the popular cost-function framework in which securities with payments linked to future events are bought and sold by an automated market maker. We show that under general conditions, it is impossible for such a market maker to simultaneously achieve bounded worst-case loss and epsilon-differential privacy without allowing the privacy guarantee to degrade extremely quickly as the number of trades grows, making such markets impractical in settings in which privacy is valued. We conclude by suggesting several avenues for potentially circumventing this lower bound.

preprint2015arXiv

Privacy and Truthful Equilibrium Selection for Aggregative Games

We study a very general class of games --- multi-dimensional aggregative games --- which in particular generalize both anonymous games and weighted congestion games. For any such game that is also large, we solve the equilibrium selection problem in a strong sense. In particular, we give an efficient weak mediator: a mechanism which has only the power to listen to reported types and provide non-binding suggested actions, such that (a) it is an asymptotic Nash equilibrium for every player to truthfully report their type to the mediator, and then follow its suggested action; and (b) that when players do so, they end up coordinating on a particular asymptotic pure strategy Nash equilibrium of the induced complete information game. In fact, truthful reporting is an ex-post Nash equilibrium of the mediated game, so our solution applies even in settings of incomplete information, and even when player types are arbitrary or worst-case (i.e. not drawn from a common prior). We achieve this by giving an efficient differentially private algorithm for computing a Nash equilibrium in such games. The rates of convergence to equilibrium in all of our results are inverse polynomial in the number of players $n$. We also apply our main results to a multi-dimensional market game. Our results can be viewed as giving, for a rich class of games, a more robust version of the Revelation Principle, in that we work with weaker informational assumptions (no common prior), yet provide a stronger solution concept (ex-post Nash versus Bayes Nash equilibrium). In comparison to previous work, our main conceptual contribution is showing that weak mediators are a game theoretic object that exist in a wide variety of games -- previously, they were only known to exist in traffic routing games.

preprint2015arXiv

The Strange Case of Privacy in Equilibrium Models

We study how privacy technologies affect user and advertiser behavior in a simple economic model of targeted advertising. In our model, a consumer first decides whether or not to buy a good, and then an advertiser chooses an advertisement to show the consumer. The consumer's value for the good is correlated with her type, which determines which ad the advertiser would prefer to show to her---and hence, the advertiser would like to use information about the consumer's purchase decision to target the ad that he shows. In our model, the advertiser is given only a differentially private signal about the consumer's behavior---which can range from no signal at all to a perfect signal, as we vary the differential privacy parameter. This allows us to study equilibrium behavior as a function of the level of privacy provided to the consumer. We show that this behavior can be highly counter-intuitive, and that the effect of adding privacy in equilibrium can be completely different from what we would expect if we ignored equilibrium incentives. Specifically, we show that increasing the level of privacy can actually increase the amount of information about the consumer's type contained in the signal the advertiser receives, lead to decreased utility for the consumer, and increased profit for the advertiser, and that generally these quantities can be non-monotonic and even discontinuous in the privacy level of the signal.

preprint2015arXiv

Truthful Linear Regression

We consider the problem of fitting a linear model to data held by individuals who are concerned about their privacy. Incentivizing most players to truthfully report their data to the analyst constrains our design to mechanisms that provide a privacy guarantee to the participants; we use differential privacy to model individuals' privacy losses. This immediately poses a problem, as differentially private computation of a linear model necessarily produces a biased estimation, and existing approaches to design mechanisms to elicit data from privacy-sensitive individuals do not generalize well to biased estimators. We overcome this challenge through an appropriate design of the computation and payment scheme.

preprint2014arXiv

Online Learning and Profit Maximization from Revealed Preferences

We consider the problem of learning from revealed preferences in an online setting. In our framework, each period a consumer buys an optimal bundle of goods from a merchant according to her (linear) utility function and current prices, subject to a budget constraint. The merchant observes only the purchased goods, and seeks to adapt prices to optimize his profits. We give an efficient algorithm for the merchant's problem that consists of a learning phase in which the consumer's utility function is (perhaps partially) inferred, followed by a price optimization step. We also consider an alternative online learning algorithm for the setting where prices are set exogenously, but the merchant would still like to predict the bundle that will be bought by the consumer for purposes of inventory or supply chain management. In contrast with most prior work on the revealed preferences problem, we demonstrate that by making stronger assumptions on the form of utility functions, efficient algorithms for both learning and profit maximization are possible, even in adaptive, online settings.

preprint2014arXiv

The Empirical Implications of Privacy-Aware Choice

This paper initiates the study of the testable implications of choice data in settings where agents have privacy preferences. We adapt the standard conceptualization of consumer choice theory to a situation where the consumer is aware of, and has preferences over, the information revealed by her choices. The main message of the paper is that little can be inferred about consumers' preferences once we introduce the possibility that the consumer has concerns about privacy. This holds even when consumers' privacy preferences are assumed to be monotonic and separable. This motivates the consideration of stronger assumptions and, to that end, we introduce an additive model for privacy preferences that does have testable implications.