Researcher profile

Jean-François Raskin

Jean-François Raskin contributes to research discovery and scholarly infrastructure.

ResearcherAffiliation not importedOpen to collaborate

Trust snapshot

Quick read

Trust 21 - EmergingVerification L1Unclaimed author
11works
0followers
5topics
4close collaborators

Actions

Decide how to stay connected

Follow researcher0

Identity and collaboration

How to connect with this researcher

Claiming links this public author record to a researcher profile and unlocks direct collaboration workflows.

Log in to claim

Direct collaboration

Open a focused conversation when the fit is right

Claim this author entity first to unlock direct invitations.

Research graph

See the researcher in context

Open full explorer

Inspect adjacent work, topics, institutions and collaborators without jumping out to a separate graph page.

Building this graph slice

BZPEER is loading the nearby papers, people, topics and institutions for this page.

Published work

11 published item(s)

preprint2026arXiv

Synthesizing POMDP Policies: Sampling Meets Model-checking via Learning

Partially Observable Markov Decision Processes (POMDPs) are the standard framework for decision-making under uncertainty. While sampling-based methods scale well, they lack formal correctness guarantees, making them unsuitable for safety-critical applications. Conversely, formal synthesis techniques provide correctness-by-construction but often struggle with scalability, as general POMDP synthesis is undecidable. To bridge this gap, we propose a synthesis framework that integrates sampling, automata learning, and model-checking. Inspired by Angluin's $L^*$ algorithm, our approach utilizes sampling as a membership oracle and model-checking as an equivalence oracle. This enables the synthesis of finite-state controllers with formal guarantees, provided the sampling-induced policy is regular. We establish a relative completeness result for this framework. Experimental results from our prototypical implementation demonstrate that this method successfully solves threshold-safety problems that remain challenging for existing formal synthesis tools. We believe our algorithm serves as a valuable component in a portfolio approach to tackling the inherent difficulty of POMDP synthesis problems.

preprint2022arXiv

Lifted Model Checking for Relational MDPs

Probabilistic model checking has been developed for verifying systems that have stochastic and nondeterministic behavior. Given a probabilistic system, a probabilistic model checker takes a property and checks whether or not the property holds in that system. For this reason, probabilistic model checking provide rigorous guarantees. So far, however, probabilistic model checking has focused on propositional models where a state is represented by a symbol. On the other hand, it is commonly required to make relational abstractions in planning and reinforcement learning. Various frameworks handle relational domains, for instance, STRIPS planning and relational Markov Decision Processes. Using propositional model checking in relational settings requires one to ground the model, which leads to the well known state explosion problem and intractability. We present pCTL-REBEL, a lifted model checking approach for verifying pCTL properties of relational MDPs. It extends REBEL, a relational model-based reinforcement learning technique, toward relational pCTL model checking. PCTL-REBEL is lifted, which means that rather than grounding, the model exploits symmetries to reason about a group of objects as a whole at the relational level. Theoretically, we show that pCTL model checking is decidable for relational MDPs that have a possibly infinite domain, provided that the states have a bounded size. Practically, we contribute algorithms and an implementation of lifted relational model checking, and we show that the lifted approach improves the scalability of the model checking approach.

preprint2022arXiv

On the Complexity of SPEs in Parity Games

We study the complexity of problems related to subgame-perfect equilibria (SPEs) in infinite duration non zero-sum multiplayer games played on finite graphs with parity objectives. We present new complexity results that close gaps in the literature. Our techniques are based on a recent characterization of SPEs in prefix-independent games that is grounded on the notions of requirements and negotiation, and according to which the plays supported by SPEs are exactly the plays consistent with the requirement that is the least fixed point of the negotiation function. The new results are as follows. First, checking that a given requirement is a fixed point of the negotiation function is an NP-complete problem. Second, we show that the SPE constrained existence problem is NP-complete, this problem was previously known to be ExpTime-easy and NP-hard. Third, the SPE constrained existence problem is fixed-parameter tractable when the number of players and of colors are parameters. Fourth, deciding whether some requirement is the least fixed point of the negotiation function is complete for the second level of the Boolean hierarchy. Finally, the SPE-verification problem -- that is, the problem of deciding whether there exists a play supported by a SPE that satisfies some LTL formula -- is PSpace-complete, this problem was known to be ExpTime-easy and PSpace-hard.

preprint2022arXiv

Pareto-Rational Verification

We study the rational verification problem which consists in verifying the correctness of a system executing in an environment that is assumed to behave rationally. We consider the model of rationality in which the environment only executes behaviors that are Pareto-optimal with regard to its set of objectives, given the behavior of the system (which is committed in advance of any interaction). We examine two ways of specifying this behavior, first by means of a deterministic Moore machine, and then by lifting its determinism. In the latter case the machine may embed several different behaviors for the system, and the universal rational verification problem aims at verifying that all of them are correct when the environment is rational. For parity objectives, we prove that the Pareto-rational verification problem is co-NP-complete and that its universal version is in PSPACE and both NP-hard and co-NP-hard. For Boolean Büchi objectives, the former problem is $Π_2\mathsf{P}$-complete and the latter is PSPACE-complete. We also study the case where the objectives are expressed using LTL formulas and show that the first problem is PSPACE-complete, and that the second is 2EXPTIME-complete. Both problems are also shown to be fixed-parameter tractable (FPT) for parity and Boolean Büchi objectives. Finally, we evaluate two variations of the FPT algorithm proposed to solve the Pareto-rational verification problem on a parametric toy example as well as on randomly generated instances.

preprint2022arXiv

Stackelberg-Pareto Synthesis (Extended Version)

We study the framework of two-player Stackelberg games played on graphs in which Player 0 announces a strategy and Player 1 responds rationally with a strategy that is an optimal response. While it is usually assumed that Player 1 has a single objective, we consider here the new setting where he has several. In this context, after responding with his strategy, Player 1 gets a payoff in the form of a vector of Booleans corresponding to his satisfied objectives. Rationality of Player 1 is encoded by the fact that his response must produce a Pareto-optimal payoff given the strategy of Player 0. We study for several kinds of $ω$-regular objectives the Stackelberg-Pareto Synthesis problem which asks whether Player 0 can announce a strategy which satisfies his objective, whatever the rational response of Player 1. We show that this problem is fixed-parameter tractable for games in which objectives are all reachability, safety, Büchi, co-Büchi, Boolean Büchi, parity, Muller, Streett or Rabin objectives. We also show that this problem is NEXPTIME-complete except for the cases of Büchi objectives for which it is NP-complete and co-Büchi objectives for which it is in NEXPTIME and NP-hard. The problem is already NP-complete in the simple case of reachability objectives and graphs that are trees.

preprint2022arXiv

Strategy Synthesis for Global Window PCTL

Given a Markov decision process (MDP) $M$ and a formula $Φ$, the strategy synthesis problem asks if there exists a strategy $σ$ s.t. the resulting Markov chain $M[σ]$ satisfies $Φ$. This problem is known to be undecidable for the probabilistic temporal logic PCTL. We study a class of formulae that can be seen as a fragment of PCTL where a local, bounded horizon property is enforced all along an execution. Moreover, we allow for linear expressions in the probabilistic inequalities. This logic is at the frontier of decidability, depending on the type of strategies considered. In particular, strategy synthesis is decidable when strategies are deterministic while the general problem is undecidable.

preprint2022arXiv

Subgame-perfect Equilibria in Mean-payoff Games

In this paper, we provide an effective characterization of all the subgame-perfect equilibria in infinite duration games played on finite graphs with mean-payoff objectives. To this end, we introduce the notion of requirement, and the notion of negotiation function. We establish that the plays that are supported by SPEs are exactly those that are consistent with the least fixed point of the negotiation function. Finally, we show that the negotiation function is piecewise linear, and can be analyzed using the linear algebraic tool box. As a corollary, we prove the decidability of the SPE constrained existence problem, whose status was left open in the literature.

preprint2020arXiv

Learning Non-Markovian Reward Models in MDPs

There are situations in which an agent should receive rewards only after having accomplished a series of previous tasks. In other words, the reward that the agent receives is non-Markovian. One natural and quite general way to represent history-dependent rewards is via a Mealy machine; a finite state automaton that produces output sequences (rewards in our case) from input sequences (state/action observations in our case). In our formal setting, we consider a Markov decision process (MDP) that models the dynamic of the environment in which the agent evolves and a Mealy machine synchronised with this MDP to formalise the non-Markovian reward function. While the MDP is known by the agent, the reward function is unknown from the agent and must be learnt. Learning non-Markov reward functions is a challenge. Our approach to overcome this challenging problem is a careful combination of the Angluin's L* active learning algorithm to learn finite automata, testing techniques for establishing conformance of finite model hypothesis and optimisation techniques for computing optimal strategies in Markovian (immediate) reward MDPs. We also show how our framework can be combined with classical heuristics such as Monte Carlo Tree Search. We illustrate our algorithms and a preliminary implementation on two typical examples for AI.

preprint2020arXiv

Mixing Probabilistic and non-Probabilistic Objectives in Markov Decision Processes

In this paper, we consider algorithms to decide the existence of strategies in MDPs for Boolean combinations of objectives. These objectives are omega-regular properties that need to be enforced either surely, almost surely, existentially, or with non-zero probability. In this setting, relevant strategies are randomized infinite memory strategies: both infinite memory and randomization may be needed to play optimally. We provide algorithms to solve the general case of Boolean combinations and we also investigate relevant subcases. We further report on complexity bounds for these problems.

preprint2020arXiv

The Adversarial Stackelberg Value in Quantitative Games

In this paper, we study the notion of adversarial Stackelberg value for two-player non-zero sum games played on bi-weighted graphs with the mean-payoff and the discounted sum functions. The adversarial Stackelberg value of Player 0 is the largest value that Player 0 can obtain when announcing her strategy to Player 1 which in turn responds with any of his best response. For the mean-payoff function, we show that the adversarial Stackelberg value is not always achievable but epsilon-optimal strategies exist. We show how to compute this value and prove that the associated threshold problem is in NP. For the discounted sum payoff function, we draw a link with the target discounted sum problem which explains why the problem is difficult to solve for this payoff function. We also provide solutions to related gap problems.