When Routine Chats Turn Toxic: Unintended Long-Term State Poisoning in Personalized Agents
Personalized LLM agents maintain persistent cross-session state to support long-horizon collaboration. Yet, this persistence introduces a subtle but critical security vulnerability: routine user-agent interactions can gradually reshape an agent's long-term state, inadvertently weakening future confirmation boundaries, expanding tool-use defaults, and escalating autonomous behavior over time. We formalize this risk as \textbf{unintended long-term state poisoning}. To systematically study it, we introduce the \textbf{Unintended Long-Term State Poisoning Bench (ULSPB)}, a bilingual benchmark comprising $350$ settings spanning five assistance categories, seven interaction patterns, 24-turn routine interactions, and matched single-injection counterparts. Furthermore, we define the \emph{Harm Score} (HS), a state-centric metric that quantifies \emph{authorization drift}, \emph{tool-use escalation}, and \emph{unchecked autonomy}. Experiments on OpenClaw with four backbone LLMs demonstrate that, while single-injection is generally effective, routine conversations alone can substantially poison long-term state, primarily corrupting memory-centric artifacts. Evaluations seeded with real-world user interactions confirm that this risk is not a mere artifact of synthetic prompts. To mitigate this threat, we propose \textbf{StateGuard}, a lightweight, post-execution defense that audits state diffs at the writeback boundary and selectively rolls back dangerous edits. Across all evaluated models, StateGuard reduces HS to near zero and lowers false-negative rates, with acceptable high false-positive rates under a safety-first writeback defense and minimal overhead.