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Grigoris Velegkas

Grigoris Velegkas contributes to research discovery and scholarly infrastructure.

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Published work

3 published item(s)

preprint2026arXiv

On the Learning Curves of Revenue Maximization

Learning curves are a fundamental primitive in supervised learning, describing how an algorithm's performance improves with more data and providing a quantitative measure of its generalization ability. Formally, a learning curve plots the decay of an algorithm's error for a fixed underlying distribution as a function of the number of training samples. Prior work on revenue-maximizing learning algorithms, starting with the seminal work of Cole and Roughgarden [STOC, 2014], adopts a distribution-free perspective, which parallels the PAC learning framework in learning theory. This approach evaluates performance against the hardest possible sequence of valuation distributions, one for each sample size, effectively defining the upper envelope of learning curves over all possible distributions, thus leading to error bounds that do not capture the shape of the learning curves. In this work we initiate the study of learning curves for revenue maximization and provide a near-complete characterization of their rate of decay in the basic setting of a single item and a single buyer. In the absence of any restriction on the valuation distribution, we show that there exists a Bayes-consistent algorithm, meaning that its learning curve converges to zero for any arbitrary valuation distribution as the number of samples $n \to \infty$. However, this convergence must be arbitrarily slow, even if the optimal revenue is finite. In contrast, if the optimal revenue is achieved by a finite price, then the optimal rate of decay is roughly $1/\sqrt{n}$. Finally, for distributions supported on discrete sets of values, we show that learning curves decay almost exponentially fast, a rate unattainable under the PAC framework.

preprint2026arXiv

What is Learnable in Valiant's Theory of the Learnable?

Valiant's 1984 paper is widely credited with introducing the PAC learning model, but it, in fact, introduced a different model: unlike PAC learning, the learner receives only positives, may issue membership queries, and must output a hypothesis with no false positives. Prior work characterized variants, including the case without queries. We revisit Valiant's original model and ask: *Which classes are learnable in it?* For every finite domain, including Valiant's Boolean-hypercube setting, we show that a class is learnable if and only if every realizable positive sample can be certified by a poly-size adaptive query-compression scheme. This is a new variant of sample compression where the learner certifies samples via a short interaction with the membership oracle. Our characterization shows that learnability in Valiant's model is strictly sandwiched between learnability in the PAC model and the variant of Valiant's model without membership queries. This is one of the rare cases where introducing membership queries changes the set of learnable classes, and not just the sample or computational complexity. Next, we study the natural extension of the model to arbitrary domains. While we do not obtain an exact characterization, our techniques readily generalize and show that the same strict sandwiching persists. Finally, we show that $d$-dimensional halfspaces, which are not learnable without queries, are learnable with queries: we give a $\mathrm{poly}(d) \tilde{O}(1/ε)$ sample and $\mathrm{poly}(d) \mathrm{polylog}(1/ε)$ query algorithm, and prove that at least $Ω(d)$ samples or queries are necessary. To our knowledge, this is the first algorithm for halfspaces in Valiant's model. Together, these results uncover a surprisingly rich theory behind Valiant's original notion of learnability and introduce ideas that may be of independent interest in learning theory.

preprint2022arXiv

Is Selling Complete Information (Approximately) Optimal?

We study the problem of selling information to a data-buyer who faces a decision problem under uncertainty. We consider the classic Bayesian decision-theoretic model pioneered by [Blackwell, 1951, 1953]. Initially, the data buyer has only partial information about the payoff-relevant state of the world. A data seller offers additional information about the state of the world. The information is revealed through signaling schemes, also referred to as experiments. In the single-agent setting, any mechanism can be represented as a menu of experiments. [Bergemann et al., 2018] present a complete characterization of the revenue-optimal mechanism in a binary state and binary action environment. By contrast, no characterization is known for the case with more actions. In this paper, we consider more general environments and study arguably the simplest mechanism, which only sells the fully informative experiment. In the environment with binary state and $m\geq 3$ actions, we provide an $O(m)$-approximation to the optimal revenue by selling only the fully informative experiment and show that the approximation ratio is tight up to an absolute constant factor. An important corollary of our lower bound is that the size of the optimal menu must grow at least linearly in the number of available actions, so no universal upper bound exists for the size of the optimal menu in the general single-dimensional setting. For multi-dimensional environments, we prove that even in arguably the simplest matching utility environment with 3 states and 3 actions, the ratio between the optimal revenue and the revenue by selling only the fully informative experiment can grow immediately to a polynomial of the number of agent types. Nonetheless, if the distribution is uniform, we show that selling only the fully informative experiment is indeed the optimal mechanism.