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Federico Echenique

Federico Echenique contributes to research discovery and scholarly infrastructure.

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Published work

12 published item(s)

preprint2026arXiv

Response Time Enhances Alignment with Heterogeneous Preferences

Aligning large language models (LLMs) to human preferences typically relies on aggregating pooled feedback into a single reward model. However, this standard approach assumes that all labelers share the same underlying preferences, ignoring the fact that real-world labelers are highly heterogeneous and usually anonymous. Consequently, relying solely on binary choice data fundamentally distorts the learned policy, making the true population-average preference unidentifiable. To overcome this critical limitation, we demonstrate that augmenting preference datasets with a simple, secondary signal -- the user's response time -- can restore the identifiability of the population's average preference. By modeling each decision as a Drift-Diffusion Model (DDM), we introduce a novel, consistent estimator of heterogeneous preferences that successfully corrects the distortions of standard choice-only labels. We prove that our estimator asymptotically converges to the true average preference even in extreme cases where each anonymous labeler contributes only a single choice. Empirically, across both synthetic and real-world datasets, our method consistently outperforms standard baselines that otherwise fail and plateau at a bias floor. Because response times are essentially free to record and require zero user tracking or identification, our results bring promises and open up new opportunities for future data-collection pipelines to improve the social benefit without requiring user-level identifiers or repeated elicitations.

preprint2025arXiv

To ArXiv or not to ArXiv: A Study Quantifying Pros and Cons of Posting Preprints Online

Double-blind conferences have engaged in debates over whether to allow authors to post their papers online on arXiv or elsewhere during the review process. Independently, some authors of research papers face the dilemma of whether to put their papers on arXiv due to its pros and cons. We conduct a study to substantiate this debate and dilemma via quantitative measurements. Specifically, we conducted surveys of reviewers in two top-tier double-blind computer science conferences -- ICML 2021 (5361 submissions and 4699 reviewers) and EC 2021 (498 submissions and 190 reviewers). Our three main findings are as follows. First, more than a third of the reviewers self-report searching online for a paper they are assigned to review. Second, conference policies restricting authors from publicising their work on social media or posting preprints before the review process may have only limited effectiveness in maintaining anonymity. Third, outside the review process, we find that preprints from better-ranked institutions experience a very small increase in visibility compared to preprints from other institutions.

preprint2022arXiv

Closure operators: Complexity and applications to classification and decision-making

We study the complexity of closure operators, with applications to machine learning and decision theory. In machine learning, closure operators emerge naturally in data classification and clustering. In decision theory, they can model equivalence of choice menus, and therefore situations with a preference for flexibility. Our contribution is to formulate a notion of complexity of closure operators, which translate into the complexity of a classifier in ML, or of a utility function in decision theory.

preprint2022arXiv

Decreasing Impatience

We characterize decreasing impatience, a common behavioral phenomenon in intertemporal choice. Discount factors that display decreasing impatience are characterized through a convexit y axiom for investments at fixed interest rates. Then we show that they are equivalent to a geometric average of generalized quasi-hype rbolic discount rates. Finally, they emerge through parimutuel preference aggregation of exponential discount factors.

preprint2022arXiv

Efficiency in Random Resource Allocation and Social Choice

We study efficiency in general collective choice problems where agents have ordinal preferences and randomization is allowed. We explore the structure of preference profiles where ex-ante and ex-post efficiency coincide, offer a unifying perspective on the known results, and give several new characterizations. The results have implications for well-studied mechanisms including random serial dictatorship and a number of specific environments, including the dichotomous, single-peaked, and social choice domains.

preprint2022arXiv

On the meaning of the Critical Cost Efficiency Index

This note provides a critical discussion of the \textit{Critical Cost-Efficiency Index} (CCEI) as used to assess deviations from utility-maximizing behavior. I argue that the CCEI is hard to interpret, and that it can disagree with other plausible measures of "irrational" behavior. The common interpretation of CCEI as wasted income is questionable. Moreover, I show that one agent may have more unstable preferences than another, but seem more rational according to the CCEI. This calls into question the (now common) use of CCEI as an ordinal and cardinal measure of degrees of rationality.

preprint2022arXiv

Twofold Multiprior Preferences and Failures of Contingent Reasoning

We propose a model of incomplete \textit{twofold multiprior preferences}, in which an act $f$ is ranked above an act $g$ only when $f$ provides higher utility in a worst-case scenario than what $g$ provides in a best-case scenario. The model explains failures of contingent reasoning, captured through a weakening of the state-by-state monotonicity (or dominance) axiom. Our model gives rise to rich comparative statics results, as well as extension exercises, and connections to choice theory. We present an application to second-price auctions.

preprint2021arXiv

Approximate Expected Utility Rationalization

We propose a new measure of deviations from expected utility theory. For any positive number~$e$, we give a characterization of the datasets with a rationalization that is within~$e$ (in beliefs, utility, or perceived prices) of expected utility theory. The number~$e$ can then be used as a measure of how far the data is to expected utility theory. We apply our methodology to data from three large-scale experiments. Many subjects in those experiments are consistent with utility maximization, but not with expected utility maximization. Our measure of distance to expected utility is correlated with subjects' demographic characteristics.

preprint2021arXiv

Ordinal and cardinal solution concepts for two-sided matching

We characterize solutions for two-sided matching, both in the transferable and in the nontransferable-utility frameworks, using a cardinal formulation. Our approach makes the comparison of the matching models with and without transfers particularly transparent. We introduce the concept of a no-trade matching to study the role of transfers in matching. A no-trade matching is one in which the availability of transfers do not affect the outcome.

preprint2020arXiv

Fairness and efficiency for probabilistic allocations with participation constraints

We propose a notion of fairness for allocation problems in which different agents may have different reservation utilities, stemming from different outside options, or property rights. Fairness is usually understood as the absence of envy, but this can be incompatible with reservation utilities. It is possible that Alice's envy of Bob's assignment cannot be remedied without violating Bob's participation constraint. Instead, we seek to rule out {\em justified envy}, defined as envy for which a remedy would not violate any agent's participation constraint. We show that fairness, meaning the absence of justified envy, can be achieved together with efficiency and individual rationality. We introduce a competitive equilibrium approach with price-dependent incomes obtaining the desired properties.

preprint2020arXiv

Spherical Preferences

We introduce and study the property of orthogonal independence, a restricted additivity axiom applying when alternatives are orthogonal. The axiom requires that the preference for one marginal change over another should be maintained after each marginal change has been shifted in a direction that is orthogonal to both. We show that continuous preferences satisfy orthogonal independence if and only if they are spherical: their indifference curves are spheres with the same center, with preference being "monotone" either away or towards the center. Spherical preferences include linear preferences as a special (limiting) case. We discuss different applications to economic and political environments. Our result delivers Euclidean preferences in models of spatial voting, quadratic welfare aggregation in social choice, and expected utility in models of choice under uncertainty.

preprint2020arXiv

Third-Party Data Providers Ruin Simple Mechanisms

Motivated by the growing prominence of third-party data providers in online marketplaces, this paper studies the impact of the presence of third-party data providers on mechanism design. When no data provider is present, it has been shown that simple mechanisms are "good enough" -- they can achieve a constant fraction of the revenue of optimal mechanisms. The results in this paper demonstrate that this is no longer true in the presence of a third-party data provider who can provide the bidder with a signal that is correlated with the item type. Specifically, even with a single seller, a single bidder, and a single item of uncertain type for sale, the strategies of pricing each item-type separately (the analog of item pricing for multi-item auctions) and bundling all item-types under a single price (the analog of grand bundling) can both simultaneously be a logarithmic factor worse than the optimal revenue. Further, in the presence of a data provider, item-type partitioning mechanisms---a more general class of mechanisms which divide item-types into disjoint groups and offer prices for each group---still cannot achieve within a $\log \log$ factor of the optimal revenue. Thus, our results highlight that the presence of a data-provider forces the use of more complicated mechanisms in order to achieve a constant fraction of the optimal revenue.