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Christos Tzamos

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Published work

27 published item(s)

preprint2026arXiv

MaxSketch: Robust Distinct Counting in Streams via Random Projections

Estimating the number of distinct elements in a data stream is well understood when repeated elements are identical. In modern settings, however, observations are high-dimensional and noisy, so repeated instances of the same object are only approximately similar -- for example, different images of the same individual may vary significantly at the pixel level. Classical sketches such as HyperLogLog rely on consistent hash values for identical elements and break down in this regime. Recent work on robust distinct counting in general metric spaces achieves $\widetildeΘ(\sqrt{n})$ memory, which is tight in the worst case. We show that substantially improved memory guarantees are possible under geometric structure common in learned representations. We introduce MaxSketch, a simple max-linear sketch built from random Gaussian projections, and prove that it succeeds in estimating the number of distinct latent objects. Concretely, we show that under this assumption $m = \widetilde{O} (\log n / \varepsilon^2)$ random projections (and hence $\widetilde{O} (\log n/\varepsilon^2)$ memory) suffice to recover the true distinct count within a $(1+\varepsilon)$ factor. Experiments on image streams confirm that MaxSketch accurately estimates distinct counts and generalizes beyond the training regime. Our results bridge classical streaming algorithms and modern representation learning, showing how geometric structure can fundamentally reduce the complexity of distinct counting.

preprint2026arXiv

Teaching Transformers to Solve Combinatorial Problems through Efficient Trial & Error

Despite their proficiency in various language tasks, Large Language Models (LLMs) struggle with combinatorial problems like Satisfiability, Traveling Salesman Problem, or even basic arithmetic. We address this gap through a novel trial & error approach for solving problems in the class NP, where candidate solutions are iteratively generated and efficiently validated using verifiers. We focus on the paradigmatic task of Sudoku and achieve state-of-the-art accuracy (99%) compared to prior neuro-symbolic approaches. Unlike prior work that used custom architectures, our method employs a vanilla decoder-only Transformer (GPT-2) without external tools or function calling. Our method integrates imitation learning of simple Sudoku rules with an explicit Depth-First Search (DFS) exploration strategy involving informed guessing and backtracking. Moving beyond imitation learning, we seek to minimize the number of guesses until reaching a solution. This is achieved using depth-1 guessing, showing empirically that almost all Sudoku can be solved using the puzzle's rules with at most one guess. We provide a rigorous analysis of this setup formalizing its connection to a contextual variant of Min-Sum Set Cover, a well-studied problem in algorithms and stochastic optimization.

preprint2022arXiv

Clustering with Queries under Semi-Random Noise

The seminal paper by Mazumdar and Saha \cite{MS17a} introduced an extensive line of work on clustering with noisy queries. Yet, despite significant progress on the problem, the proposed methods depend crucially on knowing the exact probabilities of errors of the underlying fully-random oracle. In this work, we develop robust learning methods that tolerate general semi-random noise obtaining qualitatively the same guarantees as the best possible methods in the fully-random model. More specifically, given a set of $n$ points with an unknown underlying partition, we are allowed to query pairs of points $u,v$ to check if they are in the same cluster, but with probability $p$, the answer may be adversarially chosen. We show that information theoretically $O\left(\frac{nk \log n} {(1-2p)^2}\right)$ queries suffice to learn any cluster of sufficiently large size. Our main result is a computationally efficient algorithm that can identify large clusters with $O\left(\frac{nk \log n} {(1-2p)^2}\right) + \text{poly}\left(\log n, k, \frac{1}{1-2p} \right)$ queries, matching the guarantees of the best known algorithms in the fully-random model. As a corollary of our approach, we develop the first parameter-free algorithm for the fully-random model, answering an open question by \cite{MS17a}.

preprint2022arXiv

Graph Connectivity with Noisy Queries

Graph connectivity is a fundamental combinatorial optimization problem that arises in many practical applications, where usually a spanning subgraph of a network is used for its operation. However, in the real world, links may fail unexpectedly deeming the networks non-operational, while checking whether a link is damaged is costly and possibly erroneous. After an event that has damaged an arbitrary subset of the edges, the network operator must find a spanning tree of the network using non-damaged edges by making as few checks as possible. Motivated by such questions, we study the problem of finding a spanning tree in a network, when we only have access to noisy queries of the form "Does edge e exist?". We design efficient algorithms, even when edges fail adversarially, for all possible error regimes; 2-sided error (where any answer might be erroneous), false positives (where "no" answers are always correct) and false negatives (where "yes" answers are always correct). In the first two regimes we provide efficient algorithms and give matching lower bounds for general graphs. In the False Negative case we design efficient algorithms for large interesting families of graphs (e.g. bounded treewidth, sparse). Using the previous results, we provide tight algorithms for the practically useful family of planar graphs in all error regimes.

preprint2022arXiv

Learning a Single Neuron with Adversarial Label Noise via Gradient Descent

We study the fundamental problem of learning a single neuron, i.e., a function of the form $\mathbf{x}\mapstoσ(\mathbf{w}\cdot\mathbf{x})$ for monotone activations $σ:\mathbb{R}\mapsto\mathbb{R}$, with respect to the $L_2^2$-loss in the presence of adversarial label noise. Specifically, we are given labeled examples from a distribution $D$ on $(\mathbf{x}, y)\in\mathbb{R}^d \times \mathbb{R}$ such that there exists $\mathbf{w}^\ast\in\mathbb{R}^d$ achieving $F(\mathbf{w}^\ast)=ε$, where $F(\mathbf{w})=\mathbf{E}_{(\mathbf{x},y)\sim D}[(σ(\mathbf{w}\cdot \mathbf{x})-y)^2]$. The goal of the learner is to output a hypothesis vector $\mathbf{w}$ such that $F(\mathbb{w})=C\, ε$ with high probability, where $C>1$ is a universal constant. As our main contribution, we give efficient constant-factor approximate learners for a broad class of distributions (including log-concave distributions) and activation functions. Concretely, for the class of isotropic log-concave distributions, we obtain the following important corollaries: For the logistic activation, we obtain the first polynomial-time constant factor approximation (even under the Gaussian distribution). Our algorithm has sample complexity $\widetilde{O}(d/ε)$, which is tight within polylogarithmic factors. For the ReLU activation, we give an efficient algorithm with sample complexity $\tilde{O}(d\, \polylog(1/ε))$. Prior to our work, the best known constant-factor approximate learner had sample complexity $\tildeΩ(d/ε)$. In both of these settings, our algorithms are simple, performing gradient-descent on the (regularized) $L_2^2$-loss. The correctness of our algorithms relies on novel structural results that we establish, showing that (essentially all) stationary points of the underlying non-convex loss are approximately optimal.

preprint2022arXiv

Online Learning for Min Sum Set Cover and Pandora's Box

Two central problems in Stochastic Optimization are Min Sum Set Cover and Pandora's Box. In Pandora's Box, we are presented with $n$ boxes, each containing an unknown value and the goal is to open the boxes in some order to minimize the sum of the search cost and the smallest value found. Given a distribution of value vectors, we are asked to identify a near-optimal search order. Min Sum Set Cover corresponds to the case where values are either 0 or infinity. In this work, we study the case where the value vectors are not drawn from a distribution but are presented to a learner in an online fashion. We present a computationally efficient algorithm that is constant-competitive against the cost of the optimal search order. We extend our results to a bandit setting where only the values of the boxes opened are revealed to the learner after every round. We also generalize our results to other commonly studied variants of Pandora's Box and Min Sum Set Cover that involve selecting more than a single value subject to a matroid constraint.

preprint2022arXiv

ReLU Regression with Massart Noise

We study the fundamental problem of ReLU regression, where the goal is to fit Rectified Linear Units (ReLUs) to data. This supervised learning task is efficiently solvable in the realizable setting, but is known to be computationally hard with adversarial label noise. In this work, we focus on ReLU regression in the Massart noise model, a natural and well-studied semi-random noise model. In this model, the label of every point is generated according to a function in the class, but an adversary is allowed to change this value arbitrarily with some probability, which is {\em at most} $η< 1/2$. We develop an efficient algorithm that achieves exact parameter recovery in this model under mild anti-concentration assumptions on the underlying distribution. Such assumptions are necessary for exact recovery to be information-theoretically possible. We demonstrate that our algorithm significantly outperforms naive applications of $\ell_1$ and $\ell_2$ regression on both synthetic and real data.

preprint2021arXiv

Agnostic Proper Learning of Halfspaces under Gaussian Marginals

We study the problem of agnostically learning halfspaces under the Gaussian distribution. Our main result is the {\em first proper} learning algorithm for this problem whose sample complexity and computational complexity qualitatively match those of the best known improper agnostic learner. Building on this result, we also obtain the first proper polynomial-time approximation scheme (PTAS) for agnostically learning homogeneous halfspaces. Our techniques naturally extend to agnostically learning linear models with respect to other non-linear activations, yielding in particular the first proper agnostic algorithm for ReLU regression.

preprint2020arXiv

Black-box Methods for Restoring Monotonicity

In many practical applications, heuristic or approximation algorithms are used to efficiently solve the task at hand. However their solutions frequently do not satisfy natural monotonicity properties of optimal solutions. In this work we develop algorithms that are able to restore monotonicity in the parameters of interest. Specifically, given oracle access to a (possibly non-monotone) multi-dimensional real-valued function $f$, we provide an algorithm that restores monotonicity while degrading the expected value of the function by at most $\varepsilon$. The number of queries required is at most logarithmic in $1/\varepsilon$ and exponential in the number of parameters. We also give a lower bound showing that this exponential dependence is necessary. Finally, we obtain improved query complexity bounds for restoring the weaker property of $k$-marginal monotonicity. Under this property, every $k$-dimensional projection of the function $f$ is required to be monotone. The query complexity we obtain only scales exponentially with $k$.

preprint2020arXiv

Learning Halfspaces with Massart Noise Under Structured Distributions

We study the problem of learning halfspaces with Massart noise in the distribution-specific PAC model. We give the first computationally efficient algorithm for this problem with respect to a broad family of distributions, including log-concave distributions. This resolves an open question posed in a number of prior works. Our approach is extremely simple: We identify a smooth {\em non-convex} surrogate loss with the property that any approximate stationary point of this loss defines a halfspace that is close to the target halfspace. Given this structural result, we can use SGD to solve the underlying learning problem.

preprint2020arXiv

Learning Halfspaces with Tsybakov Noise

We study the efficient PAC learnability of halfspaces in the presence of Tsybakov noise. In the Tsybakov noise model, each label is independently flipped with some probability which is controlled by an adversary. This noise model significantly generalizes the Massart noise model, by allowing the flipping probabilities to be arbitrarily close to $1/2$ for a fraction of the samples. Our main result is the first non-trivial PAC learning algorithm for this problem under a broad family of structured distributions -- satisfying certain concentration and (anti-)anti-concentration properties -- including log-concave distributions. Specifically, we given an algorithm that achieves misclassification error $ε$ with respect to the true halfspace, with quasi-polynomial runtime dependence in $1/\epsilin$. The only previous upper bound for this problem -- even for the special case of log-concave distributions -- was doubly exponential in $1/ε$ (and follows via the naive reduction to agnostic learning). Our approach relies on a novel computationally efficient procedure to certify whether a candidate solution is near-optimal, based on semi-definite programming. We use this certificate procedure as a black-box and turn it into an efficient learning algorithm by searching over the space of halfspaces via online convex optimization.

preprint2020arXiv

Menu-size Complexity and Revenue Continuity of Buy-many Mechanisms

We study the multi-item mechanism design problem where a monopolist sells $n$ heterogeneous items to a single buyer. We focus on buy-many mechanisms, a natural class of mechanisms frequently used in practice. The buy-many property allows the buyer to interact with the mechanism multiple times instead of once as in the more commonly studied buy-one mechanisms. This imposes additional incentive constraints and thus restricts the space of mechanisms that the seller can use. In this paper, we explore the qualitative differences between buy-one and buy-many mechanisms focusing on two important properties: revenue continuity and menu-size complexity. Our first main result is that when the value function of the buyer is perturbed multiplicatively by a factor of $1\pmε$, the optimal revenue obtained by buy-many mechanisms only changes by a factor of $1 \pm \textrm{poly}(n,ε)$. In contrast, for buy-one mechanisms, the revenue of the resulting optimal mechanism after such a perturbation can change arbitrarily. Our second main result shows that under any distribution of arbitrary valuations, finite menu size suffices to achieve a $(1-ε)$-approximation to the optimal buy-many mechanism. We give tight upper and lower bounds on the number of menu entries as a function of $n$ and $ε$. On the other hand, such a result fails to hold for buy-one mechanisms as even for two items and a buyer with either unit-demand or additive valuations, the menu-size complexity of approximately optimal mechanisms is unbounded.

preprint2020arXiv

Non-Convex SGD Learns Halfspaces with Adversarial Label Noise

We study the problem of agnostically learning homogeneous halfspaces in the distribution-specific PAC model. For a broad family of structured distributions, including log-concave distributions, we show that non-convex SGD efficiently converges to a solution with misclassification error $O(\opt)+\eps$, where $\opt$ is the misclassification error of the best-fitting halfspace. In sharp contrast, we show that optimizing any convex surrogate inherently leads to misclassification error of $ω(\opt)$, even under Gaussian marginals.

preprint2020arXiv

Pandora's Box with Correlations: Learning and Approximation

The Pandora's Box problem and its extensions capture optimization problems with stochastic input where the algorithm can obtain instantiations of input random variables at some cost. To our knowledge, all previous work on this class of problems assumes that different random variables in the input are distributed independently. As such it does not capture many real-world settings. In this paper, we provide the first approximation algorithms for Pandora's Box-type problems with correlations. We assume that the algorithm has access to samples drawn from the joint distribution on input. Algorithms for these problems must determine an order in which to probe random variables, as well as when to stop and return the best solution found so far. In general, an optimal algorithm may make both decisions adaptively based on instantiations observed previously. Such fully adaptive (FA) strategies cannot be efficiently approximated to within any sublinear factor with sample access. We therefore focus on the simpler objective of approximating partially adaptive (PA) strategies that probe random variables in a fixed predetermined order but decide when to stop based on the instantiations observed. We consider a number of different feasibility constraints and provide simple PA strategies that are approximately optimal with respect to the best PA strategy for each case. All of our algorithms have polynomial sample complexity. We further show that our results are tight within constant factors: better factors cannot be achieved even using the full power of FA strategies.

preprint2017arXiv

Truthful Facility Location with Additive Errors

We address the problem of locating facilities on the $[0,1]$ interval based on reports from strategic agents. The cost of each agent is her distance to the closest facility, and the global objective is to minimize either the maximum cost of an agent or the social cost. As opposed to the extensive literature on facility location which considers the multiplicative error, we focus on minimizing the worst-case additive error. Minimizing the additive error incentivizes mechanisms to adapt to the size of the instance. I.e., mechanisms can sacrifice little efficiency in small instances (location profiles in which all agents are relatively close to one another), in order to gain more [absolute] efficiency in large instances. We argue that this measure is better suited for many manifestations of the facility location problem in various domains. We present tight bounds for mechanisms locating a single facility in both deterministic and randomized cases. We further provide several extensions for locating multiple facilities.

preprint2016arXiv

A Size-Free CLT for Poisson Multinomials and its Applications

An $(n,k)$-Poisson Multinomial Distribution (PMD) is the distribution of the sum of $n$ independent random vectors supported on the set ${\cal B}_k=\{e_1,\ldots,e_k\}$ of standard basis vectors in $\mathbb{R}^k$. We show that any $(n,k)$-PMD is ${\rm poly}\left({k\over σ}\right)$-close in total variation distance to the (appropriately discretized) multi-dimensional Gaussian with the same first two moments, removing the dependence on $n$ from the Central Limit Theorem of Valiant and Valiant. Interestingly, our CLT is obtained by bootstrapping the Valiant-Valiant CLT itself through the structural characterization of PMDs shown in recent work by Daskalakis, Kamath, and Tzamos. In turn, our stronger CLT can be leveraged to obtain an efficient PTAS for approximate Nash equilibria in anonymous games, significantly improving the state of the art, and matching qualitatively the running time dependence on $n$ and $1/\varepsilon$ of the best known algorithm for two-strategy anonymous games. Our new CLT also enables the construction of covers for the set of $(n,k)$-PMDs, which are proper and whose size is shown to be essentially optimal. Our cover construction combines our CLT with the Shapley-Folkman theorem and recent sparsification results for Laplacian matrices by Batson, Spielman, and Srivastava. Our cover size lower bound is based on an algebraic geometric construction. Finally, leveraging the structural properties of the Fourier spectrum of PMDs we show that these distributions can be learned from $O_k(1/\varepsilon^2)$ samples in ${\rm poly}_k(1/\varepsilon)$-time, removing the quasi-polynomial dependence of the running time on $1/\varepsilon$ from the algorithm of Daskalakis, Kamath, and Tzamos.

preprint2016arXiv

Faster Sublinear Algorithms using Conditional Sampling

A conditional sampling oracle for a probability distribution D returns samples from the conditional distribution of D restricted to a specified subset of the domain. A recent line of work (Chakraborty et al. 2013 and Cannone et al. 2014) has shown that having access to such a conditional sampling oracle requires only polylogarithmic or even constant number of samples to solve distribution testing problems like identity and uniformity. This significantly improves over the standard sampling model where polynomially many samples are necessary. Inspired by these results, we introduce a computational model based on conditional sampling to develop sublinear algorithms with exponentially faster runtimes compared to standard sublinear algorithms. We focus on geometric optimization problems over points in high dimensional Euclidean space. Access to these points is provided via a conditional sampling oracle that takes as input a succinct representation of a subset of the domain and outputs a uniformly random point in that subset. We study two well studied problems: k-means clustering and estimating the weight of the minimum spanning tree. In contrast to prior algorithms for the classic model, our algorithms have time, space and sample complexity that is polynomial in the dimension and polylogarithmic in the number of points. Finally, we comment on the applicability of the model and compare with existing ones like streaming, parallel and distributed computational models.

preprint2016arXiv

Improving Viterbi is Hard: Better Runtimes Imply Faster Clique Algorithms

The classic algorithm of Viterbi computes the most likely path in a Hidden Markov Model (HMM) that results in a given sequence of observations. It runs in time $O(Tn^2)$ given a sequence of $T$ observations from a HMM with $n$ states. Despite significant interest in the problem and prolonged effort by different communities, no known algorithm achieves more than a polylogarithmic speedup. In this paper, we explain this difficulty by providing matching conditional lower bounds. We show that the Viterbi algorithm runtime is optimal up to subpolynomial factors even when the number of distinct observations is small. Our lower bounds are based on assumptions that the best known algorithms for the All-Pairs Shortest Paths problem (APSP) and for the Max-Weight $k$-Clique problem in edge-weighted graphs are essentially tight. Finally, using a recent algorithm by Green Larsen and Williams for online Boolean matrix-vector multiplication, we get a $2^{Ω(\sqrt {\log n})}$ speedup for the Viterbi algorithm when there are few distinct transition probabilities in the HMM.

preprint2016arXiv

Tight Hardness Results for Maximum Weight Rectangles

Given $n$ weighted points (positive or negative) in $d$ dimensions, what is the axis-aligned box which maximizes the total weight of the points it contains? The best known algorithm for this problem is based on a reduction to a related problem, the Weighted Depth problem [T. M. Chan, FOCS'13], and runs in time $O(n^d)$. It was conjectured [Barbay et al., CCCG'13] that this runtime is tight up to subpolynomial factors. We answer this conjecture affirmatively by providing a matching conditional lower bound. We also provide conditional lower bounds for the special case when points are arranged in a grid (a well studied problem known as Maximum Subarray problem) as well as for other related problems. All our lower bounds are based on assumptions that the best known algorithms for the All-Pairs Shortest Paths problem (APSP) and for the Max-Weight k-Clique problem in edge-weighted graphs are essentially optimal.

preprint2015arXiv

Mechanism Design via Optimal Transport

Optimal mechanisms have been provided in quite general multi-item settings, as long as each bidder's type distribution is given explicitly by listing every type in the support along with its associated probability. In the implicit setting, e.g. when the bidders have additive valuations with independent and/or continuous values for the items, these results do not apply, and it was recently shown that exact revenue optimization is intractable, even when there is only one bidder. Even for item distributions with special structure, optimal mechanisms have been surprisingly rare and the problem is challenging even in the two-item case. In this paper, we provide a framework for designing optimal mechanisms using optimal transport theory and duality theory. We instantiate our framework to obtain conditions under which only pricing the grand bundle is optimal in multi-item settings (complementing the work of [Manelli and Vincent 2006], as well as to characterize optimal two-item mechanisms. We use our results to derive closed-form descriptions of the optimal mechanism in several two-item settings, exhibiting also a setting where a continuum of lotteries is necessary for revenue optimization but a closed-form representation of the mechanism can still be found efficiently using our framework.

preprint2015arXiv

On the Structure, Covering, and Learning of Poisson Multinomial Distributions

An $(n,k)$-Poisson Multinomial Distribution (PMD) is the distribution of the sum of $n$ independent random vectors supported on the set ${\cal B}_k=\{e_1,\ldots,e_k\}$ of standard basis vectors in $\mathbb{R}^k$. We prove a structural characterization of these distributions, showing that, for all $\varepsilon >0$, any $(n, k)$-Poisson multinomial random vector is $\varepsilon$-close, in total variation distance, to the sum of a discretized multidimensional Gaussian and an independent $(\text{poly}(k/\varepsilon), k)$-Poisson multinomial random vector. Our structural characterization extends the multi-dimensional CLT of Valiant and Valiant, by simultaneously applying to all approximation requirements $\varepsilon$. In particular, it overcomes factors depending on $\log n$ and, importantly, the minimum eigenvalue of the PMD's covariance matrix from the distance to a multidimensional Gaussian random variable. We use our structural characterization to obtain an $\varepsilon$-cover, in total variation distance, of the set of all $(n, k)$-PMDs, significantly improving the cover size of Daskalakis and Papadimitriou, and obtaining the same qualitative dependence of the cover size on $n$ and $\varepsilon$ as the $k=2$ cover of Daskalakis and Papadimitriou. We further exploit this structure to show that $(n,k)$-PMDs can be learned to within $\varepsilon$ in total variation distance from $\tilde{O}_k(1/\varepsilon^2)$ samples, which is near-optimal in terms of dependence on $\varepsilon$ and independent of $n$. In particular, our result generalizes the single-dimensional result of Daskalakis, Diakonikolas, and Servedio for Poisson Binomials to arbitrary dimension.

preprint2015arXiv

Optimal Pricing is Hard

We show that computing the revenue-optimal deterministic auction in unit-demand single-buyer Bayesian settings, i.e. the optimal item-pricing, is computationally hard even in single-item settings where the buyer's value distribution is a sum of independently distributed attributes, or multi-item settings where the buyer's values for the items are independent. We also show that it is intractable to optimally price the grand bundle of multiple items for an additive bidder whose values for the items are independent. These difficulties stem from implicit definitions of a value distribution. We provide three instances of how different properties of implicit distributions can lead to intractability: the first is a #P-hardness proof, while the remaining two are reductions from the SQRT-SUM problem of Garey, Graham, and Johnson. While simple pricing schemes can oftentimes approximate the best scheme in revenue, they can have drastically different underlying structure. We argue therefore that either the specification of the input distribution must be highly restricted in format, or it is necessary for the goal to be mere approximation to the optimal scheme's revenue instead of computing properties of the scheme itself.

preprint2015arXiv

Who to Trust for Truthfully Maximizing Welfare?

We introduce a general approach based on \emph{selective verification} and obtain approximate mechanisms without money for maximizing the social welfare in the general domain of utilitarian voting. Having a good allocation in mind, a mechanism with verification selects few critical agents and detects, using a verification oracle, whether they have reported truthfully. If yes, the mechanism produces the desired allocation. Otherwise, the mechanism ignores any misreports and proceeds with the remaining agents. We obtain randomized truthful (or almost truthful) mechanisms without money that verify only $O(\ln m / ε)$ agents, where $m$ is the number of outcomes, independently of the total number of agents, and are $(1-ε)$-approximate for the social welfare. We also show that any truthful mechanism with a constant approximation ratio needs to verify $Ω(\log m)$ agents. A remarkable property of our mechanisms is \emph{robustness}, namely that their outcome depends only on the reports of the truthful agents.

preprint2014arXiv

The Value of Knowing Your Enemy

Many auction settings implicitly or explicitly require that bidders are treated equally ex-ante. This may be because discrimination is philosophically or legally impermissible, or because it is practically difficult to implement or impossible to enforce. We study so-called {\em anonymous} auctions to understand the revenue tradeoffs and to develop simple anonymous auctions that are approximately optimal. We consider digital goods settings and show that the optimal anonymous, dominant strategy incentive compatible auction has an intuitive structure --- imagine that bidders are randomly permuted before the auction, then infer a posterior belief about bidder i's valuation from the values of other bidders and set a posted price that maximizes revenue given this posterior. We prove that no anonymous mechanism can guarantee an approximation better than O(n) to the optimal revenue in the worst case (or O(log n) for regular distributions) and that even posted price mechanisms match those guarantees. Understanding that the real power of anonymous mechanisms comes when the auctioneer can infer the bidder identities accurately, we show a tight O(k) approximation guarantee when each bidder can be confused with at most k "higher types". Moreover, we introduce a simple mechanism based on n target prices that is asymptotically optimal and build on this mechanism to extend our results to m-unit auctions and sponsored search.

preprint2013arXiv

Strategy-Proof Facility Location for Concave Cost Functions

We consider k-Facility Location games, where n strategic agents report their locations on the real line, and a mechanism maps them to k facilities. Each agent seeks to minimize his connection cost, given by a nonnegative increasing function of his distance to the nearest facility. Departing from previous work, that mostly considers the identity cost function, we are interested in mechanisms without payments that are (group) strategyproof for any given cost function, and achieve a good approximation ratio for the social cost and/or the maximum cost of the agents. We present a randomized mechanism, called Equal Cost, which is group strategyproof and achieves a bounded approximation ratio for all k and n, for any given concave cost function. The approximation ratio is at most 2 for Max Cost and at most n for Social Cost. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first mechanism with a bounded approximation ratio for instances with k > 2 facilities and any number of agents. Our result implies an interesting separation between deterministic mechanisms, whose approximation ratio for Max Cost jumps from 2 to unbounded when k increases from 2 to 3, and randomized mechanisms, whose approximation ratio remains at most 2 for all k. On the negative side, we exclude the possibility of a mechanism with the properties of Equal Cost for strictly convex cost functions. We also present a randomized mechanism, called Pick the Loser, which applies to instances with k facilities and n = k+1 agents, and for any given concave cost function, is strongly group strategyproof and achieves an approximation ratio of 2 for Social Cost.

preprint2013arXiv

The Complexity of Optimal Mechanism Design

Myerson's seminal work provides a computationally efficient revenue-optimal auction for selling one item to multiple bidders. Generalizing this work to selling multiple items at once has been a central question in economics and algorithmic game theory, but its complexity has remained poorly understood. We answer this question by showing that a revenue-optimal auction in multi-item settings cannot be found and implemented computationally efficiently, unless ZPP contains P^#P. This is true even for a single additive bidder whose values for the items are independently distributed on two rational numbers with rational probabilities. Our result is very general: we show that it is hard to compute any encoding of an optimal auction of any format (direct or indirect, truthful or non-truthful) that can be implemented in expected polynomial time. In particular, under well-believed complexity-theoretic assumptions, revenue-optimization in very simple multi-item settings can only be tractably approximated. We note that our hardness result applies to randomized mechanisms in a very simple setting, and is not an artifact of introducing combinatorial structure to the problem by allowing correlation among item values, introducing combinatorial valuations, or requiring the mechanism to be deterministic (whose structure is readily combinatorial). Our proof is enabled by a flow-interpretation of the solutions of an exponential-size linear program for revenue maximization with an additional supermodularity constraint.

preprint2012arXiv

On the Power of Deterministic Mechanisms for Facility Location Games

We consider K-Facility Location games, where n strategic agents report their locations in a metric space, and a mechanism maps them to K facilities. Our main result is an elegant characterization of deterministic strategyproof mechanisms with a bounded approximation ratio for 2-Facility Location on the line. In particular, we show that for instances with n \geq 5 agents, any such mechanism either admits a unique dictator, or always places the facilities at the leftmost and the rightmost location of the instance. As a corollary, we obtain that the best approximation ratio achievable by deterministic strategyproof mechanisms for the problem of locating 2 facilities on the line to minimize the total connection cost is precisely n-2. Another rather surprising consequence is that the Two-Extremes mechanism of (Procaccia and Tennenholtz, EC 2009) is the only deterministic anonymous strategyproof mechanism with a bounded approximation ratio for 2-Facility Location on the line. The proof of the characterization employs several new ideas and technical tools, which provide new insights into the behavior of deterministic strategyproof mechanisms for K-Facility Location games, and may be of independent interest. Employing one of these tools, we show that for every K \geq 3, there do not exist any deterministic anonymous strategyproof mechanisms with a bounded approximation ratio for K-Facility Location on the line, even for simple instances with K+1 agents. Moreover, building on the characterization for the line, we show that there do not exist any deterministic strategyproof mechanisms with a bounded approximation ratio for 2-Facility Location on more general metric spaces, which is true even for simple instances with 3 agents located in a star.