Paper detail

Truthful Assignment without Money

We study the design of truthful mechanisms that do not use payments for the generalized assignment problem (GAP) and its variants. An instance of the GAP consists of a bipartite graph with jobs on one side and machines on the other. Machines have capacities and edges have values and sizes; the goal is to construct a welfare maximizing feasible assignment. In our model of private valuations, motivated by impossibility results, the value and sizes on all job-machine pairs are public information; however, whether an edge exists or not in the bipartite graph is a job's private information. We study several variants of the GAP starting with matching. For the unweighted version, we give an optimal strategyproof mechanism; for maximum weight bipartite matching, however, we show give a 2-approximate strategyproof mechanism and show by a matching lowerbound that this is optimal. Next we study knapsack-like problems, which are APX-hard. For these problems, we develop a general LP-based technique that extends the ideas of Lavi and Swamy to reduce designing a truthful mechanism without money to designing such a mechanism for the fractional version of the problem, at a loss of a factor equal to the integrality gap in the approximation ratio. We use this technique to obtain strategyproof mechanisms with constant approximation ratios for these problems. We then design an O(log n)-approximate strategyproof mechanism for the GAP by reducing, with logarithmic loss in the approximation, to our solution for the value-invariant GAP. Our technique may be of independent interest for designing truthful mechanisms without money for other LP-based problems.