Abstract

In the setup of selling one or more goods, various papers have shown, in various forms and for various purposes, that a small change in the distribution of a buyer's valuations may cause only a small change in the possible revenue that can be extracted. We prove a simple, clean, convenient, and general statement to this effect: let XX and YY be random valuations on kk additive goods, and let W(X,Y)W(X,Y) be the Wasserstein (or "earth mover's") distance between them; then ∣Rev(X)−Rev(Y)∣≤W(X,Y).\left\vert \sqrt{Rev(X)}-\sqrt{Rev(Y)}\right\vert \le \sqrt{W(X,Y)}. This further implies that a simple explicit modification of any optimal mechanism for XX, namely, "uniform discounting," is guaranteed to be almost optimal for any YY that is close to XX in the Wasserstein distance.

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