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Terminal Ranking Games

We analyze a mean field tournament: a mean field game in which the agents receive rewards according to the ranking of the terminal value of their projects and are subject to cost of effort. Using Schrödinger bridges we are able to explicitly calculate the equilibrium. This allows us to identify the reward functions which would yield a desired equilibrium and solve several related mechanism design problems. We are also able to identify the effect of reward inequality on the players' welfare as well as calculate the price of anarchy.

preprint2020arXivOpen access

Erhan Bayraktar Yuchong Zhang

math.OC math.PR

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Erhan Bayraktar Yuchong Zhang

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