Settling the complexity of computing approximate two-player Nash equilibria

We prove that there exists a constant $ε>0$ such that, assuming the Exponential Time Hypothesis for PPAD, computing an $ε$-approximate Nash equilibrium in a two-player (nXn) game requires quasi-polynomial time, $n^{\log^{1-o(1)} n}$. This matches (up to the o(1) term) the algorithm of Lipton, Markakis, and Mehta [LMM03]. Our proof relies on a variety of techniques from the study of probabilistically checkable proofs (PCP); this is the first time that such ideas are used for a reduction between problems inside PPAD. En route, we also prove new hardness results for computing Nash equilibria in games with many players. In particular, we show that computing an $ε$-approximate Nash equilibrium in a game with n players requires $2^{Ω(n)}$ oracle queries to the payoff tensors. This resolves an open problem posed by Hart and Nisan [HN13], Babichenko [Bab14], and Chen et al. [CCT15]. In fact, our results for n-player games are stronger: they hold with respect to the $(ε,δ)$-WeakNash relaxation recently introduced by Babichenko et al. [BPR16].

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