Abstract
We consider multiwinner elections in Euclidean space using the minimax Chamberlin-Courant rule. In this setting, voters and candidates are embedded in a -dimensional Euclidean space, and the goal is to choose a committee of candidates so that the rank of any voter's most preferred candidate in the committee is minimized. (The problem is also equivalent to the ordinal version of the classical -center problem.) We show that the problem is NP-hard in any dimension , and also provably hard to approximate. Our main results are three polynomial-time approximation schemes, each of which finds a committee with provably good minimax score. In all cases, we show that our approximation bounds are tight or close to tight. We mainly focus on the -Borda rule but some of our results also hold for the more general -Borda.
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