Abstract
We present a general analysis of multidimensional matching problems with transferable utility, paying particular attention to the case in which the dimensions of heterogeneity on the two sides of the market are unequal. A particular emphasis is put on problems where agents on one side of the market are multidimensional and agents on the other side are uni-dimensional, we describe a general approach to solve such problems. Lastly, we analyze several examples, including an hedonic model with differentiated products, a marriage market model where wives are differentiated in income and fertility, and a competitive variation of the Rochet-Choné problem. In the latter example, we show that the bunching phenomena, observed by Rochet and Choné in the monopoly context, do not occur in the competitive context
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