Estimating the Nash Social Welfare for coverage and other submodular valuations

preprint2021arXivOpen access

Abstract

We study the Nash Social Welfare problem: Given nn agents with valuation functions vi:2[m]→Rv_i:2^{[m]} \rightarrow {\mathbb R}, partition [m][m] into S1,…,SnS_1,\ldots,S_n so as to maximize (∏i=1nvi(Si))1/n(\prod_{i=1}^{n} v_i(S_i))^{1/n}. The problem has been shown to admit a constant-factor approximation for additive, budget-additive, and piecewise linear concave separable valuations; the case of submodular valuations is open. We provide a 1e(1−1e)2\frac{1}{e} (1-\frac{1}{e})^2-approximation of the {\em optimal value} for several classes of submodular valuations: coverage, sums of matroid rank functions, and certain matching-based valuations.

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