Paper detail

Enhancing Privacy against Inversion Attacks in Federated Learning by using Mixing Gradients Strategies

Federated learning reduces the risk of information leakage, but remains vulnerable to attacks. We investigate how several neural network design decisions can defend against gradients inversion attacks. We show that overlapping gradients provides numerical resistance to gradient inversion on the highly vulnerable dense layer. Specifically, we propose to leverage batching to maximise mixing of gradients by choosing an appropriate loss function and drawing identical labels. We show that otherwise it is possible to directly recover all vectors in a mini-batch without any numerical optimisation due to the de-mixing nature of the cross entropy loss. To accurately assess data recovery, we introduce an absolute variation distance (AVD) metric for information leakage in images, derived from total variation. In contrast to standard metrics, e.g. Mean Squared Error or Structural Similarity Index, AVD offers a continuous metric for extracting information in noisy images. Finally, our empirical results on information recovery from various inversion attacks and training performance supports our defense strategies. These strategies are also shown to be useful for deep convolutional neural networks such as LeNET for image recognition. We hope that this study will help guide the development of further strategies that achieve a trustful federation policy.