Paper detail

Do cycles dissipate when subjects must choose simultaneously?

This question is raised by Cason, Friedman and Hopkins (CFH, 2012) after they firstly found and indexed quantitatively the cycles in a continuous time experiment. To answer this question, we use the data from standard RPS experiment. Our experiments are of the traditional setting - in each of repeated rounds, the subjects are paired with random matching, using pure strategy and must choose simultaneously, and after each round, each subject obtains only private information. This economics environment is a decartelized and low-information one. Using the cycle rotation indexes (CRI, developed by CFH) method, we find, the cycles not only exist but also persist in our experiment. Meanwhile, the cycles' direction are consistent with 'standard' learning models. That is the answer to the CHF question: Cycles do not dissipate in the simultaneously choose game. In addtion, we discuss three questions (1) why significant cycles are uneasy to be obtained in traditional setting experiments; (2) why CRI can be an iconic indexing-method for 'standard' evolution dynamics; and (3) where more cycles could be expected.