Paper detail

Cryptographic Enforcement of Information Flow Policies without Public Information

Cryptographic access control has been studied for over 30 years and is now a mature research topic. When symmetric cryptographic primitives are used, each protected resource is encrypted and only authorized users should have access to the encryption key. By treating the keys themselves as protected resources, it is possible to develop schemes in which authorized keys are derived from the keys explicitly assigned to the user's possession and publicly available information. It has been generally assumed that each user would be assigned a single key from which all other authorized keys would be derived. Recent work has challenged this assumption by developing schemes that do not require public information, the trade-off being that a user may require more than one key. However, these new schemes, which require a chain partition of the partially ordered set on which the access control policy is based, have some disadvantages. In this paper we define the notion of a tree-based cryptographic enforcement scheme, which, like chain-based schemes, requires no public information. We establish that the strong security properties of chain-based schemes are preserved by tree-based schemes, and provide an efficient construction for deriving a tree-based enforcement scheme from a given policy that minimizes the number of keys required.