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Classificatory Sorites, Probabilistic Supervenience, and Rule-Making

We view sorites in terms of stimuli acting upon a system and evoking this system's responses. Supervenience of responses on stimuli implies that they either lack tolerance (i.e., they change in every vicinity of some of the stimuli), or stimuli are not always connectable by finite chains of stimuli in which successive members are `very similar'. If supervenience does not hold, the properties of tolerance and connectedness cannot be formulated and therefore soritical sequences cannot be constructed. We hypothesize that supervenience in empirical systems (such as people answering questions) is fundamentally probabilistic. The supervenience of probabilities of responses on stimuli is stable, in the sense that `higher-order' probability distributions can always be reduced to `ordinary' ones. In making rules about which stimuli ought to correspond to which responses, the main characterization of choices in soritical situations is their arbitrariness. We argue that arbitrariness poses no problems for classical logic.