Aspiring to the fittest and promotion of cooperation in the prisoner's dilemma game

preprint2010arXivOpen access

Abstract

Strategy changes are an essential part of evolutionary games. Here we introduce a simple rule that, depending on the value of a single parameter ww, influences the selection of players that are considered as potential sources of the new strategy. For positive ww players with high payoffs will be considered more likely, while for negative ww the opposite holds. Setting ww equal to zero returns the frequently adopted random selection of the opponent. We find that increasing the probability of adopting the strategy from the fittest player within reach, i.e. setting ww positive, promotes the evolution of cooperation. The robustness of this observation is tested against different levels of uncertainty in the strategy adoption process and for different interaction network. Since the evolution to widespread defection is tightly associated with cooperators having a lower fitness than defectors, the fact that positive values of ww facilitate cooperation is quite surprising. We show that the results can be explained by means of a negative feedback effect that increases the vulnerability of defectors although initially increasing their survivability. Moreover, we demonstrate that the introduction of ww effectively alters the interaction network and thus also the impact of uncertainty by strategy adoptions on the evolution of cooperation.

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