Abstract
This paper uses game theory to argue that, contrary to the prevailing view, a moratorium on Artificial Superintelligence (ASI) can be in a state's self-interest. By formalizing trategic interactions between geopolitical superpowers, we model the trade-off between the benefits of technological supremacy and the catastrophic risks of uncontrolled ASI. The analysis reveals that as the perceived cost of loss of control increases sufficiently relative to other parameters, it becomes in each state's self-interest to impose a moratorium. We further provide empirical evidence suggesting that the global perception of ASI risk is rising, making a stable, rational moratorium increasingly plausible in the current geopolitical landscape.
Connections
Explore this paper’s authors, topics and related work.
Building this map preview
BZPEER is loading the nearby papers, people, topics and institutions for this page.
Reviews 0
Write a review
No reviews yet.
Discussion 0
Add a comment
No comments yet.