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Zhi-Yi Chin

Zhi-Yi Chin contributes to research discovery and scholarly infrastructure.

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Published work

2 published item(s)

preprint2026arXiv

Plan2Cleanse: Test-Time Backdoor Defense via Monte-Carlo Planning in Deep Reinforcement Learning

Ensuring the security of reinforcement learning (RL) models is critical, particularly when they are trained by third parties and deployed in real-world systems. Attackers can implant backdoors into these models, causing them to behave normally under typical conditions, but execute malicious behaviors when specific triggers are activated. In this work, we propose Plan2Cleanse, a test-time detection and mitigation framework that adapts Monte Carlo Tree Search to efficiently identify and neutralize RL backdoor attacks without requiring model retraining. Our approach recasts backdoor detection as a planning problem, enabling systematic exploration of temporally extended trigger sequences while maintaining black-box access to the target policy. By leveraging the detection results, Plan2Cleanse can further achieve efficient mitigation through tree-search preventive replanning. We evaluated our method in competitive MuJoCo environments, simulated O-RAN wireless networks, and Atari games. Plan2Cleanse achieves substantial improvements, increasing trigger detection success rates by more than 61.4 percentage points in stealthy O-RAN scenarios and improving win rates from 35\% to 53\% in competitive Humanoid environments. These results demonstrate the effectiveness of our test-time defense approach and highlight the importance of proactive defenses against backdoor threats in RL deployments. Our implementation is publicly available at https://github.com/rl-bandits-lab/RL-Backdoor.

preprint2026arXiv

Prompting4Debugging: Red-Teaming Text-to-Image Diffusion Models by Finding Problematic Prompts

Text-to-image diffusion models, e.g. Stable Diffusion (SD), lately have shown remarkable ability in high-quality content generation, and become one of the representatives for the recent wave of transformative AI. Nevertheless, such advance comes with an intensifying concern about the misuse of this generative technology, especially for producing copyrighted or NSFW (i.e. not safe for work) images. Although efforts have been made to filter inappropriate images/prompts or remove undesirable concepts/styles via model fine-tuning, the reliability of these safety mechanisms against diversified problematic prompts remains largely unexplored. In this work, we propose Prompting4Debugging (P4D) as a debugging and red-teaming tool that automatically finds problematic prompts for diffusion models to test the reliability of a deployed safety mechanism. We demonstrate the efficacy of our P4D tool in uncovering new vulnerabilities of SD models with safety mechanisms. Particularly, our result shows that around half of prompts in existing safe prompting benchmarks which were originally considered "safe" can actually be manipulated to bypass many deployed safety mechanisms, including concept removal, negative prompt, and safety guidance. Our findings suggest that, without comprehensive testing, the evaluations on limited safe prompting benchmarks can lead to a false sense of safety for text-to-image models.