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Zeyu Ding

Zeyu Ding contributes to research discovery and scholarly infrastructure.

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Published work

3 published item(s)

preprint2026arXiv

The Trap of Trajectory: Towards Understanding and Mitigating Spurious Correlations in Agentic Memory

Agentic memory enables LLMs to persist information beyond a single context window and reuse it in later decisions, but it also introduces a new vulnerability: spurious correlations, where retrieved memory carries miscorrelated evidence and propagates erroneous reasoning into downstream decisions. Despite the widespread use of agentic memory, this risk remains largely underexplored. We address it from two aspects. First, we benchmark several canonical types of spurious patterns identified through causal structure and record them across trajectory-level memory. Diagnosing agentic memory systems on this benchmark reveals that memory improves reasoning on clean inputs but amplifies reliance on spurious patterns when they are present. Second, we propose CAMEL, a plug-and-play calibration method that operates across diverse memory architectures at both write and retrieval time. CAMEL consistently reduces reliance on spurious patterns across all three types while preserving or improving performance on clean inputs and staying robust under adaptive attacks targeting the calibration. Overall, CAMEL offers a principled and lightweight solution toward more reliable agentic memory deployment.

preprint2022arXiv

Reconstruction Attacks on Aggressive Relaxations of Differential Privacy

Differential privacy is a widely accepted formal privacy definition that allows aggregate information about a dataset to be released while controlling privacy leakage for individuals whose records appear in the data. Due to the unavoidable tension between privacy and utility, there have been many works trying to relax the requirements of differential privacy to achieve greater utility. One class of relaxation, which is starting to gain support outside the privacy community is embodied by the definitions of individual differential privacy (IDP) and bootstrap differential privacy (BDP). The original version of differential privacy defines a set of neighboring database pairs and achieves its privacy guarantees by requiring that each pair of neighbors should be nearly indistinguishable to an attacker. The privacy definitions we study, however, aggressively reduce the set of neighboring pairs that are protected. Both IDP and BDP define a measure of "privacy loss" that satisfies formal privacy properties such as postprocessing invariance and composition, and achieve dramatically better utility than the traditional variants of differential privacy. However, there is a significant downside - we show that they allow a significant portion of the dataset to be reconstructed using algorithms that have arbitrarily low privacy loss under their privacy accounting rules. We demonstrate these attacks using the preferred mechanisms of these privacy definitions. In particular, we design a set of queries that, when protected by these mechanisms with high noise settings (i.e., with claims of very low privacy loss), yield more precise information about the dataset than if they were not protected at all.

preprint2020arXiv

CheckDP: An Automated and Integrated Approach for Proving Differential Privacy or Finding Precise Counterexamples

We propose CheckDP, the first automated and integrated approach for proving or disproving claims that a mechanism is differentially private. CheckDP can find counterexamples for mechanisms with subtle bugs for which prior counterexample generators have failed. Furthermore, it was able to \emph{automatically} generate proofs for correct mechanisms for which no formal verification was reported before. CheckDP is built on static program analysis, allowing it to be more efficient and more precise in catching infrequent events than existing counterexample generators (which run mechanisms hundreds of thousands of times to estimate their output distribution). Moreover, its sound approach also allows automatic verification of correct mechanisms. When evaluated on standard benchmarks and newer privacy mechanisms, CheckDP generates proofs (for correct mechanisms) and counterexamples (for incorrect mechanisms) within 70 seconds without any false positives or false negatives.