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Yan Shoshitaishvili

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2 published item(s)

preprint2026arXiv

ExploitGym: Can AI Agents Turn Security Vulnerabilities into Real Attacks?

AI agents are rapidly gaining capabilities that could significantly reshape cybersecurity, making rigorous evaluation urgent. A critical capability is exploitation: turning a vulnerability, which is not yet an attack, into a concrete security impact, such as unauthorized file access or code execution. Exploitation is a particularly challenging task because it requires low-level program reasoning (e.g., about memory layout), runtime adaptation, and sustained progress over long horizons. Meanwhile, it is inherently dual-use, supporting defensive workflows while lowering the barrier for offense. Despite its importance and diagnostic value, exploitation remains under-evaluated. To address this gap, we introduce ExploitGym, a large-scale, diverse, realistic benchmark on the exploitation capabilities of AI agents. Given a program input that triggers a vulnerability, ExploitGym tasks agents with progressively extending it into a working exploit. The benchmark comprises 898 instances sourced from real-world vulnerabilities across three domains, including userspace programs, Google's V8 JavaScript engine, and the Linux kernel. We vary the security protections applied to each instance, isolating their impact on agent performance. All configurations are packaged in reproducible containerized environments. Our evaluation shows that while exploitation remains challenging, frontier models can successfully exploit a non-trivial fraction of vulnerabilities. For example, the strongest configurations are Anthropic's latest model Claude Mythos Preview and OpenAI's GPT-5.5, which produce working exploits for 157 and 120 instances, respectively. Notably, even with widely used defenses enabled, models retain non-trivial success rates. These results establish ExploitGym as an effective testbed for exploitation and highlight the growing cybersecurity risks posed by increasingly capable AI agents.

preprint2022arXiv

Context-Auditor: Context-sensitive Content Injection Mitigation

Cross-site scripting (XSS) is the most common vulnerability class in web applications over the last decade. Much research attention has focused on building exploit mitigation defenses for this problem, but no technique provides adequate protection in the face of advanced attacks. One technique that bypasses XSS mitigations is the scriptless attack: a content injection technique that uses (among other options) CSS and HTML injection to infiltrate data. In studying this technique and others, we realized that the common property among the exploitation of all content injection vulnerabilities, including not just XSS and scriptless attacks, but also command injections and several others, is an unintended context switch in the victim program's parsing engine that is caused by untrusted user input. In this paper, we propose Context-Auditor, a novel technique that leverages this insight to identify content injection vulnerabilities ranging from XSS to scriptless attacks and command injections. We implemented Context-Auditor as a general solution to content injection exploit detection problem in the form of a flexible, stand-alone detection module. We deployed instances of Context-Auditor as (1) a browser plugin, (2) a web proxy (3) a web server plugin, and (4) as a wrapper around potentially-injectable system endpoints. Because Context-Auditor targets the root cause of content injection exploitation (and, more specifically for the purpose of our prototype, XSS exploitation, scriptless exploitation, and command injection), our evaluation results demonstrate that Context-Auditor can identify and block content injection exploits that modern defenses cannot while maintaining low throughput overhead and avoiding false positives.