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Wenbo Jiang

Wenbo Jiang appears in the imported research catalog. Authorship, coauthor and topic links are available while profile ownership is still unclaimed.

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Artificial IntelligenceComputer VisionCryptography and SecurityMachine Learning

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Published work

3 published item(s)

preprint2026arXiv

CBV: Clean-label Backdoor Attacks on Vision Language Models via Diffusion Models

Vision-Language Models (VLMs) have achieved remarkable success in tasks such as image captioning and visual question answering (VQA). However, as their applications become increasingly widespread, recent studies have revealed that VLMs are vulnerable to backdoor attacks. Existing backdoor attacks on VLMs primarily rely on data poisoning by adding visual triggers and modifying text labels, where the induced image-text mismatch makes poisoned samples easy to detect. To address this limitation, we propose the Clean-Label Backdoor Attack on VLMs via Diffusion Models (CBV), which leverages diffusion models to generate natural poisoned examples via score matching. Specifically, CBV modifies the score during the reverse generation process of the diffusion model to guide the generation of poisoned samples that contain triggered image features. To further enhance the effectiveness of the attack, we incorporate the textual information of the triggered images as multimodal guidance during generation. Moreover, to enhance stealthiness, we introduce a GradCAM-guided Mask (GM) that restricts modifications to only the most semantically important regions, rather than the entire image. We evaluate our method on MSCOCO and VQA v2 with four representative VLMs, achieving over 80% ASR while preserving normal functionality.

0 citations0 reviewsNo code linkedOpen access
preprint2026arXiv

DIVER:Diving Deeper into Distilled Data via Expressive Semantic Recovery

Dataset distillation aims to synthesize a compact proxy dataset that is unreadable or non-raw from the original dataset for privacy protection and highly efficient learning. However, previous approaches typically adopt a single-stage distillation paradigm, which suffers from learning specific patterns that overfit on a prior architecture, consequently suppressing the expression of semantics and leading to performance degradation across heterogeneous architectures. To address this issue, we propose a novel dual-stage distillation framework called ${\textbf{DIVER}}$, which leverages the pre-trained diffusion model to dive deeper into $\textbf{DI}$stilled data $\textbf{V}$ia $\textbf{E}$xpressive semantic $\textbf{R}$ecovery, an entire process of semantic inheritance, guidance, and fusion. Semantic inheritance distills high-level semantics of abstract distilled images into the latent space to filter out architecture-specific ``noise" and retain the intrinsic semantics. Furthermore, semantic guidance improves the preservation of the original semantics by directing the reverse procedure. Finally, semantic fusion is designed to provide semantic guidance only during the concrete phase of the reverse process, preventing semantic ambiguity and artifacts while maintaining the guidance information. Extensive experiments validate the effectiveness and efficiency of DIVER in improving classical distillation techniques and significantly improving cross-architecture generalization, requiring processing time comparable to raw DiT on ImageNet (256$\times$256) with only 4 GB of GPU memory usage. Code is available: https://github.com/einsteinxia/DIVER.

0 citations0 reviewsNo code linkedOpen access
preprint2026arXiv

State Backdoor: Towards Stealthy Real-world Poisoning Attack on Vision-Language-Action Model in State Space

Vision-Language-Action (VLA) models are widely deployed in safety-critical embodied AI applications such as robotics. However, their complex multimodal interactions also expose new security vulnerabilities. In this paper, we investigate a backdoor threat in VLA models, where malicious inputs cause targeted misbehavior while preserving performance on clean data. Existing backdoor methods predominantly rely on inserting visible triggers into visual modality, which suffer from poor robustness and low insusceptibility in real-world settings due to environmental variability. To overcome these limitations, we introduce the State Backdoor, a novel and practical backdoor attack that leverages the robot arm's initial state as the trigger. To optimize trigger for insusceptibility and effectiveness, we design a Preference-guided Genetic Algorithm (PGA) that efficiently searches the state space for minimal yet potent triggers. Extensive experiments on five representative VLA models and five real-world tasks show that our method achieves over 90% attack success rate without affecting benign task performance, revealing an underexplored vulnerability in embodied AI systems.

0 citations0 reviewsNo code linkedOpen access