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Venkat Arun

Venkat Arun contributes to research discovery and scholarly infrastructure.

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Published work

2 published item(s)

preprint2026arXiv

Assistants, Not Architects: The Role of LLMs in Networked Systems Design

Designing the architecture of modern networked systems requires navigating a large, combinatorial space of hardware, systems, and configuration choices with complex cross-layer interactions. Architects must balance competing objectives such as performance, cost, and deployability while satisfying compatibility and resource constraints, often relying on scattered rules-of-thumb drawn from benchmarks, papers, documentation, and expert experience. This raises a natural question: can large language models (LLMs) reliably perform this kind of architectural reasoning? We find that they cannot. While LLMs produce plausible configurations, they frequently miss critical constraints, encode incorrect assumptions, and exhibit ``stickiness'' to familiar patterns. A natural workaround--iterative validation via simulation or experimentation--is often prohibitively expensive at scale and, in many cases, infeasible, particularly when comparing hardware-dependent alternatives. Motivated by this gap, we present Kepler, a lightweight reasoning framework for architecture design that combines structured, expert-driven specifications with SMT-based optimization. Kepler encodes architecturally significant properties--requirements, incompatibilities, and qualitative trade-offs--about systems, hardware, and workloads as constraints, and synthesizes feasible designs that optimize user-defined objectives. It operates at an abstract level, capturing ``rules-of-thumb'' rather than detailed system behavior, enabling tractable reasoning while preserving key interactions, and provides explanations for its decisions. Through experiments and case studies, we show that Kepler uncovers interactions missed by LLMs and supports systematic, explainable design exploration.

preprint2019arXiv

Finding Safety in Numbers with Secure Allegation Escrows

For fear of retribution, the victim of a crime may be willing to report it only if other victims of the same perpetrator also step forward. Common examples include 1) identifying oneself as the victim of sexual harassment, especially by a person in a position of authority or 2) accusing an influential politician, an authoritarian government, or ones own employer of corruption. To handle such situations, legal literature has proposed the concept of an allegation escrow: a neutral third-party that collects allegations anonymously, matches them against each other, and de-anonymizes allegers only after de-anonymity thresholds (in terms of number of co-allegers), pre-specified by the allegers, are reached. An allegation escrow can be realized as a single trusted third party; however, this party must be trusted to keep the identity of the alleger and content of the allegation private. To address this problem, this paper introduces Secure Allegation Escrows (SAE, pronounced "say"). A SAE is a group of parties with independent interests and motives, acting jointly as an escrow for collecting allegations from individuals, matching the allegations, and de-anonymizing the allegations when designated thresholds are reached. By design, SAEs provide a very strong property: No less than a majority of parties constituting a SAE can de-anonymize or disclose the content of an allegation without a sufficient number of matching allegations (even in collusion with any number of other allegers). Once a sufficient number of matching allegations exist, the join escrow discloses the allegation with the allegers' identities. We describe how SAEs can be constructed using a novel authentication protocol and a novel allegation matching and bucketing algorithm, provide formal proofs of the security of our constructions, and evaluate a prototype implementation, demonstrating feasibility in practice.