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Qidong Liu

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3 published item(s)

preprint2026arXiv

Align-GRAG: Anchor and Rationale Guided Dual Alignment for Graph Retrieval-Augmented Generation

Despite the strong abilities, large language models (LLMs) still suffer from hallucinations and reliance on outdated knowledge, raising concerns in knowledge-intensive tasks. Graph-based retrieval-augmented generation (GRAG) enriches LLMs with knowledge by retrieving graphs leveraging relational evidence, but it faces two challenges: structure-coupled irrelevant knowledge introduced by neighbor expansion and structure-reasoning discrepancy between graph embeddings and LLM semantics. We propose \ourmodel, an anchor-and-rationale guided refinement framework to address these challenges. It prompts an LLM to extract anchors and rationale chains, which provide intermediate supervision for \textbf{(1) node-level alignment} that identifies critical nodes and prunes noisy evidence, and \textbf{(2) graph-level alignment} that bridges graph and language semantic spaces via contrastive learning. Extensive experiments on commonsense reasoning, scene graph understanding, and knowledge graph reasoning demonstrate consistent gains over 18 strong baselines, validating the effectiveness of \ourmodel for improving graph-grounded generation. The code can be found in https://anonymous.4open.science/r/Align-GRAG-F3D8/.

preprint2026arXiv

Thinking in Scales: Accelerating Gigapixel Pathology Image Analysis via Adaptive Continuous Reasoning

Traditional whole slide image (WSI) analysis methods typically rely on the multiple instance learning (MIL) paradigm, which extracts patch-level features at high magnification and aggregates them for slide-level prediction. However, such exhaustive patch-level processing is computationally expensive, severely limiting the efficiency and scalability of WSI analysis. To address this challenge, we propose PathCTM (a Pathology-oriented Continuous Thought Model) that enables token-efficient scale-space continuous reasoning for gigapixel WSIs. PathCTM formulates diagnostic inference as a dynamic sequential information pursuit. It progressively transitions from low-magnification global to high-magnification local inspection, and adaptively terminates inference when sufficient evidence is gathered to effectively bound decision uncertainty. Specifically, it uses conditional computation for dynamic scale switching with attention-guided region pruning, coupled with confidence-aware early stopping. Extensive experiments demonstrate that, compared with standard MIL-based methods, PathCTM reduces the number of required image patches by 95.95% and shortens inference time by approximately 95.62%, while maintaining AUC without degradation. Code is available at https://github.com/JSGe-AI/PathCTM.

preprint2022arXiv

Bribery in Rating Systems: A Game-Theoretic Perspective

Rating systems play a vital role in the exponential growth of service-oriented markets. As highly rated online services usually receive substantial revenue in the markets, malicious sellers seek to boost their service evaluation by manipulating the rating system with fake ratings. One effective way to improve the service evaluation is to hire fake rating providers by bribery. The fake ratings given by the bribed buyers influence the evaluation of the service, which further impacts the decision-making of potential buyers. In this paper, we study the bribery of a rating system with multiple sellers and buyers via a game-theoretic perspective. In detail, we examine whether there exists an equilibrium state in the market in which the rating system is expected to be bribery-proof: no bribery strategy yields a strictly positive gain. We first collect real-world data for modeling the bribery problem in rating systems. On top of that, we analyze the problem of bribery in a rating system as a static game. From our analysis, we conclude that at least a Nash equilibrium can be reached in the bribery game of rating systems.