Researcher profile

Paul Schrater

Paul Schrater contributes to research discovery and scholarly infrastructure.

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Published work

4 published item(s)

preprint2026arXiv

Playing games with knowledge: AI-Induced delusions need game theoretic interventions

Conversational AI has a fundamental flaw as a knowledge interface: sycophantic chatbots induce epistemic entrenchment and delusional belief spirals even in rational agents. We propose the problem does not stem from the AI model, rooted instead in a systemic consequence of the paradigm shift from user-driven knowledge search to users and agents engaged in strategic, repeated-play communication. We formalize the problem as a Crawford-Sobel cheap talk game, where costless user signals induce a pooling equilibrium. Agents optimized for user satisfaction produce sycophantic strategies that provide identical reinforcement across user types with opposite epistemic incentives: exploratory ``Growth-seekers'' ($θ_G$) and confirmatory ``Validation-seekers'' ($θ_V$). Under repeated play, this identification failure creates a coordination trap -- analogous to a Prisoner's Dilemma -- where locally rational feedback loops drive users toward pathologically certain false beliefs. We propose an inference-time mechanism design intervention called an Epistemic Mediator that breaks this pooling equilibrium by introducing a costly signal (epistemic friction), forcing type revelation based on users' asymmetric cognitive costs for processing resistance. A key contribution is Belief Versioning, a git-inspired epistemic meta-memory system that stores healthy beliefs and rollbacks when validation-seeking resistance is detected. In simulation, this intervention achieves a separating equilibrium achieving a $48\times$ differential in spiral rates while passing a learning preservation criterion), evidence that epistemic safety in AI is fundamentally a problem of strategic information environment design rather than simple model alignment.

preprint2022arXiv

Linking Theories and Methods in Cognitive Sciences via Joint Embedding of the Scientific Literature: The Example of Cognitive Control

Traditionally, theory and practice of Cognitive Control are linked via literature reviews by human domain experts. This approach, however, is inadequate to track the ever-growing literature. It may also be biased, and yield redundancies and confusion. Here we present an alternative approach. We performed automated text analyses on a large body of scientific texts to create a joint representation of tasks and constructs. More specifically, 385,705 scientific abstracts were first mapped into an embedding space using a transformers-based language model. Document embeddings were then used to identify a task-construct graph embedding that grounds constructs on tasks and supports nuanced meaning of the constructs by taking advantage of constrained random walks in the graph. This joint task-construct graph embedding, can be queried to generate task batteries targeting specific constructs, may reveal knowledge gaps in the literature, and inspire new tasks and novel hypotheses.

preprint2021arXiv

A Unified Paths Perspective for Pruning at Initialization

A number of recent approaches have been proposed for pruning neural network parameters at initialization with the goal of reducing the size and computational burden of models while minimally affecting their training dynamics and generalization performance. While each of these approaches have some amount of well-founded motivation, a rigorous analysis of the effect of these pruning methods on network training dynamics and their formal relationship to each other has thus far received little attention. Leveraging recent theoretical approximations provided by the Neural Tangent Kernel, we unify a number of popular approaches for pruning at initialization under a single path-centric framework. We introduce the Path Kernel as the data-independent factor in a decomposition of the Neural Tangent Kernel and show the global structure of the Path Kernel can be computed efficiently. This Path Kernel decomposition separates the architectural effects from the data-dependent effects within the Neural Tangent Kernel, providing a means to predict the convergence dynamics of a network from its architecture alone. We analyze the use of this structure in approximating training and generalization performance of networks in the absence of data across a number of initialization pruning approaches. Observing the relationship between input data and paths and the relationship between the Path Kernel and its natural norm, we additionally propose two augmentations of the SynFlow algorithm for pruning at initialization.

preprint2020arXiv

Appreciating the variety of goals in computational neuroscience

Within computational neuroscience, informal interactions with modelers often reveal wildly divergent goals. In this opinion piece, we explicitly address the diversity of goals that motivate and ultimately influence modeling efforts. We argue that a wide range of goals can be meaningfully taken to be of highest importance. A simple informal survey conducted on the Internet confirmed the diversity of goals in the community. However, different priorities or preferences of individual researchers can lead to divergent model evaluation criteria. We propose that many disagreements in evaluating the merit of computational research stem from differences in goals and not from the mechanics of constructing, describing, and validating models. We suggest that authors state explicitly their goals when proposing models so that others can judge the quality of the research with respect to its stated goals.