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Noah D. Stein

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Published work

8 published item(s)

preprint2026arXiv

Voice Biomarkers for Depression and Anxiety

Current approaches to detecting depression and anxiety from speech primarily rely on machine learning techniques that utilize hand-engineered paralinguistic features and related acoustic descriptors derived from time- and frequency-domain representations of speech signals. Applying deep learning methods directly to raw speech signals has the potential to produce biomarker representations with substantially greater predictive power. However, these approaches typically require large volumes of carefully annotated data to learn robust and clinically meaningful representations of the underlying biomarkers. In this paper, we describe our efforts toward developing a deep learning model trained on a large-scale proprietary dataset comprising ~65,000 utterances collected from more than 23,000 subjects representative of relevant United States demographics. We present the techniques employed and analyze their impact on model performance. Our results demonstrate that the proposed models can extract content-agnostic biomarker information, which, when combined with lexical features extracted from audio, yields improved predictive performance in production settings. Our models are evaluated on ~5000 unique subjects and achieve performance of 71% in terms of sensitivity and specificity. To foster further research in mental health assessment from speech, we release the best-performing model described in this paper on HuggingFace.

preprint2016arXiv

Nonnegative tensor factorization with frequency modulation cues for blind audio source separation

We present Vibrato Nonnegative Tensor Factorization, an algorithm for single-channel unsupervised audio source separation with an application to separating instrumental or vocal sources with nonstationary pitch from music recordings. Our approach extends Nonnegative Matrix Factorization for audio modeling by including local estimates of frequency modulation as cues in the separation. This permits the modeling and unsupervised separation of vibrato or glissando musical sources, which is not possible with the basic matrix factorization formulation. The algorithm factorizes a sparse nonnegative tensor comprising the audio spectrogram and local frequency-slope-to-frequency ratios, which are estimated at each time-frequency bin using the Distributed Derivative Method. The use of local frequency modulations as separation cues is motivated by the principle of common fate partial grouping from Auditory Scene Analysis, which hypothesizes that each latent source in a mixture is characterized perceptually by coherent frequency and amplitude modulations shared by its component partials. We derive multiplicative factor updates by Minorization-Maximization, which guarantees convergence to a local optimum by iteration. We then compare our method to the baseline on two separation tasks: one considers synthetic vibrato notes, while the other considers vibrato string instrument recordings.

preprint2014arXiv

Exchangeable Equilibria, Part I: Symmetric Bimatrix Games

We introduce the notion of exchangeable equilibria of a symmetric bimatrix game, defined as those correlated equilibria in which players' strategy choices are conditionally independently and identically distributed given some hidden variable. We give several game-theoretic interpretations and a version of the "revelation principle". Geometrically, the set of exchangeable equilibria is convex and lies between the symmetric Nash equilibria and the symmetric correlated equilibria. Exchangeable equilibria can achieve higher expected utility than symmetric Nash equilibria.

preprint2011arXiv

Structure of Extreme Correlated Equilibria: a Zero-Sum Example and its Implications

We exhibit the rich structure of the set of correlated equilibria by analyzing the simplest of polynomial games: the mixed extension of matching pennies. We show that while the correlated equilibrium set is convex and compact, the structure of its extreme points can be quite complicated. In finite games the ratio of extreme correlated to extreme Nash equilibria can be greater than exponential in the size of the strategy spaces. In polynomial games there can exist extreme correlated equilibria which are not finitely supported; we construct a large family of examples using techniques from ergodic theory. We show that in general the set of correlated equilibrium distributions of a polynomial game cannot be described by conditions on finitely many moments (means, covariances, etc.), in marked contrast to the set of Nash equilibria which is always expressible in terms of finitely many moments.

preprint2010arXiv

A partial proof of Nash's Theorem via exchangeable equilibria

This document consists of two parts: the second part was submitted earlier as a new proof of Nash's theorem, and the first part is a note explaining a problem found in that proof. We are indebted to Sergiu Hart and Eran Shmaya for their careful study which led to their simultaneous discovery of this error. So far the error has not been fixed, but many of the results and techniques of the paper remain valid, so we will continue to make it available online. Abstract for the original paper: We give a novel proof of the existence of Nash equilibria in all finite games without using fixed point theorems or path following arguments. Our approach relies on a new notion intermediate between Nash and correlated equilibria called exchangeable equilibria, which are correlated equilibria with certain symmetry and factorization properties. We prove these exist by a duality argument, using Hart and Schmeidler's proof of correlated equilibrium existence as a first step. In an appropriate limit exchangeable equilibria converge to the convex hull of Nash equilibria, proving that these exist as well. Exchangeable equilibria are defined in terms of symmetries of the game, so this method automatically proves the stronger statement that a symmetric game has a symmetric Nash equilibrium. The case without symmetries follows by a symmetrization argument.

preprint2010arXiv

Correlated Equilibria in Continuous Games: Characterization and Computation

We present several new characterizations of correlated equilibria in games with continuous utility functions. These have the advantage of being more computationally and analytically tractable than the standard definition in terms of departure functions. We use these characterizations to construct effective algorithms for approximating a single correlated equilibrium or the entire set of correlated equilibria of a game with polynomial utility functions.

preprint2007arXiv

Separable and Low-Rank Continuous Games

In this paper, we study nonzero-sum separable games, which are continuous games whose payoffs take a sum-of-products form. Included in this subclass are all finite games and polynomial games. We investigate the structure of equilibria in separable games. We show that these games admit finitely supported Nash equilibria. Motivated by the bounds on the supports of mixed equilibria in two-player finite games in terms of the ranks of the payoff matrices, we define the notion of the rank of an n-player continuous game and use this to provide bounds on the cardinality of the support of equilibrium strategies. We present a general characterization theorem that states that a continuous game has finite rank if and only if it is separable. Using our rank results, we present an efficient algorithm for computing approximate equilibria of two-player separable games with fixed strategy spaces in time polynomial in the rank of the game.