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Nicholas Teh

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Published work

6 published item(s)

preprint2026arXiv

Efficient Ensemble Selection from Binary and Pairwise Feedback

Organizations increasingly deploy multiple AI systems across task domains, but selecting a small, high-performing ensemble can require costly model calls, benchmark runs, and human evaluation. We study this selection problem as a distributional variant of multiwinner voting: tasks are drawn from an unknown domain distribution, each task induces feedback over candidate experts, and a committee's value on a task is determined by its best-performing member. We analyze both binary feedback, for tasks with correct/incorrect outcomes, and pairwise feedback, for tasks where candidate outputs are compared by preference. In the binary setting, the induced objective is coverage. We give exhaustive-elicitation baselines and matching worst-case query lower bounds, and we design a failure-conditioned greedy algorithm that preserves the standard $(1-1/e)$ guarantee while obtaining instance-dependent query savings. In the pairwise setting, we study $θ$-winning committees. We show that full-information optimization admits a PTAS but no EPTAS under Gap-ETH, and that the objective is monotone but not submodular. This motivates a weighted ordinal coverage relaxation, which is submodular and supports a failure-conditioned greedy oracle under pairwise feedback. We then convert this oracle back into $θ$-type guarantees through finite-family auditing or a minimax wrapper. We also provide small-scale LLM experiments illustrating the predicted query savings and the role of complementarity in committee selection.

preprint2026arXiv

The Price of Proportional Representation in Temporal Voting

We study proportional representation in the temporal voting model, where collective decisions are made repeatedly over time over a fixed horizon. Prior work has extensively investigated how proportional representation axioms from multiwinner voting (e.g., justified representation (JR) and its variants) can be adapted, satisfied, and verified in this setting. However, much less is understood about their interaction with social welfare. In this work, we quantify the efficiency cost of enforcing proportionality. We formalize the welfare-proportionality tension via the worst-case ratio between the maximum achievable utilitarian welfare and the maximum welfare attainable subject to a proportionality axiom. We show that imposing proportional representation in the temporal setting can incur a growing, yet sublinear, welfare loss as the number of voters or rounds increases. We further identify a clean separation among axioms: for JR, the welfare loss diminishes as the time horizon grows and vanishes asymptotically, whereas for stronger axioms this conflict persists even with many rounds. Moreover, we prove that welfare maximization under each axiom is NP-complete and APX-hard, even under static preferences and bounded-degree approvals, and provide fixed-parameter algorithms under several natural structural parameters.

preprint2022arXiv

Better Collective Decisions via Uncertainty Reduction

We consider an agent community wishing to decide on several binary issues by means of issue-by-issue majority voting. For each issue and each agent, one of the two options is better than the other. However, some of the agents may be confused about some of the issues, in which case they may vote for the option that is objectively worse for them. A benevolent external party wants to help the agents to make better decisions, i.e., select the majority-preferred option for as many issues as possible. This party may have one of the following tools at its disposal: (1) educating some of the agents, so as to enable them to vote correctly on all issues, (2) appointing a subset of highly competent agents to make decisions on behalf of the entire group, or (3) guiding the agents on how to delegate their votes to other agents, in a way that is consistent with the agents' opinions. For each of these tools, we study the complexity of the decision problem faced by this external party, obtaining both NP-hardness results and fixed-parameter tractability results.

preprint2022arXiv

Edge modes and dressing fields for the Newton-Cartan quantum Hall effect

It is now well-known that Newton-Cartan theory is the correct geometrical setting for modelling the quantum Hall effect. In addition, in recent years edge modes for the Newton-Cartan quantum Hall effect have been derived. However, the existence of these edge modes has, as of yet, been derived using only orthodox methodologies involving the breaking of gauge-invariance; it would be preferable to derive the existence of such edge modes in a gauge-invariant manner. In this article, we employ recent work by Donnelly and Freidel in order to accomplish exactly this task. Our results agree with known physics, but afford greater conceptual insight into the existence of these edge modes: in particular, they connect them to subtle aspects of Newton-Cartan geometry and pave the way for further applications of Newton-Cartan theory in condensed matter physics.

preprint2022arXiv

On Maximum Weighted Nash Welfare for Binary Valuations

We consider the problem of fairly allocating indivisible goods to agents with weights representing their entitlements. A natural rule in this setting is the maximum weighted Nash welfare (MWNW) rule, which selects an allocation maximizing the weighted product of the agents' utilities. We show that when agents have binary valuations, a specific version of MWNW is resource- and population-monotone, satisfies group-strategyproofness, and can be implemented in polynomial time.

preprint2016arXiv

Comparing Dualities and Gauge Symmetries

We discuss some aspects of the relation between dualities and gauge symmetries. Both of these ideas are of course multi-faceted, and we confine ourselves to making two points. Both points are about dualities in string theory, and both have the 'flavour' that two dual theories are 'closer in content' than you might think. For both points, we adopt a simple conception of a duality as an 'isomorphism' between theories: more precisely, as appropriate bijections between the two theories' sets of states and sets of quantities. The first point (Section 3) is that this conception of duality meshes with two dual theories being 'gauge related' in the general philosophical sense of being physically equivalent. For a string duality, such as T-duality and gauge/gravity duality, this means taking such features as the radius of a compact dimension, and the dimensionality of spacetime, to be 'gauge'. The second point (Sections 4, 5 and 6) is much more specific. We give a result about gauge/gravity duality that shows its relation to gauge symmetries (in the physical sense of symmetry transformations that are spacetime-dependent) to be subtler than you might expect. For gauge theories, you might expect that the duality bijections relate only gauge-invariant quantities and states, in the sense that gauge symmetries in one theory will be unrelated to any symmetries in the other theory. This may be so in general; and indeed, it is suggested by discussions of Polchinski and Horowitz. But we show that in gauge/gravity duality, each of a certain class of gauge symmetries in the gravity/bulk theory, viz. diffeomorphisms, is related by the duality to a position-dependent symmetry of the gauge/boundary theory.