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Mohamed Ghanem

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Machine Learning Cryptography and Security

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preprint2026arXiv

Natural Synthesis: Outperforming Reactive Synthesis Tools with Large Reasoning Models

Reactive synthesis, the problem of automatically constructing a hardware circuit from a logical specification, is a long-standing challenge in formal verification. It is elusive for two reasons: It is algorithmically hard, and writing formal specifications by hand is notoriously difficult. In this paper, we tackle both sides of the problem. For the algorithmic side, we present a neuro-symbolic approach to reactive synthesis that couples large reasoning models with model checkers to iteratively repair a synthesized Verilog implementation via sound symbolic feedback. Our approach solves more benchmarks than the best dedicated tools in the annual synthesis competition and extends to constructing parameterized systems, a problem known to be undecidable. On the specification side, we introduce an autoformalization step that shifts the specification task from temporal logic to natural language by introducing a hand-authored dataset of natural-language specifications for evaluation. We demonstrate performance comparable to that of starting from formal specifications, establishing natural synthesis as a viable end-to-end workflow.

preprint2022arXiv

Breaking the De-Pois Poisoning Defense

Attacks on machine learning models have been, since their conception, a very persistent and evasive issue resembling an endless cat-and-mouse game. One major variant of such attacks is poisoning attacks which can indirectly manipulate an ML model. It has been observed over the years that the majority of proposed effective defense models are only effective when an attacker is not aware of them being employed. In this paper, we show that the attack-agnostic De-Pois defense is hardly an exception to that rule. In fact, we demonstrate its vulnerability to the simplest White-Box and Black-Box attacks by an attacker that knows the structure of the De-Pois defense model. In essence, the De-Pois defense relies on a critic model that can be used to detect poisoned data before passing it to the target model. In our work, we break this poison-protection layer by replicating the critic model and then performing a composed gradient-sign attack on both the critic and target models simultaneously -- allowing us to bypass the critic firewall to poison the target model.