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Researcher profile

Milad Nasr

Milad Nasr contributes to research discovery and scholarly infrastructure.

ResearcherAffiliation not importedOpen to collaborate
Cryptography and SecurityMachine LearningArtificial IntelligenceInformation Retrieval

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Published work

9 published item(s)

preprint2026arXiv

ExploitGym: Can AI Agents Turn Security Vulnerabilities into Real Attacks?

AI agents are rapidly gaining capabilities that could significantly reshape cybersecurity, making rigorous evaluation urgent. A critical capability is exploitation: turning a vulnerability, which is not yet an attack, into a concrete security impact, such as unauthorized file access or code execution. Exploitation is a particularly challenging task because it requires low-level program reasoning (e.g., about memory layout), runtime adaptation, and sustained progress over long horizons. Meanwhile, it is inherently dual-use, supporting defensive workflows while lowering the barrier for offense. Despite its importance and diagnostic value, exploitation remains under-evaluated. To address this gap, we introduce ExploitGym, a large-scale, diverse, realistic benchmark on the exploitation capabilities of AI agents. Given a program input that triggers a vulnerability, ExploitGym tasks agents with progressively extending it into a working exploit. The benchmark comprises 898 instances sourced from real-world vulnerabilities across three domains, including userspace programs, Google's V8 JavaScript engine, and the Linux kernel. We vary the security protections applied to each instance, isolating their impact on agent performance. All configurations are packaged in reproducible containerized environments. Our evaluation shows that while exploitation remains challenging, frontier models can successfully exploit a non-trivial fraction of vulnerabilities. For example, the strongest configurations are Anthropic's latest model Claude Mythos Preview and OpenAI's GPT-5.5, which produce working exploits for 157 and 120 instances, respectively. Notably, even with widely used defenses enabled, models retain non-trivial success rates. These results establish ExploitGym as an effective testbed for exploitation and highlight the growing cybersecurity risks posed by increasingly capable AI agents.

0 citations0 reviewsNo code linkedOpen access
preprint2026arXiv

Exploring the limits of strong membership inference attacks on large language models

State-of-the-art membership inference attacks (MIAs) typically require training many reference models, making it difficult to scale these attacks to large pre-trained language models (LLMs). As a result, prior research has either relied on weaker attacks that avoid training references (e.g., fine-tuning attacks), or on stronger attacks applied to small models and datasets. However, weaker attacks have been shown to be brittle and insights from strong attacks in simplified settings do not translate to today&#39;s LLMs. These challenges prompt an important question: are the limitations observed in prior work due to attack design choices, or are MIAs fundamentally ineffective on LLMs? We address this question by scaling LiRA--one of the strongest MIAs--to GPT-2 architectures ranging from 10M to 1B parameters, training references on over 20B tokens from the C4 dataset. Our results advance the understanding of MIAs on LLMs in four key ways. While (1) strong MIAs can succeed on pre-trained LLMs, (2) their effectiveness, remains limited (e.g., AUC<0.7) in practical settings. (3) Even when strong MIAs achieve better-than-random AUC, aggregate metrics can conceal substantial per-sample MIA decision instability: due to training randomness, many decisions are so unstable that they are statistically indistinguishable from a coin flip. Finally, (4) the relationship between MIA success and related LLM privacy metrics is not as straightforward as prior work has suggested.

0 citations0 reviewsNo code linkedOpen access
preprint2022arXiv

FEL: High Capacity Learning for Recommendation and Ranking via Federated Ensemble Learning

Federated learning (FL) has emerged as an effective approach to address consumer privacy needs. FL has been successfully applied to certain machine learning tasks, such as training smart keyboard models and keyword spotting. Despite FL&#39;s initial success, many important deep learning use cases, such as ranking and recommendation tasks, have been limited from on-device learning. One of the key challenges faced by practical FL adoption for DL-based ranking and recommendation is the prohibitive resource requirements that cannot be satisfied by modern mobile systems. We propose Federated Ensemble Learning (FEL) as a solution to tackle the large memory requirement of deep learning ranking and recommendation tasks. FEL enables large-scale ranking and recommendation model training on-device by simultaneously training multiple model versions on disjoint clusters of client devices. FEL integrates the trained sub-models via an over-arch layer into an ensemble model that is hosted on the server. Our experiments demonstrate that FEL leads to 0.43-2.31% model quality improvement over traditional on-device federated learning - a significant improvement for ranking and recommendation system use cases.

0 citations0 reviewsNo code linkedOpen access
preprint2022arXiv

Membership Inference Attacks From First Principles

A membership inference attack allows an adversary to query a trained machine learning model to predict whether or not a particular example was contained in the model&#39;s training dataset. These attacks are currently evaluated using average-case &#34;accuracy&#34; metrics that fail to characterize whether the attack can confidently identify any members of the training set. We argue that attacks should instead be evaluated by computing their true-positive rate at low (e.g., <0.1%) false-positive rates, and find most prior attacks perform poorly when evaluated in this way. To address this we develop a Likelihood Ratio Attack (LiRA) that carefully combines multiple ideas from the literature. Our attack is 10x more powerful at low false-positive rates, and also strictly dominates prior attacks on existing metrics.

0 citations0 reviewsNo code linkedOpen access
preprint2021arXiv

Adversary Instantiation: Lower Bounds for Differentially Private Machine Learning

Differentially private (DP) machine learning allows us to train models on private data while limiting data leakage. DP formalizes this data leakage through a cryptographic game, where an adversary must predict if a model was trained on a dataset D, or a dataset D&#39; that differs in just one example.If observing the training algorithm does not meaningfully increase the adversary&#39;s odds of successfully guessing which dataset the model was trained on, then the algorithm is said to be differentially private. Hence, the purpose of privacy analysis is to upper bound the probability that any adversary could successfully guess which dataset the model was trained on.In our paper, we instantiate this hypothetical adversary in order to establish lower bounds on the probability that this distinguishing game can be won. We use this adversary to evaluate the importance of the adversary capabilities allowed in the privacy analysis of DP training algorithms.For DP-SGD, the most common method for training neural networks with differential privacy, our lower bounds are tight and match the theoretical upper bound. This implies that in order to prove better upper bounds, it will be necessary to make use of additional assumptions. Fortunately, we find that our attacks are significantly weaker when additional (realistic)restrictions are put in place on the adversary&#39;s capabilities.Thus, in the practical setting common to many real-world deployments, there is a gap between our lower bounds and the upper bounds provided by the analysis: differential privacy is conservative and adversaries may not be able to leak as much information as suggested by the theoretical bound.

0 citations0 reviewsNo code linkedOpen access
preprint2021arXiv

Robust Adversarial Attacks Against DNN-Based Wireless Communication Systems

Deep Neural Networks (DNNs) have become prevalent in wireless communication systems due to their promising performance. However, similar to other DNN-based applications, they are vulnerable to adversarial examples. In this work, we propose an input-agnostic, undetectable, and robust adversarial attack against DNN-based wireless communication systems in both white-box and black-box scenarios. We design tailored Universal Adversarial Perturbations (UAPs) to perform the attack. We also use a Generative Adversarial Network (GAN) to enforce an undetectability constraint for our attack. Furthermore, we investigate the robustness of our attack against countermeasures. We show that in the presence of defense mechanisms deployed by the communicating parties, our attack performs significantly better compared to existing attacks against DNN-based wireless systems. In particular, the results demonstrate that even when employing well-considered defenses, DNN-based wireless communications are vulnerable to adversarial attacks.

0 citations0 reviewsNo code linkedOpen access
preprint2020arXiv

Blind Adversarial Network Perturbations

Deep Neural Networks (DNNs) are commonly used for various traffic analysis problems, such as website fingerprinting and flow correlation, as they outperform traditional (e.g., statistical) techniques by large margins. However, deep neural networks are known to be vulnerable to adversarial examples: adversarial inputs to the model that get labeled incorrectly by the model due to small adversarial perturbations. In this paper, for the first time, we show that an adversary can defeat DNN-based traffic analysis techniques by applying \emph{adversarial perturbations} on the patterns of \emph{live} network traffic.

0 citations0 reviewsNo code linkedOpen access
preprint2020arXiv

Comprehensive Privacy Analysis of Deep Learning: Passive and Active White-box Inference Attacks against Centralized and Federated Learning

Deep neural networks are susceptible to various inference attacks as they remember information about their training data. We design white-box inference attacks to perform a comprehensive privacy analysis of deep learning models. We measure the privacy leakage through parameters of fully trained models as well as the parameter updates of models during training. We design inference algorithms for both centralized and federated learning, with respect to passive and active inference attackers, and assuming different adversary prior knowledge. We evaluate our novel white-box membership inference attacks against deep learning algorithms to trace their training data records. We show that a straightforward extension of the known black-box attacks to the white-box setting (through analyzing the outputs of activation functions) is ineffective. We therefore design new algorithms tailored to the white-box setting by exploiting the privacy vulnerabilities of the stochastic gradient descent algorithm, which is the algorithm used to train deep neural networks. We investigate the reasons why deep learning models may leak information about their training data. We then show that even well-generalized models are significantly susceptible to white-box membership inference attacks, by analyzing state-of-the-art pre-trained and publicly available models for the CIFAR dataset. We also show how adversarial participants, in the federated learning setting, can successfully run active membership inference attacks against other participants, even when the global model achieves high prediction accuracies.

0 citations0 reviewsNo code linkedOpen access
preprint2020arXiv

Improving Deep Learning with Differential Privacy using Gradient Encoding and Denoising

Deep learning models leak significant amounts of information about their training datasets. Previous work has investigated training models with differential privacy (DP) guarantees through adding DP noise to the gradients. However, such solutions (specifically, DPSGD), result in large degradations in the accuracy of the trained models. In this paper, we aim at training deep learning models with DP guarantees while preserving model accuracy much better than previous works. Our key technique is to encode gradients to map them to a smaller vector space, therefore enabling us to obtain DP guarantees for different noise distributions. This allows us to investigate and choose noise distributions that best preserve model accuracy for a target privacy budget. We also take advantage of the post-processing property of differential privacy by introducing the idea of denoising, which further improves the utility of the trained models without degrading their DP guarantees. We show that our mechanism outperforms the state-of-the-art DPSGD; for instance, for the same model accuracy of $96.1\%$ on MNIST, our technique results in a privacy bound of $ε=3.2$ compared to $ε=6$ of DPSGD, which is a significant improvement.

0 citations0 reviewsNo code linkedOpen access