Researcher profile

Michael-Andrei Panaitescu-Liess

Michael-Andrei Panaitescu-Liess contributes to research discovery and scholarly infrastructure.

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Published work

2 published item(s)

preprint2026arXiv

Compositional Adversarial Training for Robust Visual Watermarking

Robust watermarking is typically trained with random post-processing augmentation, but random sampling under-covers the combinatorial space of realistic attack pipelines and rarely encounters the rare compositions that actually break detection. This leads to unstable training and poor sample efficiency. We instead formulate watermark robustness as a min-max problem over a structured space of compositional transformations. We propose Compositional Adversarial Training (CAT), a plug-in framework that learns a sequential differentiable adversary that observes the current watermarked image and selects an attack family at each step to maximally disrupt message recovery. CAT combines a straight-through Gumbel-Softmax attack selection with entropy regularization, allowing the backward pass to be end-to-end differentiable and aggregate gradient information across attack families, yielding faster, smoother convergence without collapsing to a single attack mode. We evaluate CAT on post-generation watermarks VideoSeal 0.0, VideoSeal 1.0, and PixelSeal and in-generation WMAR under both single-step and two-step attack suites, on in-distribution and multiple out-of-distribution image and video benchmarks. CAT consistently outperforms random-augmentation baselines trained with the same augmentation budget, with the largest gains on hard composed attacks and OOD evaluations; improving overall watermark capacity by up to $63.5\%$ in the single-step attack setting and $13.0\%$ in the compositional setting. In the autoregressive setting, CAT improves the TPR@FPR$=1\%$ by $12\%$ on average on difficult geometric transformations. These results show that robust visual watermarking benefits from training against adaptive compositional adversaries rather than independent random corruptions.

preprint2025arXiv

RAGPart & RAGMask: Retrieval-Stage Defenses Against Corpus Poisoning in Retrieval-Augmented Generation

Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) has emerged as a promising paradigm to enhance large language models (LLMs) with external knowledge, reducing hallucinations and compensating for outdated information. However, recent studies have exposed a critical vulnerability in RAG pipelines corpus poisoning where adversaries inject malicious documents into the retrieval corpus to manipulate model outputs. In this work, we propose two complementary retrieval-stage defenses: RAGPart and RAGMask. Our defenses operate directly on the retriever, making them computationally lightweight and requiring no modification to the generation model. RAGPart leverages the inherent training dynamics of dense retrievers, exploiting document partitioning to mitigate the effect of poisoned points. In contrast, RAGMask identifies suspicious tokens based on significant similarity shifts under targeted token masking. Across two benchmarks, four poisoning strategies, and four state-of-the-art retrievers, our defenses consistently reduce attack success rates while preserving utility under benign conditions. We further introduce an interpretable attack to stress-test our defenses. Our findings highlight the potential and limitations of retrieval-stage defenses, providing practical insights for robust RAG deployments.