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Source author record

Manish Raghavan

Manish Raghavan appears in the imported research catalog. Authorship, coauthor and topic links are available while profile ownership is still unclaimed.

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cs.CYMachine LearningComputer Science and Game TheoryMethodologyMultiagent Systemsphysics.soc-phSocial and Information Networks

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Published work

7 published item(s)

preprint2026arXiv

When to Ask a Question: Understanding Communication Strategies in Generative AI Tools

Generative AI models differ from traditional machine learning tools in that they allow users to provide as much or as little information as they choose in their inputs. This flexibility often leads users to omit certain details, relying on the models to infer and fill in under-specified information based on distributional knowledge of user preferences. Such inferences may privilege majority viewpoints and disadvantage users with atypical preferences, raising concerns about fairness. Unlike more traditional recommender systems, LLMs can explicitly solicit more information from users through natural language. However, while directly eliciting user preferences could increase personalization and mitigate inequality, excessive querying places a burden on users who value efficiency. We develop a stylized model of user-LLM interaction and develop an objective that captures tradeoff between user burden and preference representation. Building on the observation that individual preferences are often correlated, we analyze how AI systems should balance inference and elicitation, characterizing the optimal amount of information to solicit before content generation. Ultimately, we show that information elicitation can mitigate the systematic biases of preference inference, enabling the design of generative tools that better incorporate diverse user perspectives while maintaining efficiency. We complement this theoretical analysis with an empirical evaluation illustrating the model's predictions and exploring their practical implications.

0 citations0 reviewsNo code linkedOpen access
preprint2025arXiv

Statistical Guarantees in the Search for Less Discriminatory Algorithms

Recent scholarship has argued that firms building data-driven decision systems in high-stakes domains like employment, credit, and housing should search for "less discriminatory algorithms" (LDAs) (Black et al., 2024). That is, for a given decision problem, firms considering deploying a model should make a good-faith effort to find equally performant models with lower disparate impact across social groups. Evidence from the literature on model multiplicity shows that randomness in training pipelines can lead to multiple models with the same performance, but meaningful variations in disparate impact. This suggests that developers can find LDAs simply by randomly retraining models. Firms cannot continue retraining forever, though, which raises the question: What constitutes a good-faith effort? In this paper, we formalize LDA search via model multiplicity as an optimal stopping problem, where a model developer with limited information wants to produce strong evidence that they have sufficiently explored the space of models. Our primary contribution is an adaptive stopping algorithm that yields a high-probability upper bound on the gains achievable from a continued search, allowing the developer to certify (e.g., to a court) that their search was sufficient. We provide a framework under which developers can impose stronger assumptions about the distribution of models, yielding correspondingly stronger bounds. We validate the method on real-world credit, employment and housing datasets.

0 citations0 reviewsNo code linkedOpen access
preprint2021arXiv

Algorithmic Monoculture and Social Welfare

As algorithms are increasingly applied to screen applicants for high-stakes decisions in employment, lending, and other domains, concerns have been raised about the effects of algorithmic monoculture, in which many decision-makers all rely on the same algorithm. This concern invokes analogies to agriculture, where a monocultural system runs the risk of severe harm from unexpected shocks. Here we show that the dangers of algorithmic monoculture run much deeper, in that monocultural convergence on a single algorithm by a group of decision-making agents, even when the algorithm is more accurate for any one agent in isolation, can reduce the overall quality of the decisions being made by the full collection of agents. Unexpected shocks are therefore not needed to expose the risks of monoculture; it can hurt accuracy even under "normal" operations, and even for algorithms that are more accurate when used by only a single decision-maker. Our results rely on minimal assumptions, and involve the development of a probabilistic framework for analyzing systems that use multiple noisy estimates of a set of alternatives.

0 citations0 reviewsNo code linkedOpen access
preprint2021arXiv

Bridging Machine Learning and Mechanism Design towards Algorithmic Fairness

Decision-making systems increasingly orchestrate our world: how to intervene on the algorithmic components to build fair and equitable systems is therefore a question of utmost importance; one that is substantially complicated by the context-dependent nature of fairness and discrimination. Modern decision-making systems that involve allocating resources or information to people (e.g., school choice, advertising) incorporate machine-learned predictions in their pipelines, raising concerns about potential strategic behavior or constrained allocation, concerns usually tackled in the context of mechanism design. Although both machine learning and mechanism design have developed frameworks for addressing issues of fairness and equity, in some complex decision-making systems, neither framework is individually sufficient. In this paper, we develop the position that building fair decision-making systems requires overcoming these limitations which, we argue, are inherent to each field. Our ultimate objective is to build an encompassing framework that cohesively bridges the individual frameworks of mechanism design and machine learning. We begin to lay the ground work towards this goal by comparing the perspective each discipline takes on fair decision-making, teasing out the lessons each field has taught and can teach the other, and highlighting application domains that require a strong collaboration between these disciplines.

0 citations0 reviewsNo code linkedOpen access
preprint2020arXiv

Roles for Computing in Social Change

A recent normative turn in computer science has brought concerns about fairness, bias, and accountability to the core of the field. Yet recent scholarship has warned that much of this technical work treats problematic features of the status quo as fixed, and fails to address deeper patterns of injustice and inequality. While acknowledging these critiques, we posit that computational research has valuable roles to play in addressing social problems -- roles whose value can be recognized even from a perspective that aspires toward fundamental social change. In this paper, we articulate four such roles, through an analysis that considers the opportunities as well as the significant risks inherent in such work. Computing research can serve as a diagnostic, helping us to understand and measure social problems with precision and clarity. As a formalizer, computing shapes how social problems are explicitly defined --- changing how those problems, and possible responses to them, are understood. Computing serves as rebuttal when it illuminates the boundaries of what is possible through technical means. And computing acts as synecdoche when it makes long-standing social problems newly salient in the public eye. We offer these paths forward as modalities that leverage the particular strengths of computational work in the service of social change, without overclaiming computing's capacity to solve social problems on its own.

0 citations0 reviewsNo code linkedOpen access
preprint2016arXiv

Inherent Trade-Offs in the Fair Determination of Risk Scores

Recent discussion in the public sphere about algorithmic classification has involved tension between competing notions of what it means for a probabilistic classification to be fair to different groups. We formalize three fairness conditions that lie at the heart of these debates, and we prove that except in highly constrained special cases, there is no method that can satisfy these three conditions simultaneously. Moreover, even satisfying all three conditions approximately requires that the data lie in an approximate version of one of the constrained special cases identified by our theorem. These results suggest some of the ways in which key notions of fairness are incompatible with each other, and hence provide a framework for thinking about the trade-offs between them.

0 citations0 reviewsNo code linkedOpen access
preprint2016arXiv

Planning Problems for Sophisticated Agents with Present Bias

Present bias, the tendency to weigh costs and benefits incurred in the present too heavily, is one of the most widespread human behavioral biases. It has also been the subject of extensive study in the behavioral economics literature. While the simplest models assume that the agents are naive, reasoning about the future without taking their bias into account, there is considerable evidence that people often behave in ways that are sophisticated with respect to present bias, making plans based on the belief that they will be present-biased in the future. For example, committing to a course of action to reduce future opportunities for procrastination or overconsumption are instances of sophisticated behavior in everyday life. Models of sophisticated behavior have lacked an underlying formalism that allows one to reason over the full space of multi-step tasks that a sophisticated agent might face. This has made it correspondingly difficult to make comparative or worst-case statements about the performance of sophisticated agents in arbitrary scenarios. In this paper, we incorporate the notion of sophistication into a graph-theoretic model that we used in recent work for modeling naive agents. This new synthesis of two formalisms - sophistication and graph-theoretic planning - uncovers a rich structure that wasn't apparent in the earlier behavioral economics work on this problem. In particular, our graph-theoretic model makes two kinds of new results possible. First, we give tight worst-case bounds on the performance of sophisticated agents in arbitrary multi-step tasks relative to the optimal plan. Second, the flexibility of our formalism makes it possible to identify new phenomena that had not been seen in prior literature: these include a surprising non-monotonic property in the use of rewards to motivate sophisticated agents and a framework for reasoning about commitment devices.

0 citations0 reviewsNo code linkedOpen access